Tough, Direct Approach
What Matters Is Mutual Trust ― As Always
For diplomatic watchers wondering about the Barack Obama administration's North Korea policy, a hint seems to have just been dropped.
The ``comprehensive package'' concept floated here Monday by Kurt Campbell, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, to lure the Stalinist country back to the dialogue table, is neither entirely new nor specific but could represent a major turnaround in policy from previous administrations.
Officials in both Washington and Seoul are trying not to attach much meaning to this new ― and old ― approach, which promises all the communist country has wanted, namely diplomatic recognition, security guarantees and economic aid, in a package once Pyongyang takes ``serious, irreversible'' steps toward denuclearization. By most signs, however, it is also clear this is not just another piece of bait.
Assistant Secretary Campbell is no official to be taken lightly in view of both his rank and experience in North Korea affairs. The reason the Obama administration is turning to a blanket deal is also far too apparent: all step-by-step, carrot-and-stick tactics of its predecessors have failed. So Washington's latest idea seems to be to use only sticks for the time being, saving the carrots to give all at the same time ― only when the ``unruly teenager,'' as Campbell's boss Hillary Clinton described the North, shows true repentance as well as signs of real change.
Such a presumed tactical change wins additional credence from the reports on the South Korean government's creation of a $40-billion aid fund for the North with the help of international lenders. Although foreign ministry officials denied the report, Cheong Wa Dae apparently didn't want to waste the publicity opportunity, stressing the comprehensive package idea ``originally came from President Lee Myung-bak'' during his summit with President Obama. In actuality, exactly the same contents appeared first in the 1994 Agreed Framework and reappeared in the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement ― albeit in gradual, not simultaneous, form.
Both Presidents Lee and Obama, however, need to ponder why their predecessors chose to take the time-taking ― and painstaking ― gradual, action-to-action approach: A complete lack of mutual trust between North Korean leaders and its U.S., South Korean and Japanese counterparts.
From Pyongyang's ― and an objective third party's ― viewpoint, there is a serious asymmetry of risks in the far-reaching, all-embracing deal, because while the ``irreversible'' disarmament is literally irrevocable, promises can always be revoked under various pretexts.
Without mutual trust, a comprehensive, simultaneous solution proposal, however ``appealing'' its contents may be as Campbell described, could only appear as one-sided and even work as ``another pressure'' for the reclusive and incredulous regime. U.S. officials need to look no further than the complete failure of President Lee's original proposal to Pyongyang ― the South would increase the North's per capita income to $3,000 if the impoverished regime opens and denuclearizes itself ― only ending up aggravating the inter-Korean relationship almost beyond repair.
What's important now is not to try to take the initiative in approaching the North either in hard-line or soft-line ways, but to regain lost trust through small but genuine steps forward, including the resumption of interrupted tourism projects and normalizing the inter-Korean industrial complex.
North Korea is reportedly preparing to propose the resumption of family unions around the Korean version of Thanksgiving Day in early October. How the Koreas can cooperate in this and other humanitarian programs will show whether there still remains some hope for reviving the worst inter-Korean ties in decades.