Korea's science diplomacy in the age of technopolitics
Park Jin
The power of traditional geopolitics is being challenged in the 21st century. Territory, natural resources and military power have long constituted — and remain — the principal foundations of national influence. But technological capabilities are becoming just as important, and sometimes more so, in shaping the fate of nations as they amplify geopolitical advantages, compensate for traditional disadvantages or reshape the balance of power.
Science historian Gabrielle Hecht developed the concept of “technopolitics” to describe how political objectives could be embedded in the design of nuclear technology. Today, it encompasses the broader convergence of geopolitics and technology: states increasingly develop, control and employ technology not simply as an industrial asset, but as an instrument of political, economic, diplomatic and security strategies.
This shift has become increasingly explicit in national strategy. Last August, the United States released its National Security Science and Technology Strategy, elevating science and technology to a central pillar of national security. In effect, it was a declaration of the age of technopolitics: science and technology have become strategic assets cutting across interstate competition, deterrence, alliance-building, economic security and supply chain resilience.
This is precisely where science diplomacy becomes essential, bringing together the traditionally separate worlds of science and international relations. It can broadly be understood in three dimensions. Science in diplomacy uses scientific knowledge and expertise to inform foreign policy and diplomatic decisions. Diplomacy for science uses diplomatic channels to facilitate international research, exchanges and collaboration. Science for diplomacy uses scientific cooperation to build trust, improve relations and address common challenges, including among countries with political differences.
Artificial intelligence (AI) accelerates this transformation. As semiconductors, data centers, electricity, critical minerals and talent become integrated into a single strategic ecosystem, research security, export controls, investment screening and competition over standards have become central issues of diplomacy and national security.
At the same time, AI presents a new governance challenge. As recent cases have demonstrated, the more capable agentic AI becomes, the greater the risk of unintended or potentially deviant behavior. If human control and oversight mechanisms fail to keep pace with rapidly advancing AI capabilities, safeguards for monitoring and preventing AI-enabled cyberattacks will become increasingly important. The challenge is therefore not simply how rapidly we can develop AI, but how effectively states can cooperate to control and govern it while maximizing its benefits and managing its risks.
Korea has already helped advance this conversation. It hosted the AI Seoul Summit following the United Kingdom and, with the Netherlands, convened the high-level Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain in Seoul, producing a Blueprint for Action adopted by 61 countries. The challenge now is to turn such achievements into a sustained national strategy rather than a series of one-off events.
Korea starts from considerable strength. Its research and development (R&D) expenditure exceeds 5 percent of its gross domestic product, with world-leading capabilities in semiconductors, shipbuilding, nuclear power and batteries. The government is now looking beyond these strengths, allocating more than $30 billion to foster strategic industries that could drive Korea’s post-semiconductor economy. Its expanded R&D budget will focus on the Seven SEED National Strategic Core Technologies: small modular reactors (SMRs), nuclear fusion, renewable energy, quantum technology, aerospace, advanced biotechnology and advanced supply chains. These priorities should also guide science diplomacy: Korea must determine where it can lead, where it needs partners and where international cooperation can accelerate its ambitions.
That requires a diversified portfolio of technological and international partnerships. In AI and semiconductors, Korea should build an international ecosystem connecting computing resources, advanced memory, foundries, packaging, data and technical standards. In quantum technology, cooperation is urgently needed on joint testbeds, measurement standards and the transition to post-quantum cryptography. In clean energy, including nuclear power and SMRs, cooperation should extend beyond R&D to licensing, safety, financing and joint entry into third-country markets. Space cooperation should expand beyond launch vehicles and satellites to Earth observation, disaster response and next-generation networks.
The geography of cooperation must be equally diverse. With the United States, Korea should produce concrete projects based on the revised bilateral Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement and the Korea–U.S. Technology Prosperity Deal memorandum of understanding signed last October. With Europe, Korea should build on its status as the first Asian country associated with Horizon Europe and work together in areas under the Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness pillar. Japan offers complementarities in advanced technologies, hydrogen and space. With China, Korea should manage risks around security-sensitive technologies while maintaining channels in areas such as climate change, public health and AI safety.
This strategy should expand to the Indo-Pacific. Canada offers strengths in AI, quantum technology and clean energy; Australia in critical minerals, space and climate technology; and India in digital infrastructure, biotechnology and advanced manufacturing.
Cooperation with the Global South is both a responsibility and a strategic opportunity. As a leading country in AI technology, Korea can expand cooperation with countries across Asia, the Middle East and Africa through AI capacity-building, talent development, technology partnerships and digital infrastructure, including data centers. Rather than pursuing one-way technology transfers, Korea should work with local universities, governments and companies to define problems jointly and build indigenous capabilities. The World Health Organization Global Training Hub for Biomanufacturing, hosted by Korea, offers one such model. Such partnerships can help narrow the global AI divide while building a more inclusive and resilient international technology ecosystem.
This is not a matter of choosing one bloc over another, but of building a pragmatic portfolio guided by values, security and mutual benefit.
Such an ambitious strategy requires an institutional foundation. First, Korea should establish a governmentwide national science diplomacy strategy and central coordinating body. Second, overseas diplomatic missions should become hubs for technological intelligence and international research, supported by more science and technology officers. Third, Korea should create a permanent platform, modeled on Switzerland’s Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator, where scientists, businesses, universities, policymakers and diplomats can work together. Research funding, talent visas, research security, intellectual property and international standard-setting should form part of the same strategy.
Korea may not be a superpower, but it can become a “global platform nation” for science diplomacy — connecting countries and regions, science and industry, and innovation and responsibility. Its position between established and emerging powers, combined with its technological and industrial capabilities, gives it an opportunity to build bridges and shape solutions where common rules are required.
Greater capabilities bring greater responsibilities. Korea’s mission in the age of technopolitics is clear: through science diplomacy, it should help ensure that scientific and technological progress reduces threats to humanity and delivers greater benefits for all.
Park Jin, former foreign minister of Korea, is a distinguished invited professor at KAIST.