Naval Disaster to Affect Top Military Brass
By Jung Sung-ki
Staff Reporter
Military authorities have been under fire for their mishandling of the sinking of the naval ship Cheonan on March 26. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as well as the defense minister and top naval commanders concerned are expected to face dismissal, to take responsibility for the naval disaster that killed two sailors and left 44 others missing in action.
A joint investigation team comprised of the military and civilians plans to inspect whether or not relevant officers responded to the incident properly, on top of the probe of the cause of the sinking of the frigate in the West Sea (Yellow Sea), a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense said.
``The investigation team will first focus on determining the cause of the incident, but then a comprehensive inspection of top military brass will be conducted regarding their actions afterward,'' the spokesman said.
Points for the inspection will include whether or not the incident report system between the JCS and Navy commanders worked properly and if the Army and Air Force reacted appropriately under an emergency order, he said.
Many loopholes have been found in responding to the disaster.
For example, JCS Chairman Gen. Lee Sang-eui failed to play his commanding role when the incident occurred around 9:22 p.m. because he was travelling by KTX train to Seoul from Daejeon where he presided over a conference.
Lee arrived at the JCS headquarters about 80 minutes after an explosion tore the ship in two. Adm. Park Jung-hwa, commander of the Navy Operations Command in Busan, tried to report the situation to Lee via phone, but the JCS chairman couldn't properly orchestrate his armed forces.
Park then made a phone call to Defense Minister Kim Tae-young to receive an order to fire against a target presumed to be an enemy vessel near the site of the incident.
``At that time, the authority to order firing (against an enemy) was in the hands of the commander of the 2nd Navy Fleet. But it seemed that communications didn't work well because the JCS chairman was on a train,'' Kim said in a National Assembly session last week. ``The commander of the Navy Operations Command called me and asked for permission to fire. I ordered it then.''
The frigate Sokcho was chasing unidentified targets near the site of the incident at that time and started firing its 76mm cannons toward them at 11 p.m. The targets were later found to be a flock of birds, according to the Navy and JCS.
But the chain of command at that time was against procedure.
Under the current operational rules, a fleet commander concerned has the authority to order an attack against an enemy without approval from his superiors. A fleet commander is supposed to report later to the operations commander, and then to the JCS chairman, not the defense minister.
Critics say combined reinforcement efforts also failed.
The 2nd Fleet issued the top security alert, dubbed ``West Wind-I,'' 18 minutes after the ship sank and asked the Air Force to dispatch search-and-rescue forces about 20 minutes after that.
Under that alert level, Air Force fighter jets and artillery units of the Army and Marines are supposed to be in combat positions.
But the JCS ordered the fighter aircraft up at 10:40 p.m., an hour after the security alert was issued.
The military is also under criticism for its failure in determining the exact time of the incident. It initially said the incident occurred at 9:45 p.m. and changed the timeline several times later.