I am an editorial writer at The Korea Times, focusing on foreign policy, North Korea and domestic politics. My key areas of interest include North Korea, foreign interference in elections, election integrity, cyberattacks and human rights. Prior to joining the Editorial Board, I served as both Politics Desk editor and Culture Desk editor. During my career, I have reported on the Presidential Office under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly.
Reforming the shadows: Military intelligence shake-up raises alarms
Yeo In-hyung, right, the former defense counterintelligence commander, testifies at the impeachment trial of former president Yoon Suk Yeol at the Constitutional Court, Seoul, February 2025. Yonhap
By Kang Hyun-kyung
The days of the Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCC) are numbered. The military intelligence agency, which has overseen counterintelligence for nearly five decades, is set to disappear from history by the end of this year.
Once dissolved, its core functions will be split and transferred to two newly created bodies — tentatively named the National Security Service and the Central Security Audit Office — in an effort to prevent the concentration of power.
Another military intelligence unit, the Defense Intelligence Command (DIC), whose main responsibilities include covert operations and infiltration into North Korea, is also facing a bleak future. The DIC is meant for sweeping reforms to ensure it can no longer be used as an instrument of abuse by the commander-in-chief.
The plan to overhaul the military’s intelligence apparatus reflects President Lee Jae Myung’s determination to prevent a repeat of Korea’s troubled past. The DCC and DIC now face uncharted waters after both were mobilized to support now-ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Dec. 3 declaration of martial law.
Some experts, however, have expressed concerns over the proposed reshuffle, warning that it could result in the loss of institutional knowledge and weaken the military’s intelligence gathering capabilities and operational networks.
Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum criticized the plan to dissolve the DCC, calling it self-destructive and likening it to amputating the arms and legs of the president, who serves as commander-in-chief.
“The primary role of the DCC lies in preventing military coups,” Chun said, asking who would suffer most if such coups could no longer be prevented.
“If the DCC is as dysfunctional as officials in the Lee administration claim, how could it have survived previous liberal governments under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and, most recently, Moon Jae-in?” he said. “There is a reason the agency has endured despite changes in government. What the nation needs is a stronger DCC, not its dissolution.”
According to Chun, abolishing the DCC would ultimately do a disservice to the sitting president.
“The DCC has played a key role in preventing corruption within the military,” he said. “It has compiled intelligence reports on selected military officials, containing detailed information such as their whereabouts, whom they met, and the times they arrived at and left their offices.”
He explained that for colonels, such classified reports are compiled monthly and shared with their superiors, while for generals they are updated weekly.
Military officials are aware that these reports exist, which encourages them to be cautious and refrain from crossing the line or engaging in misconduct, Chun indicated.
The new military intelligence apparatus will stop reporting on key military officials.
Without the DCC, Chun warned, military personnel would face fewer checks, leading to an increase in irregularities, misconduct and verbal abuse within the ranks.
“As commander-in-chief, the president is expected to be briefed regularly on all types of intelligence,” Chun added. “Currently, the DCC reports directly to the defense minister. That practice should change — the DCC should report directly to the president, not the defense minister.”
Moon Sang-ho, former defense intelligence commander, testifies at a National Assembly committee meeting on Dec. 10, 2024, a week after then-President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law. Yonhap
The DIC is also facing a major reshuffle. During the martial law decree, several DIC officials were dispatched to the National Election Commission to inspect its servers to determine whether allegations of election fraud had any basis.
At the time, then-President Yoon justified the declaration of martial law by claiming that an alleged “election fraud cartel” had made it difficult for law enforcement authorities to fully investigate the claims.
Beyond its role during the martial law episode, the DIC has also come under scrutiny over allegations that it collaborated with two civilians to fly drones into North Korea.
On Jan. 10, North Korea claimed it had detected and shot down two flying objects sent from the South on separate occasions, releasing photographs of the drones and their devices. Pyongyang denounced Seoul, calling the incident a grave violation of its sovereignty.
Days later, a male graduate student in his 30s told local media that he had flown the drones into North Korea and that one of the devices disclosed by Pyongyang was his. He said his goal was to monitor North Korea’s nuclear programs and verify media reports that the North had discharged nuclear waste from a uranium refining facility in Pyongsan County, North Hwanghae Province.
According to media reports, the civilian had collaborated with the DIC and operated two front companies to conduct cognitive operations related to North Korea.
The DIC’s alleged involvement in the covert operation has drawn sharp criticism from President Lee. During a Cabinet meeting on Jan. 20, Lee warned that sending drones into North Korea could constitute a serious provocation, likening it to the initiation of hostilities. He said he had been informed that a state-run agency had been involved and instructed relevant ministries to conduct a thorough investigation. He did not name the agency, but media reports identified it as the DIC.
Lee’s reaction reflects the legal and political sensitivity surrounding such operations. His predecessor, Yoon, was brought to justice on charges related to benefiting the enemy after the military under his administration sent drones toward Pyongyang — an action that the special prosecutor argued was risky enough to provoke North Korean military retaliation.
If confirmed that similar operations were conducted under the Lee administration, the DIC’s actions could expose the current president to comparable legal and political risks.
From a legal standpoint, sending drones into North Korea may be interpreted as an act of provocation. From a strategic intelligence perspective, however, experts say the same incident can be viewed very differently.
A source familiar with military intelligence said it is not unusual for intelligence agencies to use civilians to conduct sensitive operations in enemy territory.
“The use of nonofficial cover is a recognized intelligence tool designed to provide plausible deniability and avoid the diplomatic escalation that overt military assets would trigger,” the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media. “There is significant historical precedent for using civilian fronts in politically sensitive environments, such as the CIA’s use of Air America during the Cold War and the Vietnam War. The failure in this specific case lies not in the choice of method, but in poor operational security.”
The source added that sending drones into enemy territory alone does not justify a sweeping reshuffle of a military intelligence agency.