Kim Jong-un's Dandong visit is wake-up call for S. Korea-US-Japan partnership
Chun In-bum
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s Oct. 24 visit to Dandong, China, and his meeting with Wang Huning should not be dismissed as another diplomatic ceremony. It was a carefully staged demonstration of strengthening relations between Beijing and Pyongyang. More importantly, it should serve as a warning to the United States, South Korea and Japan that the strategic environment in Northeast Asia is changing.
Wang Huning is not an ordinary Chinese official. He ranks fourth in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy and serves as chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. A former professor at Fudan University, Wang has been one of China’s most influential political thinkers and strategists, advising three successive leaders: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.
Few Chinese officials have enjoyed such sustained influence across three administrations. Wang has helped shape the ideological foundations of modern Chinese governance. His involvement in Kim’s visit, including conveying Chinese President Xi’s personal greetings, underscores the political significance Beijing attaches to its relationship with North Korea.
Equally important was Kim’s crossing of the recently opened New Amnok River Bridge connecting the Chinese border city of Dandong with North Korea's Sinuiju. Completed in 2014, the bridge remained unused for approximately 12 years before opening this October. Its four lanes and modern infrastructure provide new opportunities for transportation, trade and economic cooperation. The bridge is more than concrete and steel. It is a political statement. China and North Korea are signaling their intention to expand economic engagement. The opening of the bridge could facilitate the movement of industrial equipment, raw materials, energy products and other goods essential to North Korea’s economy.
This raises an uncomfortable question: What remains of the international sanctions regime against North Korea?
United Nations sanctions have not formally ended. Nevertheless, sanctions are effective only when major countries enforce them. If China expands economic cooperation while Russia continues its military relationship with Pyongyang, the practical effectiveness of international pressure could be seriously weakened. The international community must distinguish between sanctions that exist on paper and sanctions that actually influence North Korean behavior.
There is another dimension to this development. North Korea is strengthening its relations with both China and Russia. These relationships are not identical. China provides North Korea with its principal economic lifeline, while Russia has become an increasingly important military partner. Together, these relationships could give Pyongyang greater strategic flexibility and reduce its incentive to negotiate seriously over its nuclear weapons. This is a serious development for the United States and its allies.
However, the challenge is not exclusively military. Economic dependence has become a strategic vulnerability, and South Korea provides a clear example. China remains an enormous market for South Korean businesses and an important supplier of industrial materials, components, and critical minerals. South Korea cannot simply abandon this economic relationship without significant consequences for its industries and national economy. At the same time, South Korea relies on foreign suppliers for essential energy resources, including nuclear fuel. Russia has been a significant supplier of enriched uranium used in South Korea’s civilian nuclear power industry. These dependencies create potential vulnerabilities during periods of international confrontation.
The United States frequently encourages its allies to reduce their strategic dependence on China and Russia. That objective is understandable. But Washington must recognize that economic independence cannot be achieved through political declarations alone. If America expects its allies to diversify away from potentially unreliable suppliers, it must help provide practical alternatives.
This means expanding cooperation in critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, energy security and nuclear fuel supplies. It also means strengthening investment, encouraging reliable supply chains and accepting that economic security requires long-term commitments. America cannot expect its allies to assume substantial economic risks without helping them manage the consequences.
Equally important is the relationship between South Korea and Japan. The two countries are democratic, economically advanced and closely allied with the United States. They face many of the same security challenges, particularly North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities.
Yet historical disagreements continue to undermine political trust. Japan must recognize that historical sensitivities among Koreans are real and cannot simply be dismissed as outdated nationalism. Japan’s colonial rule over Korea remains an important part of Korean historical memory. Symbolic gestures by Japanese political leaders matter. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s offerings to Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted Class-A war criminals are enshrined alongside Japan’s war dead, create unnecessary tensions.
Japan has every right to remember those who died in its service. But its leaders should find ways to honor their dead without reopening historical wounds among neighboring countries. Such gestures are particularly unhelpful when regional security cooperation is becoming more important. South Korea also has responsibilities. Koreans must recognize that legitimate historical grievances cannot become a permanent obstacle to necessary security cooperation. Geography, economic interdependence and shared security interests make cooperation with Japan indispensable.
Neither country needs to forget its history. Both must understand that protecting their future requires practical cooperation today. This cooperation should include intelligence sharing, missile defense coordination, maritime security, supply-chain resilience and closer communication between political and military leaders.
The United States has a particularly important responsibility in making this possible. American leadership in Northeast Asia is urgently needed, but leadership means more than maintaining military forces or demanding increased defense spending from allies. It requires consistent diplomatic engagement, credible security commitments and a willingness to help allies overcome political and economic obstacles.
Washington must understand that strengthening the U.S.–South Korea alliance and the U.S.–Japan alliance separately is not enough. It must also encourage a durable relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. The three countries do not have to agree on every political issue. But they must recognize that their security interests are closely connected.
China and North Korea are strengthening their relationship. Russia continues to deepen its cooperation with Pyongyang. These developments do not necessarily mean that Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang constitute a unified military alliance. Their interests differ, and those differences should not be ignored. Nevertheless, their growing cooperation presents challenges that deserve serious attention.
Kim’s visit to Dandong should therefore be understood as more than a bilateral diplomatic event. It is a reminder that economic relationships, military cooperation and political symbolism are increasingly intertwined. The United States, South Korea and Japan must respond with greater strategic coordination, not complacency or unnecessary confrontation
Military deterrence remains essential. But deterrence without economic resilience, political trust and sustained American leadership will not be sufficient to preserve stability in Northeast Asia.
Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.