Pragmatism on trial: Lee’s cross-party appointments meet political reality
Yoo Seong-min, right, then presidential candidate of the Bareun Party, greets Lee Jae Myung, then presidential candidate of the Democratic Party of Korea, during a meeting of nationwide union leaders organized by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions at Jamsil Student Gymnasium in Seoul, March 22, 2017. Newsis
Why personnel choices quickly turn into political flashpoints
President Lee Jae Myung’s reported offer of the prime ministership to former conservative lawmaker Yoo Seong-min has reignited debate over the new administration’s approach to cross-party appointments, raising questions about whether pragmatism can withstand Korea’s deeply polarized political environment.
The disclosure followed Lee’s earlier decision to nominate Lee Hye-hoon, a former opposition People Power Party (PPP) lawmaker, as the first minister of the newly established Ministry of Planning and Budget. The two cases have come to define Lee’s stated intention to draw talent from across party lines — a governing philosophy that is often praised in principle, but rarely rewarded in practice.
Despite the presidential office’s emphasis on unity and pragmatism, the political response was immediate and unforgiving. Efforts to cross partisan boundaries were quickly recast as attempts to weaken the opposition, highlighting how narrow the space for nontraditional appointments remains.
Kim Dae-jung, right, then leader of the National Congress for New Politics, and Kim Jong-pil, left, then leader of the United Liberal Democrats, attend an event at Kim Jong-pil’s residence, Oct. 27, 1997, after finalizing negotiations to unify their presidential candidacies. Korea Times file
Cross-party moves
Yoo said that Lee’s camp had approached him with an offer to serve as prime minister, but said he rejected it without hesitation, although the presidential office denied making such an offer.
Speaking in a recent radio interview, Yoo said the gap between his policy views and those of the administration was simply too wide to bridge.
“How can you work together when your thinking is fundamentally different?” Yoo said. “I did not see the position as something worth pursuing at the cost of abandoning my principles.”
According to Yoo, the outreach began before the presidential election last June, first through figures from the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), to which the president belongs, and later through direct attempts at contact. Yoo said he chose not to respond, pointing to long-standing disagreements over key economic policies, including basic income proposals, local currency programs and the potential use of the national pension fund to stabilize the foreign exchange market.
Yoo also criticized the president’s decision to nominate Lee Hye-hoon, dismissing it as a political maneuver rather than a gesture of cooperation. “This is not about integration,” he said, describing the move as “taking one person away” from the opposition camp.
The controversy surrounding Lee Hye-hoon’s nomination unfolded along similar lines. The administration defended the decision by pointing to her experience in economic and fiscal policy, saying the choice was intended to bolster policy expertise rather than make a political statement.
The opposition responded sharply. The PPP accused the government of deliberately targeting its members and moved to expel the nominee from the party. Even within the ruling party camp, questions were raised over whether her past political positions could align with the administration’s policy direction.
Together, these two cases demonstrate how personnel decisions are seen in Korean politics — appointments based on expertise or administrative need quickly become embroiled in partisan disputes, where political intent is scrutinized more closely than policy credentials.
Then-U.S. President Barack Obama, center, gestures as he speaks in the East Room of the White House in Washington, Jan. 7, 2013, to announce that he is nominating Chuck Hagel, left, as his new defense secretary. AP-Yonhap
Lessons from past and abroad
There have been similar cases or attempts of cross-party appointments in Korean politics.
Under the late former liberal President Kim Dae-jung, power-sharing was rooted in the alliance formed during the 1997 presidential election. Conservative politicians Kim Jong-pil and Park Tae-joon both served as prime minister for Kim Dae-jung under arrangements that had been explicitly negotiated during the election campaign. Consequently, these appointments were based on political agreements made prior to the election rather than gestures of unity made afterward.
Later in Kim’s presidency, Lee Han-dong, a senior conservative figure, was appointed prime minister after the alliance collapsed. The appointment was framed at the time as a step toward political stability, but it was largely seen as a short-term fix and failed to produce lasting cooperation across party lines.
A comparable pattern emerged during the final months of the conservative Park Geun-hye administration. With mass protests growing over her corruption scandal, Park nominated former liberal politician Kim Byung-joon as prime minister in a bid to contain the political fallout.
However, the nomination failed to gain parliamentary approval, reflecting the limited space for compromise once the administration’s legitimacy was in question.
Similar arguments have been often made in other countries, including the United States.
In 2013, then-Democrat President Barack Obama tapped Republican Chuck Hagel as defense secretary, a choice that quickly ran into resistance from Capitol Hill.
Opposition came not only from Democrats, but also from within Hagel’s own party. The confirmation process dragged on amid procedural disputes and ideological criticism. The Senate approved the nomination after weeks of political wrangling.
Before Hagel, in 2009 when he first took office, Obama chose to retain Robert Gates, a holdover from the George W. Bush administration, as defense secretary. This decision emphasized continuity during the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it was accompanied by a clear division of authority, allowing it to proceed with relatively little friction.
These cases suggest that pragmatic appointments do not eliminate political conflict. Instead, they often shift the burden onto the president, leaving questions about what exactly is expected of a president.
“There is value in President Lee’s attempt to pursue a broad, national-level political vision by reaching beyond ideological camps, as former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun once did,” said Lee Jun-han, a professor of political science at Incheon National University.
“However, at a time when the political process is still ongoing to hold those who opposed the impeachment [of former President Yoon Suk Yeol over his martial law fiasco] accountable, bringing such figures into government — or making premature moves toward political unity — could end up becoming a burden on the president himself,” the professor said, referring to Lee Hye-hoon's earlier stance to oppose Yoon's impeachment.
Park Chang-hwan, a political commentator and professor at Jangan University, argues that the backlash reflects structural limits inherent in Korea’s presidential system.
“In a presidential system, responsibility ultimately rests with the president,” Park said “There can be debate over whether appointing figures only from one’s own camp is desirable, but in reality, it is often unavoidable.”
Park said the deeper problem lies in the current political climate. “Korean politics has moved beyond ordinary partisan competition and into a phase of entrenched hostility,” he said. “In that environment, any personnel decision becomes a political target.”
Still, Park said the timing of Lee’s outreach efforts should not be overlooked. “After a period of extreme political confrontation, there is growing public demand to shift the focus toward governance, the economy and people’s livelihoods,” he said.
He also rejected claims that the administration was encouraging political defection. “There was no demand for party switching or ideological conversion,” Park said. “Making an offer is not the same as dismantling the opposition.”
When asked whether the political costs outweighed the benefits, Park was blunt. “If you are president, there are things you have to do regardless of short-term political loss,” he said. “Stabilizing governance and earning public trust sometimes requires going through that process.”