Roundtable Gauging impact of US-Israel war on Iran

Participants in The Korea Times' roundtable titled “U.S.-Israel war on Iran and its impact on the Korean Peninsula” stand together after the discussion. The three speakers are retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, second from left, former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command; Kim Won-soo, center, former under-secretary-general of the U.N. and high representative for disarmament affairs; and Song Kyung-jin, fourth from left, senior fellow at Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University. Shim Jae-yun, right, is chief editorial writer for The Korea Times and Kim Ji-soo, left, is an editorial writer for The Korea Times. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

By Kim Ji-soo

• Published Mar 12, 2026 3:51 PM KST
• Updated Mar 13, 2026 6:32 AM KST

Korea must diversify energy sources, form alliances, increase self-defense, wary of 'inadvertent conflict'

As the world attempts to make sense of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran, Korean experts are gauging when the conflict will end, as well as grappling with its economic and political ramifications, including the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and soaring energy prices.

U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday (local time) said that Iran is facing imminent defeat and that the U.S. is willing to escalate its attacks. However, there is no sign that Iran is considering surrender or that the war will come to a swift conclusion.

To better understand the issues, a panel of experts was invited to share their opinions at The Korea Times roundtable, "U.S.-Israel war on Iran and its impact on the Korean Peninsula," held Wednesday in Seoul. The Korea Times' chief editorial writer Shim Jae-yun moderated the event, which featured Kim Won-soo, former United Nations under-secretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs and retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command, along with Song Kyung-jin, senior fellow at the Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University.

Q: The attack on Iran seems different than the capture of former President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. It continues in the wake of last June's Operation Midnight Hammer attack on Iran's nuclear sites. In your view, what do you see as having triggered the war?

Song Kyung-jin: The U.S.-Israeli military campaign has stated that its goal is the unconditional surrender of Iran. But a senior Iranian foreign ministry official whom I recently met in a forum said that Iran will "put an end to the existence of the U.S. presence in the Middle East." The war's original stated goal is to prompt Iran to give up its nuclear capabilities, as well as to realign the Middle East order to align better with U.S. and Israel. Some officials have said that Oman-mediated talks with the United States were making progress but the attacks happened just before the second round of negotiations was to begin.

Kim Won-soo: Basically, from Iran's perspective, this is a war with Israel joined by the United States. Unlike other previous wars, the U.S. lately did not explain anything to allied nations to legitimize its military campaign nor did it act like it needed one. The war's goal for U.S. seems short-term without a clear endgame. Decapitation has been easy but what about the day after? Iran knows this and is maintaining a sustained resistance, making it harder for the U.S. to claim victory.

Chun In-bum: If we are looking at the root of the entire situation, we need to go back decades. What triggered this particular war? We would have to go back to 2023 when Hamas attacked civilians in Israel and Israel realized that there can be no peace unless Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis, supported by Iranian leadership, were eliminated. A conscious goal was set: regime change.

For the U.S., various aspects of its national interest were involved, including its need to maintain influence on Middle Eastern oil. In light of that fact, the most destabilizing factor for the U.S. was also Iran. The U.S. has kept in place sanctions against Iran for 40 years. Although I do not believe the U.S. has any intent to conquer Iran, the U.S. cannot have a nuclear weapon armed Iran. Iran must accept this and abandon its nuclear weapons programs.

Q: How long will the war last? What would determine whether it is a short-term or long-term conflict? Who has the military advantage?

Chun: For the U.S.-Israel military goal in Iran to be achieved, there should first be complete destruction of Iran's nuclear capability. Second, they must eliminate all drone and ballistic capabilities. Third, they will want to destroy military facilities and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and finally eliminate Iran's ability to support proxy groups. On the first day of their attack on Iran, all air defense systems were neutralized. Actually, much of the aerial system was destroyed last June. On the second and third days, the U.S. attacked Iranian missile launchers and the air fields where drones were launched. And now they are targeting drone and missile storage and manufacturing facilities. Within a couple of days, Iran will not be able to launch drones or missiles in large numbers. About 50 Iranian naval vessels have already been destroyed.

The war can be concluded next week and President Trump can say, "I have achieved my military goals." In a sense, the elimination of all nuclear facilities has been accomplished.

The only thing now is to verify if nuclear facilities were destroyed. Either the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) or ground forces can go in, within some parameters, to see in person the damage done and take out nuclear materials. In that sense, they will be a form of "extracting" forces, not occupying forces. Iranians would be wise to agree, and anticipate a better future by doing so.

Kim: That issue Gen. Chun just raised is critical in giving legitimacy to the war and also for future disarmament. There are three factors key to achieving nuclear weapons. First is the top political leadership's will; second, the availability of facilities to make them, either through reprocessing or enrichment — the latter of which Iran chose. And third is the nuclear material made in the facility. The activities of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — a nuclear limitation and nonproliferation agreement — have been seriously impacted and it is suspected that Iran has hidden 450 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium.

If the U.S. can extract this material or verify where it exists so that Iran cannot hide it elsewhere, the war can be seen as a success. If not, people will start asking why they went to war. President Trump at the least needs to extract and destroy the nuclear material or to bar Iran's access to it to claim victory. But this is hard to achieve on the ground. If he does not succeed, Iran's resolve may be hardened and other nations will be thinking about whether they, too, need to have nuclear weapons capability.

Song: I agree with your remarks. It would be difficult for the U.S. president to claim victory perhaps in that sense, considering the negative impact of the conflict on oil prices, rare earths and critical materials and related supplies. Also, in light of that assessment, I believe that the security risk on the Korean Peninsula has risen, as North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons.

Chun: I want to emphasize here that by Wednesday or the next weekend, the fighter jets, missiles and drones of the United States and Israel will be able to fly in and out of Iranian airspace. Their aerial defense system is destroyed and I believe the U.S. attack on the school was a mistake. The core aim is to destroy the resolve, which is important in war, of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). I think the consistent bombing will eventually break the IRGC's resolve. President Trump knows that about 75 percent of American citizens will support the war if it ends by late March.

Q: What are the foreseeable repercussions on the economy?

Song: This war's lesson for Korea is that we need to diversify oil and liquid natural gas sources as well as other critical materials. While oil prices are fluctuating now, if current oil prices of around $100 persist for a year, our GDP will fall by 3 percent point, inflation will rise by 1.1 percent and the current account surplus will shed $26 billion. Our economic indexes, which were forecast when oil prices stood at $65 per barrel, will have to be adjusted. I expect oil prices will hover in the $100 range for some time, which will be a difficult burden for the Korean economy. Also, the government must come up with a new strategy to secure a stable supply of rare earths and critical minerals because they are the backbone materials of Korea’s manufacturing -- defense production, semiconductors, AI, shipbuilding, quantum computing, etc. It will take time and money but we can no longer rely on good will of resource-rich countries in view of frequent supply chain disruptions.

Kim: I would like to say this to Korean businesses: As seen from the hike in oil prices with the Strait of Hormuz blocked, they need to diversify supply chains to reduce overdependence on a single source and factor in costs for political security when calculating the overall cost on top of the obvious costs.

Chun: I don't think the Iranian forces can continue to use munitions to keep ships out of Strait of Hormuz in the long term. As I said, we should watch and see what happens over the next week. President Trump has said four to six weeks, so let's see.

Song: Despite that, we can expect disruptions. The Iranian people are angry about the bombing of a school, resulting in the deaths of girls aged 7 to 12. There are inconsistencies within the U.S. administration and between Trump and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth. Iranians have pride in their long-held traditions and government, in spite of recent autocratic actions.

Q: What are the lessons for Korea, in terms of its response to the many crises in the region? What contingency scenarios should we think about for the future, in particular regarding North Korea and possibly Taiwan?

Kim: I think Asian and European allies may be asking, with the Trump administration involving itself mainly in the Western hemisphere and now Iran, will they pivot again to Asia, with China in mind? And from China's perspective, will the U.S. move aggressively or more prudently on Taiwan, and if so, would China use North Korea as a reason to keep U.S. troops in South Korea? I think Korea needs to prepare for all scenarios because of the complicated and tangled interests involved with the latest U.S. campaign. We should be wary of and prepared for "inadvertent conflict."

There is another point I want to make in regard to calls for South Korea to have its own nuclear capability — it has to be approached prudently and with the realization that it comes with nearly unbearable costs, both political and economic. It should not be seen as a status, as many leaders around the globe seem to think.

Song: Yet at the same time, I think North Korea should note that Trump remains open to talks. If not in Beijing, which Trump will visit for a summit in late March, Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un could meet elsewhere for dialogue. The time is ripe for Kim to be more proactive and meet with Trump for stability and prosperity of the North as well as stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. There are many things South Korea can offer. The U.S. credibility that is in question by allies and partners also need to be restored.

Kim: We, however, must be conscious of Trump-style arguments. We must join voices with nations that face similar nuclear umbrella needs, such as Japan. In short, South Korea needs independent military strength, robust alliance and coalition-building that can reduce risks in terms of security, politics and supply chains.

At this time of great uncertainty, alliance relationship must be managed carefully by highlighting convergences publicly while keeping divergences quiet. South Korea must restore domestic consensus on security and foreign policy. Korean political leaders must avoid the politicization of security.

Chun: I want to emphasize that North Korea is safe not because of its nuclear weapons, but because of the strength of the South Korea–United States alliance. In order to protect Seoul and Tokyo, the United States will not risk a full-scale shooting war with North Korea. If and when serious negotiations begin between the United States and North Korea, South Korea should expect Washington to provide a robust nuclear deterrent. This deterrence architecture is already evolving through the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which has become the envy of many U.S. allies who seek similar levels of strategic reassurance. South Korea must work diligently to maintain this momentum and deepen alliance-based deterrence. U.S. support for a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine program would further strengthen deterrence and create more favorable conditions for serious negotiations between North Korea and the United States. At the same time, South Korea’s military must continue strengthening its own capabilities to ensure that deterrence remains credible and sustainable.