Deliberating Diplomacy
Lee's Foreign Policy Requires Complete Overhaul
In the miserable bottom lines of the first five months of the Lee Myung-bak presidency, the economy and diplomacy even stand out.
The Lee administration blames adverse factors from outside for both fiascoes, which is not entirely groundless. Not just Lee's enemies but some of his allies, however, acknowledge the President's poor leadership and his aides' clumsy responses to these external hardships have made them into serious crises. Between the two, the diplomatic deadlock appears to be more of the government's own making, while the economic doldrums are relatively inevitable.
Take the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Singapore last week. Both South and North Korea disgraced themselves on the international stage by trying to revise the chairman's statement to their respective liking while trying to delete parts pushed by each other.
Seoul seems to be the bigger loser in this. The South Korean delegation, led by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, failed to include its calls for Pyongyang to cooperate in investigating the fatal shooting of a tourist at Mt. Geumgang in the statement, while attempting to omit the North's emphasis on the Oct. 4 2007 Joint Declaration on inter-Korean reconciliation. The bewildered host decided to strike both out to ensure balance.
Minister Yu and Korean officials are to blame more for their poor judgment in bringing a bilateral issue to the multilateral stage than being outmaneuvered by their North Korean counterparts at the ARF.
It was little better than the Japanese government hindering the progress of the six-party talks, citing the bilateral abduction issue. Misjudging the nature of an issue and confusing the right stage to tackle it show the administration's lack of diplomatic philosophy and principles.
Lack of Philosophy
North Korea's inhumane shooting death of an unarmed civilian is unforgivable under any circumstances. One can presume, however, the tragic incident could have been settled easier and earlier had the Lee administration not unnecessarily chilled inter-Korean ties upon its inauguration.
Seoul blew the opportunity to resolve the issue and restore cross-border relations again last week when it went to the unusual length of deleting the Oct. 4 joint statement signed by the top leaders of both Koreas. The relationship between Koreas will likely keep worsening before it gets any better because of the closing statement fracas. Most hard to understand is Seoul's abhorrence of the two summit accords signed by previous governments, even after President Lee recently showed some willingness to positively consider them.
It is not certain yet whether Minister Yu did this on his own judgment or on instructions from Cheong Wa Dae. If Lee ordered his top diplomat to effectively revoke the policy turnaround hinted at by the President himself a few weeks ago, it only reveals that he had no serious intention to revive the inter-Korean thaw. If Minister Yu did so on his own, he seemed to have misread his boss's mind in blind-minded loyalty of a ``soulless bureaucrat,'' as a ranking official described officialdom.
Yu's credential as the foreign minister is in doubt in more fundamental ways ― for failing to properly guide the top leader, who is a diplomatic novice. It is not known who is the main architect of Lee's key diplomatic concept of ``pragmatism.'' Even if Yu did not invent the term, he is the one who should rectify it if it didn't work or fill its contents if the principle itself is deemed okay. He did neither, however.
There should be nothing wrong with pragmatism itself whether in diplomacy or any other fields. The problem is, Lee's pragmatism has neither a philosophical background nor practical guidelines.
Excessive Cost of 'ABR'
By most appearances, the pragmatic diplomacy was just the ``anything-but-Roh'' (ABR) reversion of his predecessor's policy, but Lee is paying too high a cost for this blind decision. The denuclearization-first policy unnecessarily narrowed Seoul's own area of activities, while straining inter-Korean ties beyond immediate repair.
As things stand now, it is a just matter of time before South Korea becomes the odd ball of Northeast Asia, where the mating game is brisk, between Japan and China, Japan and North Korea, U.S. and North Korea and even between Taiwan and China. In a worst-case scenario, Seoul will be left with just the bill for denuclearization ― a thankless payer at that.
All this shows all the more clearly why the South Korean officials in Singapore should have tried to put claims from both sides in the final statement. Seoul will soon have to issue a separate statement that the government is not opposed to inter-Korean reconciliation as stipulated in the Oct. 4 joint declaration, if it is to genuinely mend fences with Pyongyang.
Organizational, Personnel Change
President Lee, now on vacation, should seriously consider overhauling the diplomacy-security setup as well as persons constituting it. North Korean Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun refused to discuss the tourist killing issue, citing the matter belongs to another agency, probably the North Korean counterpart of Seoul's Unification Ministry. This and various other issues point to the need for the government to take away excessive authority and organization from the Foreign Ministry, which itself is overly centered on pro-U.S. diplomats in this era of renewed multi-polar international politics.
Lee ought to usher in a top diplomat among those who can guide him, not blindly follow him. This should start with breaking away from favoritism in diplomatic appointment. The President needs to stop sending his cronies with little diplomatic careers to key ambassadorial or consul general posts.
A case in point is Ambassador Kwon Chul-hyun to Japan. Right after the Dokdo islet dispute occurred, President Lee rightly called for a cool-headed, long-term approach, but Amb. Kwon made a series of excessively hard-line remarks. This was nothing but another display of a lack of teamwork, which in turn showed ― once again ― Lee's men either did not know their boss' intention or ignored it.
Even before Lee's inauguration, many people were concerned about the CEO-turned-President's diplomatic and political finesse. Lee should start from the ground up with the help of more faithful but straight-talking aides.