Hosting Nuclear Conference

Solving N. Korean Issue Is Essential for Summit Success

South Korea's hosting of the second nuclear security summit in 2012 will no doubt greatly enhance its status in the international community. By attracting no fewer than 50 national leaders here, the NSS in Seoul will be the largest and most important diplomatic event the nation will have played host, even exceeding the G-20 summit later this year.

Many Koreans, particularly of older generations, might feel quite emotional about the fact that this country's role has changed from a spectator to a participant and now to the chair of world-changing events in both economic and political areas, in little more than one generation.

Seoul may also likely be able to get material gains no smaller than such symbolic significance: It can make the most of its host status in taking an advantageous position in the escalating sales war of atomic power plants, by focusing on its excellent technology and experiences in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Revisiting the Korea-U.S. nuclear accord to gain greater leeway in the treatment of spent fuel could be a bonus.

So far, so good, but the hard part begins here. Needless to say, at issue is how to deal with North Korean nuclear problem, which also may be the main reason President Obama has picked Seoul as the venue.

The nuclear summit in Seoul will surely have the effect of presenting a dagger under Pyongyang's nose to considerably pressurize the North Korean leadership, while sharply strengthening Seoul's position as the main party of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. It is a different matter, however, whether the summit would succeed in changing the attitude of Kim Jong-il and his followers, who have long pledged to turn their nation into a ``strong, prosperous country" by 2012 ― complete with a nuclear arsenal and economic sustainability.

Even the U.S. President acknowledged the difficulties in dealing with the reclusive regime during the Washington summit, saying, ``Sanctions are not a magic wand. Unfortunately, nothing in international relations is."

These and the recent remarks by U.S. officials insinuating their acquiescence of Pyongyang as a nuclear power means the conference here after two years could turn into a mixed blessing for Seoul at best. In a worst-case scenario, South Korea will have to watch its northern rival get away with its nuclear weapons while guests from all over the world are watching, unless it manages to persuade the United States to shift the focus of discussion from non-proliferation to denuclearization until then .

All this leaves few options for President Lee Myung-bak. He can either take a mid- to long-term approach on the North Korean nuclear issue by acknowledging it as a nuclear power, which is the most likely scenario if he maintains the present strategy of waiting and occasional pressurizing, or do all he can to lure Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.

Whether Lee will go down as a leader who allowed the North to become a major nuclear power amid inter-Korean hostility or one who freed this peninsula from an atomic shadow through engagement is to a large extent up to the President and his administration. The choice seems simple but the action far more difficult if his track record over the past two years provides any guide.