The paradox of deterrence: Why peace strategy requires focused military
Chun In-bum
Peace on the Korean Peninsula is not a partisan preference or an idealist’s dream — it is an absolute geopolitical necessity. For decades, tens of millions of people have lived under the persistent shadow of conflict, where a single miscalculation could trigger a catastrophic war. A stable and durable peace on the peninsula is undeniably in the best interest of everyone: the Korean people of both North and South, regional neighbors and the broader international community. Because the stakes are so high, virtually any legitimate diplomatic effort to lower tensions, open lines of communication, reduce the danger of miscalculation and foster reconciliation is fundamentally worthwhile.
However, building peace with an adversary requires navigating a paradox: Trust between long-standing adversaries is essential for progress but notoriously difficult to establish. It cannot be manufactured overnight through handshakes, declarations or ceremonial summits. Genuine trust requires sustained effort, patience, verification and a cold-eyed assessment of reality. Most importantly, it requires a clear understanding of the relationship between diplomacy and military strength. In any serious effort to build peace, a robust military and credible deterrence posture are not obstacles to diplomacy — they are its indispensable foundation.
This distinction is particularly important on the Korean Peninsula. Political leaders must have the freedom to explore dialogue, negotiate agreements and pursue reconciliation. They should be able to take diplomatic initiatives without constantly fearing that doing so will weaken the country’s security. That freedom exists precisely because the armed forces remain prepared for the possibility that diplomacy may fail. The soldier therefore supports diplomacy not by becoming a diplomat, but by ensuring that the nation remains secure while diplomacy is attempted.
Diplomacy operates most effectively when backed by strength. The primary role of the armed forces during a peace process is to maintain a credible deterrent, ensuring that an adversary understands that aggression will fail and impose unacceptable costs. When deterrence is firm, diplomats can negotiate from a position of confidence rather than vulnerability. They can make political compromises when appropriate without those compromises being interpreted as evidence of military weakness. The military’s true contribution to peace is therefore straightforward: It must do its core job exceptionally well by remaining vigilant, trained, disciplined and operationally ready.
This does not mean that the military should resist political authority — quite the opposite. In a democracy, the armed forces must remain firmly subordinate to elected civilian leadership. If the government orders the military to modify an exercise, change a deployment, establish a confidence-building measure or accept some operational restraint as part of a diplomatic agreement, the military has a responsibility to execute that lawful decision professionally. Civilian control of the military is fundamental, but civilian control is very different from military leaders attempting to anticipate what politicians might want and then voluntarily reducing readiness before being directed to do so.
Unfortunately, historical precedent reveals a troubling departure from this principle within elements of the Republic of Korea military establishment. Rather than maintaining absolute focus on readiness while civilian leaders pursued diplomatic initiatives, some military leaders develop an ingrained tendency toward preemptive compliance or acting subserviently on their own initiative.
This is more dangerous than it may initially appear. A commander may believe that reducing an exercise, modifying training or relaxing a posture demonstrates political sensitivity. They may even convince themselves that they are helping create an atmosphere conducive to peace. But unless such measures have been directed by civilian authorities, the commander has crossed an important professional boundary. They are no longer simply implementing policy but attempting to interpret political intentions and convert them into military actions on their own.
Time and again, defense officials have implemented self-limiting measures and operational concessions that political leaders did not explicitly demand, expect or necessarily desire. In a misguided effort to signal goodwill or mirror political rhetoric, military leaders have compromised training schedules, relaxed defense postures or voluntarily accepted limitations that affected readiness. The immediate changes may sometimes appear minor, but their cumulative effect can be serious. Military readiness is built through repetition, realistic training, discipline and institutional habits. Once those habits begin to weaken, restoring them takes time.
Such behavior can also create confusion around responsibilities. If an elected government decides that a particular military concession is necessary to advance diplomacy, then the government should make that decision and accept responsibility for it. Military commanders should provide their professional assessment of the operational consequences and then execute lawful orders. They should not make political concessions on behalf of civilian leaders who never asked for them.
Preemptive accommodation produces two dangerous consequences: First, it weakens deterrence. Unilateral concessions and degraded readiness can create uncertainty about resolve and capability. Deterrence depends not merely on possessing weapons but on convincing an adversary that those forces are trained, prepared and supported by a functioning command structure. A military that voluntarily diminishes its readiness risks weakening the very shield that gives diplomacy room to operate.
Second, it nurtures military complacency. When commanders begin measuring success according to political atmosphere rather than military effectiveness, professional standards can gradually deteriorate. Training becomes negotiable. Readiness becomes secondary. Officers begin asking what political leaders would like to hear rather than what commanders professionally need to tell them. That is unhealthy for any armed force and especially dangerous for one confronting a heavily armed adversary.
Peace cannot be built on self-inflicted weakness. Political leaders have the responsibility to engage in diplomacy and seek structural avenues toward peace. Military commanders have a different responsibility: to maintain an uncompromising defense capable of protecting the nation if diplomacy fails. These roles complement one another precisely because they are different.
The message to military leadership must therefore be stark: Wake up and do your job.
That does not mean opposing peace. It does not mean provoking North Korea, obstructing diplomacy or advocating confrontation. Nor does it mean that military readiness should dictate national policy. It means understanding the proper division of responsibility in a democratic state. Political leaders decide policy. Diplomats negotiate. Soldiers deter and defend.
There is no contradiction between sincerely pursuing peace and maintaining a powerful military. The contradiction arises only when military weakness is mistaken for peaceful intent. A nation can extend its hand diplomatically while keeping its shield firmly in place. Indeed, that may be the paradox at the heart of deterrence: The military best contributes to peace when it remains prepared for war.
Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.