'Kim Jong-un's goal has not changed'
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, is flanked by his younger sister Kim Yo-jong, fourth from left, and ceremonial leader Kim Yong-nam, second from left, in Pyongyang on Feb. 13 after Kim Jong-un welcomed back a high-ranking delegation from the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in South Korea. Among other attendants are National Sports Guidance Committee chairman Choi Hwi, left, and Central Committee of the Peaceful Reunification chairman Ri Son-gwon. / Yonhap
Moon needs to study Kim family’s strategy, German unification
By Kim Jae-kyoung
President Moon Jae-in and his close aides deserve credit for easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula recently, to the point of getting an invitation from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Pyongyang.
Moon declined to accept the offer immediately but he may feel he is one step closer to a breakthrough in the longstanding North Korean nuclear crisis through his dialogue overture.
It will take some time but chances are he will eventually go to Pyongyang to have talks with the young leader of the reclusive country, given his eagerness to improve inter-Korean ties regardless of public opinion.
Everybody agrees that talks for the sake of talks will bear no fruit. In this regard, Moon needs to take his time and ponder Kim’s intentions behind the invitation to ensure successful talks.
In particular, to develop an effective game plan and avoid dancing to Kim Jong-un’s tune, he needs to burrow deep into the nuts and bolts of the strategies of Kim’s grandfather Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il, as well as the process of German unification.
History shows the Kim family’s strategy and ultimate goal have not changed since the 1950s. Simply speaking, Kim Jong-un’s strategy would be no different from those pursued by his predecessors.
They all have tried to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington while urging U.S. troops to withdraw from South Korea and forcing the South into reunification in the North’s favor.
Against this backdrop, experts said Moon must first try to indentify Kim Jong-un’s intention behind his charm offensive using the PyeongChang Winter Olympics.
They are split over how Moon should respond to the invitation but are all in the same camp over Kim’s motives.
“Kim’s goal hasn’t changed and it’s to rule the entire Korean Peninsula under its system,” Tara O, adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, told The Korea Times.
“It’s not about whether he wants to improve inter-Korean ties or not, but rather he’d see it as a way to get what he wants to achieve his goal.”
From her perspective, Kim’s objectives would be to render the sanctions useless and to sever the ROK-U.S. alliance. O is a retired U.S. Air Force officer who worked at the Pentagon and the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command.
As his father did, she expects Kim Jong-un would likely demand discontinuing ROK-U.S. combined military exercises, as well as cash and goods transfer from South Korea and anything else that would help achieve a Kim family-dominated Korean Peninsula.
“To see this invitation as some new breakthrough in achieving a denuclearized North Korea completely ignores Kim’s unchanged goal and past decades of history trying to denuclearize North Korea,” she said.
James D. Bindenagel, the Henry Kissinger professor for Governance and International Security at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-University, Bonn, in Germany, concurred.
“One should remain skeptical of the motives behind Kim Jong-un’s invitation to President Moon to visit North Korea,” he said.
“Kim has established a narrative that his nuclear weapons are his guarantee against regime change. That narrative is unlikely to change with a visit by the South Korean President.”
Preconditions for talks
The experts recommended Moon respond to Kim’s invitation with caution and conditions.
They said there must be two conditions for talks in Pyongyang. First, there should be no sanctions relief or cash offers. Second, denuclearization should top the agenda.
“I sense Kim is looking for sanctions relief. He’s also playing the Korean ethnicity card against foreign power America, which resonates with South Korea’s nationalist left,” said Sean King, senior vice president of Park Strategies.
“Moon shouldn’t offer any sanctions relief or aid or reopen the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. It may sound harsh, but we have to deny Kim’s regime hard currency wherever possible.“
O said Moon should make it clear the talks must be about the North’s denuclearization. She also urged Moon to discard the North Korea-driven model as in the Olympics.
“One key precondition should be that North Korea place denuclearization on the agenda. It should also halt any provocations,” she said.
“Also, Moon should not weaken the sanctions by asking for various exceptions, and resume the combined military exercises as planned.”
Most analysts share concerns that Moon is too keen to improve inter-Korean ties even at the risk of jeopardizing relations with the U.S. and Japan.
“Based on his administration’s performance on its interactions with North Korea leading up to and at the Olympics, that was obvious,” O said.
She explained such concerns are spelled out in the “Regrets for PyeongChang” rap song that has been popular.
“The young who have supported him unconditionally in the past have noticed and dislike the way North Korea set the agenda and conditions South Korea just accommodated,” she said.
King shared those concerns.
“What’s more, Kim also knows this about Moon and will use Moon’s eagerness to his own strategic advantage,” he said.
Coordination with U.S.
To dismiss these concerns, experts said it is a must for Seoul to coordinate closely with Washington because a solid ROK-U.S. alliance only reinforces Moon’s position in regard to Kim.
“President Moon, by calling on Kim to speak with the Americans first, should build confidence in the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is fundamental to the avoidance of conflict on the peninsula,” Bindenagel said.
“Kim must know that he cannot drive a wedge between these partners, whose shared history is now seven decades old, and that partnership has ensured peace and prosperity in South Korea.”
From his perspective, Moon has wisely maintained close ties with the Trump administration.
“He should not let any light shine between the two partners’ policies,” he said.
“The resultant credibility with the U.S. helps sustain Moon’s ability to share his assessment of Kim with the Trump administration and keep a path to conflict resolution open.”
As for the Trump administration’s stance on the North, experts said there has been little policy change _ maximum pressure, while being open to talks.
“Washington is still shaping its position to engage in new ways with North Korea that were not tried by earlier administrations,” Bindenagel said.
“Denuclearization remains the bottom line for the U.S. administration as much as denying regime change remains for Kim.”
King said any kind of direct talks with North Korea should go hand in hand with pushing for real secondary sanctions against the mainland Chinese entities and banks fronting for, and enabling, the North.
“The North might have by now been much weaker than it is,” he said. “We’d thus be entering any such talks in a comparatively much stronger position.”
Lesson from Germany
Bindenagel, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany, said it is important to take a long-term approach by first seeking a confidence-building process. He called for the U.S. to endorse post-Olympic engagement between the two Koreas.
“While the Korean Ministry of Unification in Seoul supports a deepening of relations with the North, starting with family reunions and travel for the elderly would be confidence-building,” he said.
He suggested South Korea take a lesson from Germany, noting that West and East Germany agreed on such steps in opening relations after the West Germans recognized the East Germans 25 years after the two countries were created.
“It took another 20 years to achieve unification,” he said. “Confidence-building measures, not demands for concessions from the North, could keep the door open to dialogue and diplomacy, reminiscent of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.”