ED Peace through pragmatism, not illusion
President Lee Jae Myung answers questions from reporters during his New Year’s press conference at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul, Jan. 21. Korea Times photo by Kim Do-hoon.
US must reengage N. Korea to promote ties and peace
President Lee Jae Myung’s New Year's press conference offered a stark but necessary diagnosis of the Korean Peninsula’s condition. His remark that “it would be fortunate just to avoid war, let alone unification” was not an exercise in pessimism, but a sober acknowledgment of reality. Decades of stalled diplomacy, hardened mistrust and unchecked nuclear development in North Korea have left the peninsula in a state of chronic instability. Lee’s call for pragmatic peace and coexistence deserves serious consideration, both at home and abroad.
At the heart of Lee’s message was a refusal to cling to ideals divorced from reality. On denuclearization, he posed an uncomfortable but unavoidable question: Will North Korea truly give up its nuclear weapons under current conditions? The international community’s insistence on complete denuclearization as a precondition for engagement has not halted Pyongyang’s nuclear advances. On the contrary, North Korea today possesses more nuclear material, more sophisticated missiles and greater leverage than ever before. Ignoring this reality in the name of principle has only deepened the crisis.
Lee’s proposed three-stage approach — first freezing further nuclear development, then pursuing arms reduction and ultimately aiming for denuclearization — seeks to reconcile ideals with practical risk management. This is not an abandonment of the denuclearization goal, but a recognition that progress requires sequencing. Preventing the additional production of nuclear material, halting intercontinental ballistic missile development and blocking proliferation would significantly reduce global risk. In diplomacy, reducing danger is often a necessary precondition for achieving transformation.
The United States has a central role to play in this process. Without sustained U.S.-North Korea dialogue, no meaningful progress is possible. Lee’s emphasis on U.S. President Donald Trump’s “unconventional” leadership style reflects a pragmatic assessment rather than political preference. Trump remains one of the few U.S. leaders to have demonstrated both willingness and ability to engage directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. However unpredictable, that channel matters. Washington must decide whether it prefers managing an expanding nuclear threat or testing the possibilities of phased agreements that constrain it.
Equally important is a lesson from recent history. During the Moon Jae-in administration, inter-Korean diplomacy reached levels once thought unimaginable. North and South Korean leaders met repeatedly, military tensions eased and a visit by Kim Jong-un to Seoul, while ultimately unrealized, was actively discussed. The significance of that moment lies not in what failed to materialize, but in what briefly became possible. During that period of dialogue, the specter of war receded and crisis management replaced crisis escalation. The experience demonstrated that engagement, even when incomplete, can meaningfully reduce risk.
The collapse of dialogue since then has produced the opposite result. Mutual suspicion has hardened into hostility. Incidents such as drone incursions and North Korea’s construction of layered border fortifications underscore how badly trust has eroded. Lee’s observation that distrust has reached an extreme is difficult to dispute. However, this very deterioration makes renewed engagement more urgent, not less. Deterrence alone, however robust, cannot substitute for communication. Peace is not achieved by goodwill alone, nor is it sustained by force alone.
Critically, Lee has been clear that advocating for dialogue is not “taking North Korea’s side.” It is an exercise in strategic empathy and understanding the adversary’s calculations in order to influence them. If North Korea cannot be eliminated, the only rational course is to shape its behavior in ways that reduce harm and open pathways toward eventual change. Recognizing reality is not weakness — it is the foundation of effective statecraft.
The responsibility for peace on the Korean Peninsula does not rest with Seoul alone. The United States must move beyond a binary choice between pressure and paralysis, while North Korea must recognize that permanent nuclear expansion will only deepen its isolation and insecurity. South Korea, for its part, must act as a facilitator, strengthening its defense while persistently reopening channels for dialogue.
Choosing managed peace over managed crisis is not an act of surrender. It is a deliberate, disciplined effort to prevent the worst outcomes while keeping the door open to better ones. The alternative — endless escalation without engagement — has already shown us where it leads.