Prolonging Stalemate

Koreas Need Confidence-Building Measures

Pyongyang's rejection of Seoul's latest proposal for opening liaison offices in each other is not very surprising but is still disappointing.

Chances were quite slim for North Korea to favorably respond to ― let alone accept _― the offer President Lee made during his recent U.S. visit, in view of the its previous positions as well as its present relationship with the South.

Pyongyang repeatedly turned down similar offers from Seoul in the past even when the atmosphere between the two Koreas was far better than now, saying it could perpetuate national division. So it would have been rather astonishing had the Stalinist regime picked up the olive branch dropped before its feet seemingly abruptly when inter-Korean ties are at their lowest in more than a decade.

Despite the poor timing and the way the proposal was made, both its downright rejection and the manner Pyongyang showed in doing so were indeed deplorable.

Pyongyang needs to show greater consistency both realistically and theoretically. Peaceful unification does not come all of a sudden one day unless one side collapses or surrenders, which is hardly likely. And if a unified Korea should take the form of a federation as the North wants instead of a unitary state as the South seeks, there should be some sort of liaison offices, if not embassies. West and East Germany set up representative offices and held nine inter-German summits before eventual unification. The Koreas, too, will have to remain as two separate states closest to each other before becoming one.

Even more lamentable was the rhetoric Pyongyang used in denouncing the South Korean leader and his ideas. The North's propaganda machine described the proposal as a ``parlor trick'' admissible to no one, while calling President Lee a ``know-nothing dimwit'' and ``political sleepwalker.''

These kinds of lowly statements would serve no purposes except for degrading their issuer, while raising reasonable questions about the North's intention to seriously deal with the South's new government. It's a pity if Pyongyang still does not realize such words will only antagonize South Koreans, who have chosen a conservative leader.

That said, the new government's North Korea policy has too long a way to go before reaching anywhere. It really defies our understanding why President Lee should follow the suit of the failed policy of the U.S. Republican administration ― summed up at best as benign neglect ― especially when even the latter is reversing its course, while it is uncertain whether it will remain in power.

Leaders in both Koreas need to start efforts to restore trust in each other before it becomes too late. It is regrettable in this regard that Seoul is seeming to take a wait-and-see attitude for the time being, as shown by a Cheong Wa Dae spokeman's comment on the North's refusal, saying, ``We will not be glad and sad by turns, as the door to dialogue is always open.''

Nor will Seoul's suspected tactic of bringing famine-stricken Pyongyang to its knees work, considering the North Korean leadership's track record and China's willingness to help its neighbor in an Olympic year.

Seoul should break the deadlock it created, by resuming humanitarian aid and conveying such an intention in face-saving ways for both. Any further war of nerves could drive the North Koreans into another ``march of hardship,'' for which the South Korean government cannot avoid international blame.