How to mend ties between S. Korea and China?

By Sunny Lee

BEIJING — The view that China-South Korean relations have deteriorated since the Cheonan incident is flawed. Rather, the Cheonan incident was a trigger that pushed to the surface a set of accumulated issues between the two nations, said Kim Dong-jin, who teaches at China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing.

Among South Korea’s top decision-makers, Kim, the former CEO of South Korean conglomerate POSCO’s China operations, is a well-recognized China hand. When South Korean Ambassador to China Yu Woo-ik was tapped for the position, Kim was among a handful of experts Yu consulted.

With over two decades of living in China, “Now, I can think like a Chinese person,” Kim said in an interview in Wangjing, the “Korea Town” in the Chinese capital.

Lately in South Korea, “how to deal with China” has become a fashionable intellectual sport and the topic has found space in newspaper editorials and opinion pages.

Even pro-America conservative newspapers have begun to voice concern over President Lee Myung-bak’s policy orientation that is almost exclusively leaning toward the United States.

Citing a key government official dealing with foreign affairs, for example, the local Chosun Ilbo daily on Oct. 20 said: “South Korea’s shoddy diplomatic ties with China have been manifested in matters over the Cheonan incident, Kim Jong-il’s visit to China, and North Korea’s succession.”

All these issues, with which Seoul is a key stakeholder, also involve Beijing. And in all these issues, South Korea experienced what the newspaper called a “communications problem” with China.

The chilly relationship developed into apprehension in Seoul as it warily watched China’s assertiveness in its handling of a South China Sea territorial dispute with Japan, which impregnated a fearful sense of “China’s rise” in many Korean people’s psyche.

With that, there is a brooding sense that the country actually knows very little about its giant neighbor.

“South Korea is not alone. In fact, many other countries have hard time in understanding what ‘China’ is about,” Kim said.

He attributes this to the “duality” China displays. For example, it is outwardly a socialist country, which in reality practices capitalism.

On North Korea, it has displayed two conflicting approaches too. Beijing expressed anger over Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2006, but recently it has been noticeably ramping up its ties even in the aftermath of a second nuclear test last year and the Cheonan incident this year.

But in the Chinese philosophy of yin and yang, duality is a familiar trait of nature, not a display of double standards or dishonesty.

On the foreign affairs front, what enables the country to embrace duality, according to Kim, is national interest. “Furthermore, China’s national interest changes too, adding more confusion,” said Kim.

On an individual level, what makes it hard to understand the Chinese is that their words often contain ambiguity. “Chinese people are often perceived as not revealing what they think when they speak,” said Kim, who attributes it to a tumultuous history in which peacetime was rarity, not normality.

“Historians say Chinese history is full of blood. And its history is a history of massacres. So, people are reluctant to reveal what’s on their minds. It’s a survival instinct,” Kim said.

Misunderstanding on Cheonan?

In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, South Koreans felt disappointed by what they perceived as China’s siding with North Korea. Actually, the disappointment was mutual, according to Kim.

“Each side feels that something unduly was done by the other side. It’s like Seoul and Beijing saying to each other: ‘Why can’t you understand me?’” Kim said.

According to Kim, China has long suspected that the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. was aimed at it. “In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, and when the large-scale joint military exercises began, the joint move validated the Chinese suspicion that it was meant to topple North Korea.”

In other words, Beijing did see the Cheonan incident and its ensuing repercussions as a conflict between the two Koreas, but essentially as a power game between it and Washington.

Kim finds a failure of strategic communication as the culprit for the fallout of the incident.

Several months have passed since the Cheonan incident. China wants to “turn the page” now, but South Korea believes that North Korea’s showing signs of sincerity regarding the tragic incident is a prerequisite.

“Before the Cheonan, the Sino-South Korean relationship had been on honeymoon. It’s over now,” Kim said, adding the incident was just a beginning point of what is in store. And what is in store will likely be a challenge for the two countries.

“The two countries will have to face ‘uncomfortable truths’ from now on, including disputes surrounding the territory, American troops stationed in South Korea, and the Northeast Project, to name just a few,” Kim said, warning what he calls “the world’s most robust nationalism” of the two countries is likely to exacerbate the situation.

‘China threat’ and South Korea’s national interest

Kim is also concerned about the rising “China threat” sentiment in South Korea. To determine whether Beijing is a “threat,” Kim said, Seoul must first of all define what its national interest is.

“The wisdom of South Korea’s survival lies in proactively adjusting to the shifting geopolitical reality, balancing between the U.S. and China.”

Kim then proceeded to ask a formidably uncomfortable question for the Lee Myung-bak administration to hear: “Does South Korea’s tilting completely toward the U.S. best serve its national interest?”

With that, Kim notes another problem: “South Korea tends to see China through the American perspective.”

“A fundamental paradigm shift is necessary in the Sino-Korean relationship. Koreans should stop seeing China through the American prism,” Kim said.

Some analysts believe that there is a fundamental mismatch between the Lee Myung-bak administration and China. “The Lee administration is not interested in improving ties with China. On the other hand, China isn’t expecting much from Lee either. It is simply waiting for the year 2012,” said a South Korean scholar, who talks to both governments. Lee’s term ends in 2012.

Kim fears sustaining the status quo will become a missed opportunity for mending ties. Contrary to the widespread belief, he doesn’t believe Seoul lacks experts on Beijing. Rather, he said, the real problem is that the Lee administration doesn’t use them.

As a consequence, “when there is a problem with China, the U.S. has Henry Kissinger. Japan has Yasuhiro Nakasone. But South Korea has no one,” Kim said.