ED A 50-year nuclear shackle
Capture from the website of Westinghouse / The Korea Times
KNHP's nuclear deal with Westinghouse requires urgent redress
Korea’s recent nuclear export agreement with U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company has ignited growing concern across political, industrial and academic circles. At the heart of the issue is a sweeping, long-term contract that not only imposes significant financial burdens on Korea’s nuclear industry but also undermines its technological sovereignty and export potential in critical global markets.
The agreement, signed in January 2024 by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), obliges Korea to pay Westinghouse $825 million for every nuclear reactor it exports over the next 50 years. This amount includes $650 million for equipment and services and $175 million in technology usage fees, effectively locking Korea into long-term financial and technological dependence on Westinghouse.
Even more concerning are the conditions that extend beyond this immediate cost. The contract reportedly restricts KHNP from independently entering the North American and European markets — two of the most significant arenas for nuclear energy development. Furthermore, even for future exports of independently developed small modular reactors (SMRs), KHNP must undergo a verification process by Westinghouse to determine whether any of its proprietary technologies have been used, potentially limiting Korea’s competitiveness in next-generation nuclear technologies.
The origin of this agreement lies in an intellectual property dispute that began years earlier. Westinghouse had argued that Korea’s flagship reactor — the APR1400, intended for export to the Czech Republic — was derived from U.S.-licensed designs and therefore violated its intellectual property rights. The Korean government, eager to secure the Czech nuclear deal of over $20 billion and to resolve the legal standoff, entered into a trilateral agreement under the broader Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation framework. This culminated in the now-controversial deal, which suspended litigation but imposed long-term commercial obligations.
Some argue the agreement was a strategic necessity. Facing the threat of protracted litigation and exclusion from major export opportunities, Korea opted for compromise. However, the terms of the deal raise serious questions. Why did a nation with proven nuclear expertise — demonstrated by its successful execution of the Barakah nuclear project in the United Arab Emirates — accept a contract that effectively reduces its role to that of a subcontractor? Why was such a far-reaching deal negotiated with limited transparency and without broader industry or legislative input?
The consequences are sobering. Even if Korea wins future nuclear export contracts, the bulk of profits could be eroded by royalties, mandated procurement from Westinghouse and obligatory local participation in recipient countries. In practical terms, the economic viability of Korea’s nuclear exports is now in jeopardy. More troubling still, the SMR sector — which represents the future of nuclear energy — may also be compromised by this agreement.
To make matters worse, reports suggest that there was internal opposition within the boards of KHNP and KEPCO at the time of the deal’s approval, and possible political pressure to expedite the agreement. If true, this raises fundamental concerns about governance, due process and the prioritization of short-term diplomatic goals over long-term industrial strategy.
What must happen now is clear. First, a thorough parliamentary inquiry or audit should be conducted to review the negotiation process, evaluate the fairness of the contract and investigate claims of any external influence. Second, the Korean government must explore avenues for renegotiation or international arbitration to amend the most restrictive or excessive clauses. Westinghouse, which lacks independent construction capabilities, still requires Korean expertise to fulfill projects — leverage that should not be ignored.
Finally, this episode must serve as a wake-up call for Korea’s broader industrial policy. Without investment in core, original technologies, the nation will remain vulnerable to similar dependencies in other sectors. It is time for the government to take the lead in supporting long-term research, protecting intellectual property and ensuring genuine technological self-reliance.
The next 50 years of Korea’s energy and economic security may well depend on how this moment is handled.