Another Nuclear Milestone

Seoul's Hands-off Policy Risks Isolation

The world will likely watch North Korea blow up the cooling tower attached to its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon Friday. More symbolic than substantive, this drama seems to be co-produced by Pyongyang and Washington to maximize the effects of the denuclearization passing its second stage of disablement and declaration. For the six countries involved in the process, however, it's about time substance replaced symbolism.

This week North Korea is also expected to give its declaration of nuclear programs to China, the host of the six-party talks, which may announce the conference's resumption as soon as possible.

It is significant the four-year-long process to dissolve the North's second nuclear crisis is nearing the end of its second-phase settlement, albeit six months behind the original deadline. Most vital was the favorable evaluation of the 18,000-page report by the U.S. administration. Japan was also of considerable help by reaching a long-awaited compromise on the abduction issue.

There still remain some stumbling blocks of course. The U.S. intelligence agency is presuming the North has produced up to 50 kilograms of plutonium, much more than the 37 kg declared by Pyongyang. Unresolved suspicions about the North's uranium enrichment program and its possible nuclear proliferation could also make Congressional hawks try to block Washington's dropping of Pyongyang from the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries and its lifting of trade sanctions.

Fortunately, the Bush administration appears set to put an end to the second phase with the disablement of Yongbyon facilities, leaving the verification and scrapping of nuclear weapons to the third stage. This is a reasonable course of action, as it will not be until September to finish this stage and there will be little time to move to the next stage anytime soon considering the U.S. election timetable.

So Seoul should also do its best for the smooth conclusion of the second-phase settlement. Conservative critics may take issue with what they see as the insufficient declaration, but seeking perfection could put off ― if not completely derail ― the progress while nullifying what little has been achieved so far. The North's denuclearization should remain a painstaking step-by-step process rather than seeking a dramatic breakthrough.

What's worrisome is the government's dwindling role, or its increasing dependence on other players ― namely Washington and Tokyo ― in the overall process. President Lee Myung-bak and his foreign policy team have none to blame but themselves for the present dismal state of inter-Korean relationship. As things stand now, Seoul will likely suffer serious isolation in the future.

The Lee administration's ``anything-but-Roh" policy has failed in several areas, but nowhere is this fiasco more noticeable than in inter-Korean ties by failing to come up with workable alternatives. As an opposition party, they might need just a slogan, but as a government, they need a solution.

President Lee is expected to replace his economic team in his Cabinet shakeup scheduled for next week. No less vital is the reshuffle of his inter-Korean policymakers. Of course, the President should first change his own position on North Korea, but any aide or Cabinet minister who cannot or would not rectify their bosses' mistakes are not qualified to stay in the governing circles.