$10 Billion for What?
China's Aid Should Be Linked to Denuclearization
The yet-to-be-confirmed report about China's $10-billion investment into North Korea, if proved true, will have tremendous repercussions on the regional economy and politics.
Government officials here have downplayed the Yonhap News report as an ``untrustworthy allegation,'' saying they cannot confirm its authenticity. Or so they might be hoping. Regardless of the reliability of the latest report, however, Seoul should prepare for the possibility that China, which is expected to officially emerge as the world's second-largest economy this year, will make a massive investment in North Korea.
The only problem in the way of China's investment ― or economic aid if you will ― is what effect such a move will have on international economic sanctions on Pyongyang and its denuclearization commitments. So one might as well presume the decision on the alleged investment, if it becomes reality, was made under tacit approval of other dialogue partners.
It is well known China would rather have a nuclear-armed North Korea than a completely collapsed neighbor. Still, Beijing will also need to seriously ponder what impact Pyongyang nuclear armament would leave on other regional countries in terms of what analysts call a major regression in global non-proliferation efforts.
The reported $10-billion in infrastructure investment, which accounts for almost 70 percent of the impoverished country's annual gross domestic product, must never be used as an economic prop enabling North Korea to also produce uranium-based nuclear weapons in a couple of years.
This is also why the five other participants in the six-party talks should cooperate to keep North Korea from dragging its feet in denuclearization.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who celebrated his 68th birthday yesterday, must also think hard what his slogan of creating a ``strong and prosperous country'' should really mean, and why he still cannot materialize two major desires of his late father, Kim Il-sung: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and feeding his people ``boiled rice and beef soup'' instead of corn.
By resorting to Chinese aid, the nuclear-armed North Korea may barely manage to avoid total economic collapse but Pyongyang's absolute dependency on Beijing will make it even harder for itself to be an independent country. The only reason Kim refuses to take the easiest path in turning his father's two wishes ― giving up nuclear arms and opening up to the outside world ― is his adherence to anachronistic one-man rule and socialist leadership in a rivalry with South Korea over ideological legitimacy on the peninsula.
No smaller loser of possible Chinese supremacy over North Korea is South Korea, who will have to watch the northern half of the divided peninsula all but become China's ``fourth northeastern province.''
The report on China's $10-billion investment means Beijing could preempt the Lee Myung-bak administration's ``grand bargain'' proposal, which Seoul seems to be using as bait for the North's quick surrender, that lacks any detailed action programs ― or even genuine intentions.
By most appearances, chances are that the six-nation talks may resume before long, but at issue is not whether or when to restart dialogue but how to operate it and what results to expect from it.
Only when Seoul has a firm will, clear strategy and smooth communication with its northern counterpart, can South Koreans have expectations and confidence in their government's ability to lead the whole process. Unfortunately, the Lee administration has shown none of these, at least so far.