ED US backs Korea's nuclear aspirations
President Lee Jae Myung answers reporters’ questions after announcing the Korea-U.S. fact sheet agreement at the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Friday. To the left is policy chief Kim Yong-beom, and on the right is national security director Wi Sung-lac. Yonhap
Korea's nuclear path requires unwavering US support
The fact sheet released after the recent Korea-United States summit marks a potentially historic turning point in bilateral nuclear cooperation. For the first time, the United States stated that it “supports procedures that could lead to South Korea’s peaceful enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, within the framework of the U.S.–ROK nuclear cooperation agreement and consistent with U.S. legal requirements.” This declaration is far more than a diplomatic gesture for a country that ranks among the world’s top five nuclear power producers yet remains heavily constrained in handling nuclear materials. Washington’s explicit support of Seoul represents the first institutional step toward easing long-standing restrictions, made possible through U.S. cooperation.
Korea is under mounting pressure to manage its spent nuclear fuel, as storage facilities are expected to reach capacity by 2030. The current bilateral agreement prohibits reprocessing, effectively blocking a viable long-term solution. Moreover, Seoul cannot even produce low-enriched uranium -- below 20 percent and unrelated to weapons-- without U.S. consent, forcing complete reliance on imports for reactor fuel. In an era when artificial intelligence, data centers and advanced manufacturing drive exponentially growing electricity demand, nuclear power is emerging as the only reliable, low-cost baseload option. Enriched uranium, increasingly viewed as a strategic commodity akin to rare earth elements, will become ever more critical. For a resource-poor nation such as Korea, gaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is fundamental to its long-term energy security. The fact that movement on these issues is beginning, with direct U.S. backing, underscores the significance of American support.
Still, these are not decisions that the U.S. president can enact unilaterally. Any change must navigate complex interagency deliberations involving the Departments of State, War and Energy, as well as consultations with international bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency. That the language survived until the final version of the fact sheet, despite intense debate within Washington, illustrates the sensitivity of the topic. Even so, the outcome was possible only because the United States chose to recognize Korean concerns and support procedural progress.
The agreement also provided an important opening for cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines. Washington has effectively signaled approval for Seoul’s pursuit of such capabilities and securing of reactor fuel for submarine propulsion, a domain previously off-limits under the bilateral nuclear agreement. Just as Japan secured enrichment and reprocessing rights in 1988 through revisions to the U.S.–Japan agreement, Korea may now be taking the first steps, with U.S. cooperation, toward becoming a fully capable nuclear energy state.
Yet it would be premature to assume smooth progress. The transfer of nuclear submarine technology is notoriously complex; Australia’s experience required more than two years of U.S. legislative action. Enrichment and reprocessing remain sensitive due to long-standing nonproliferation concerns. As negotiations proceed, Washington may also expect broader contributions from Seoul in return. The fact sheet itself hints at this: It calls for an enhanced U.S. deterrence posture against “all regional threats,” points to expanded roles for U.S. Forces Korea across the Indo-Pacific and includes references to the Taiwan Strait — issues China has repeatedly opposed. These elements foreshadow potential strategic costs for Seoul amid the intensifying U.S.-China strategic rivalry.
The true test of the alliance's modernization lies ahead. Korea must strengthen its own capabilities while avoiding unnecessary confrontations with China as the United States seeks greater Korean participation in its regional strategy. The balance between these objectives will determine whether the alliance evolves constructively or faces new strains. What remains clear is that continued U.S. cooperation, especially on nuclear fuel, advanced reactors and submarine propulsion, is indispensable for Korea’s energy security and national defense.
Now more than ever, Seoul must deploy its full diplomatic efforts to institutionalize this new phase of cooperation. By leveraging American support while safeguarding its own national interests, Korea can help shape a modernized alliance that is both resilient and mutually beneficial.