How Iran’s strikes on US bases could offer preview for Asia-Pacific

Smoke rises above Riyadh, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 5. Reuters-Yonhap
Tehran’s retaliation against Washington’s Gulf allies offers lessons for a potential Taiwan conflict, analysts say
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on U.S. military assets across the Middle East serve as a preview of how Beijing might target American bases in Asian countries in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict, according to analysts.
In retaliation for large-scale air attacks by the U.S. and Israel since February 28, Iran has launched missiles and drones at Gulf states that host U.S. military bases and facilities, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.
Those targets included Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, which serves as the regional headquarters of the United States Central Command.
At least 11 American military bases or installations across the Middle East have been damaged, around half of those in the region, according to a March 11 report by The New York Times, citing anonymous U.S. officials.
Analysts said the retaliatory strikes could serve as a template for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as Beijing might consider actions against U.S. allies hosting American military assets such as Japan, the Philippines and South Korea.
“These moves by Iran against nearby U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf region do absolutely highlight the possibility that in a Taiwan scenario that China would likely target U.S. bases throughout the Asia-Pacific region,” said Lyle Goldstein, a senior fellow at Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.
“Indeed, it has long been apparent that U.S. forces operating out of Japan, the Philippines and South Korea could be vulnerable to major Chinese attacks,” he said.
In the Indo-Pacific, there are 24 permanent American bases and 20 other military sites where the U.S. Department of Defence has access, according to a 2024 report by the Congressional Research Service.
Key bases include Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan — the largest U.S. airbase in East Asia — as well as Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 64km (40 miles) south of Seoul.
In 2023, the Philippines expanded the number of U.S.-accessible military sites in the country to nine. This included four new sites, three of which are on the island of Luzon, not far from Taiwan.
A member of the civil defence makes his way through debris at the site of overnight Israeli airstrikes in the southern suburbs of Beirut, March 6. AFP-Yonhap
Lyle Morris, a senior fellow for foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, said Beijing could cause more damage to US installations in the region compared with Iran.
“If anything, China would be able to inflict much greater damage and with more precision on U.S. bases in Asia than Iran has up to this point in the Middle East,” he said.
“The takeaway is that if the U.S. sees vulnerabilities to Iranian missile strikes to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it would be a much worse problem set for the U.S. when facing Chinese missile threats in Asia.”
Goldstein agreed. He said China’s hypothetical military strikes across a range of capabilities, including missiles and drone attacks, would be both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to those being carried out by Iran.
“China has the requisite capabilities to severely damage U.S. bases in the region — even in the initial hours of a military conflict, if Beijing chooses to do so,” he said.
However, Beijing’s approach towards American military bases in the region might vary depending on the degree of U.S. and allied involvement in a Taiwan crisis, observers said.
“If the U.S. decides not to become involved in a cross-strait conflict, I believe that China would act with reciprocal restraint and avoid hitting U.S. bases in the wider region,” Goldstein said.
Goldstein added that, compared with its partners in the Gulf, Washington’s Asian allies included more powerful countries such as Japan and South Korea, whose views carried significantly more weight in Washington’s strategic calculations.
“On the one hand, they bring more firepower and defensive capability to any fight,” he said, noting this also meant they were major targets for the People’s Liberation Army.
The Philippines, by contrast, was more comparable to Washington’s Gulf allies, offering basing access while contributing less military, economic and diplomatic leverage in a conflict, he added.
Read the article at SCMP.