Opinion - The Korea Times

Price of confrontation

By Tong Kim It is the Christmas holiday season and time to wish for ``peace on earth, good will toward men.” But, the leaders of both Koreas are shunning this holy message for human aspiration. The South vows a ``merciless counterattack” against the North if its territory is attacked again. The atheistic North threatens to wage ``a holy war” with its nuclear capability against its southern neighbor. Apart from rhetoric, it was a relief that the North did not attack the South again in reaction to a live-fire drill on Yeonpyeong Island by the South Korean forces on Dec. 20. The North only responded by a statement that it was not worth it to “retaliate against every despicable military provocation,” yet threatening a second and third strike, “knowing no limit to blow up” the bases of the U.S. and the South Korean warmongers.” South Korea carried out even a larger-scale joint live strike exercise at Pocheon not far from the DMZ on Dec. 23, which prompted the North Korean defense minister, Kim Young-chun, to warn of a nuclear all-out war. Why did the North shift to a war of r

Dec 26, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

A question of war and peace

By Tong Kim The Korean Peninsula has been thrown into perhaps the worst security crisis in decades that may even lead to an unwanted limited war, of which the scope and duration are unpredictable. The belligerent rhetoric and more possible provocations from the North and the increasing military measures with a matching level of strong rhetoric by the South remind us of an often-quoted comparison of two trains rushing toward each other on a collision course. Chinese President Hu Jintao told President Barack Obama in a phone call that tensions on the Korean Peninsula could get out of control, if not handled properly. If China and the United States fail to play their responsible roles to rein in their allies in the North and South to maintain the stability on the peninsula, it seems at least for now that the Koreans on both sides are ready to go to war to fight each other again. The stated purpose of bolstering South Korea’s combat readiness in resolve and capability is to deter further aggression from North Korea, but also to counterattack if the deterrence fails. The South h

Dec 12, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Challenges from Yeonpyeong

By Tong Kim North Korea’s indiscriminate artillery attack of Yeonpyong Island, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians while injuring 20 more people, was an intolerable and inexcusable provocation that deserves strong condemnation. An exchange of artillery shelling between the North Korean MRLs (Multiple Rocket Launching Systems) with support of coastal howitzers and the ROK marines’ self-propelled artillery guns was the first of its kind since the Armistice Agreement of 1953, which ended the shooting in the war but maintained a technical state of war on the Korean Peninsula. The North’s surprise attack triggered angry public resentment against the North Korean leadership, without whose order the attack would not have been launched. At the same time, the public was disappointed at the South Korean military’s poor state of combat readiness ― including the failure to anticipate such an attack, despite some physical evidence of the North Korean military maneuvers beforehand and a direct warning from the North against the live firings during the South Korea ``Hoguk” (Def

Nov 28, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

G20, FTA and N. Korea

By Tong Kim The G20 in Seoul heralded a symbolic rise in South Korea’s global leadership. South Korea implemented an impressive, near perfect plan for the conference. The host country’s emphasis was to ensure an efficient conference organization, providing watertight security against any possible terrorist attacks, sabotage or disruptions, and assisting seamless facilitation of the agenda. For months before the actual event took place, the banners saying, ``We pray for a successful hosting of the G20 conference” were hung on many tall buildings in Seoul. It was not clear what ``a successful hosting” was supposed to mean but it certainly inferred a trouble-free conference for two days without terrorist attempts, without North Korean provocations, and without unpredicted accidents. The prayer was answered; there were no major disruptions, and no traffic havoc due to the closed streets around the conference sites. On substantive matters, the real issues were how to end the ``currency war” or the competitive devaluations and to fix disproportionate trade imbalances ― between Ch

Nov 14, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

ROKs balancing act

By Tong Kim Largely attributable to the undisputable rise of China, the current political and military map of Northeast Asia defines two groups of nations in confrontation that may signal the beginning of an unwanted, new Cold War ― with the United States, Japan and South Korea on one side and China, North Korea and Russia on the other. However, unlike under the old Cold War, the rule of conflict is not collective action of one camp against the other. Under the newly evolving international environment, each actor is seeking its own interest that may be in conflict with the common interest of the group to which it is supposed to belong. Each actor has stakes in the strengthening of cooperation within its respective group, but it also has bilateral issues to address directly with a member of the other group. Since the Cheonan incident South Korea has confirmed its perspective that efforts to resolve the North Korean issues ― such as denuclearization, implementation of U.N. sanctions, changing the North for opening and reform, ending the dynastic succession, multilateral prep

Oct 31, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Intransigence in N. Korea policy

By Tong Kim In the midst of a significantly shifting security environment in Northeast Asia ― with the confirmation of Kim Jong-un as the next leader of North Korea, China’s remarkable rise in power, assertiveness and influence, and the cementing of a ``lips and teeth” relationship between China and the DPRK, the United States needs to reassert its leadership with a new strategy to protect its interest in the Korean peninsula and the region. The U.S. seems to have abandoned its leadership role that its friends respected and its foes recognized in the past. While taking no clear position on the North’s succession issue, Washington just wants to wait and see how the process would unfold or what impact the process might have on its relations with the South and the United States. On the prospect of denuclearization, Washington still sticks to its passive strategy of waiting for Pyongyang to show a genuine willingness to comply with its commitment to the 2005 and 2007 agreements. Recently, Washington added a new condition for reengaging Pyongyang: improved inter-Korean relations. T

Oct 17, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Power transfer in N. Korea

By Tong Kim The anointment of Kim Jong-un as the next leader of North Korea has finally come true after a long period of speculation. It was not a surprise. I had predicted in an interview with a South Korean weekly magazine five years ago that Kim Jong-il would be succeed by one of his sons, while most observers were inclined to believe that a collective military leadership structure would more likely rule the North. The basis for my prediction was simple: North Korea is a ``Confucian nationalist autocratic dynasty.” Recently many observers again speculated that Jang Song-thaek, the husband of Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s sister, who was also appointed along with Kim Jong-un as a four-star general last week, would become a regent or a de facto or even a de jure ruler of North Korea, even if Jong-un becomes a nominal leader. There were reports that Kim Kyong-hui might be the next in line for the leadership. They were all wrong. Many speculators are now saying that a second father-to-son succession process has just begun and its success is not certain. They are wrong: Kim Jong-u

Oct 3, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Same problems, shifting views

By Tong Kim Into the second half of his presidency, Lee Myung-bak is still struggling with very much the same agenda that he had undertaken upon inauguration. His agenda included among others an advanced economy, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, a government compassionate to the working and low-income classes, and a reformed education system that would free children from the heavy burden of coercive preparations for going to college. He set out as a pragmatic growth president who would raise South Korea to the next level of advancement ― or he would at least lay the foundation for Korea to become the seventh largest economy in the world. Now MB tries to find a balance between growth and polarization. It is true that his first year was tainted by the unfortunate ``beef candlelight vigils” that almost paralyzed the functioning of the government. Some blame the unprecedented global financial trouble for the frustration of MB’s vision. Yet, he is given credit for a fast recovery from the worldwide financial crisis. The fact that South Korea will host the G20 conference in Nov

Sep 19, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Continuing saga of N. Korea

By Tong Kim North Korea last week again dominated news headlines with former President Jimmy Carter’s second visit to Pyongyang and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s sixth visit to China. Beijing says it has a fresh proposal to restart nuclear talks. Washington announced new sanctions specifically targeting the North Korean leadership. Carter did not meet with Kim, who left for China on more important business shortly after Carter’s arrival. Carter’s disappointment ended the effectiveness of former presidents’ efforts to contribute to denuclearization. It also reflects a diminishing return of the efficacy of the track II diplomacy by other prominent Americans. Before Carter went to the North, he had publically called for Washington and Seoul to take the initiative to resume talks with Pyongyang. In June 1994, Carter was able to help divert the first nuclear crisis to direct negotiations between North Korea and the United States that led to a successful conclusion of the Agreed Framework, which had frozen the North Korean nuclear program for eight years. In 1994, Carter wa

Sep 5, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Is peaceful unification possible?

By Tong Kim Aug. 15 last week marked the 65th anniversary of the national division of Korea that the Korean people did not want, following the liberation from Japanese colonial rule at the end of World War II. At this point in history, it would be futile to revisit the origin of the division or to blame those foreign powers responsible. However, it is still useful to discuss whether peaceful unification is achievable or even desirable. The regimes of the North and South have since their establishment regarded reunification as the highest policy goal. The North Korean communists unsuccessfully tried to unify the Korean Peninsula by a brutal all-out attack 60 years ago. In theory, unification by force may still be possible, but another war is unthinkable to any sane mind. To the North Korean leaders, peaceful unification used to mean a non-violent Communist takeover of the South. Now they know it would be impossible to subvert its free democratic neighbor, which has become the world’s 15th most thriving economy. With a per-capita income of $20,000 ― as compared to $1,000 fo

Aug 22, 2010By Tong Kim

Tong Kim

Read more

Price of confrontation

A question of war and peace

Challenges from Yeonpyeong

G20, FTA and N. Korea

ROKs balancing act

Intransigence in N. Korea policy

Power transfer in N. Korea

Same problems, shifting views

Continuing saga of N. Korea

Is peaceful unification possible?

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