Open letter to new US envoy Michelle Steel
Moon Keun-sik
The new U.S. ambassador to South Korea is a diplomat who represents the president and government of the United States and advances American national interests. It would therefore be inappropriate to expect the newly arrived Ambassador Michelle Steel to advocate South Korea’s position simply because she is Korean American. Major policy questions involving shipbuilding, nuclear energy and security require deliberation and coordination among the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Energy Department and Congress.
At the same time, an ambassador should not be viewed merely as a messenger. An ambassador serves as a vital diplomatic channel who accurately explains the host country’s strategic value and public sentiment to Washington, identifies common ground when the two countries’ interests diverge and helps translate agreements between their leaders into concrete policies. A former politician with extensive experience and personal networks in both Congress and the Donald Trump administration can be particularly effective in facilitating policy change.
In this regard, Steel’s appointment carries special significance. Born in Seoul in 1955, she grew up in Japan before immigrating to the United States. She went on to serve on the California State Board of Equalization, as an Orange County supervisor and as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Her journey as an immigrant and Asian American woman who reached the highest levels of American politics embodies the openness and opportunities that American society can offer.
Her return to the country of her birth as the representative of the United States is highly symbolic. Yet what ultimately matters is not her heritage, but the shared interests she helps advance during her tenure. I hope Steel will be remembered as an ambassador who helped make the U.S.-South Korea alliance more mutually beneficial and forward-looking. Three areas deserve particular attention.
First, U.S.-South Korea shipbuilding cooperation should become a successful alliance model for rebuilding America’s maritime industrial base.
Such cooperation is not intended to take American jobs or replace the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Its central purpose should be to leverage Korean investment and production-management expertise to modernize U.S. shipyards, train skilled American workers and expand shipbuilding and maintenance capacity within the United States. The partnership must be mutually beneficial, providing the United States with more ships and more resilient supply chains while giving Korean companies fair access to the U.S. market and new business opportunities.
The two countries should realistically review the legal and institutional restrictions on the foreign construction of U.S. vessels while expanding cooperation in U.S.-based investment, maintenance, repair and overhaul, joint technology development and workforce training. Steel can help connect the two governments, their legislatures and private sector companies so that shipbuilding cooperation contributes both to the revival of American manufacturing and to greater alliance burden-sharing.
Second, Steel is expected to help expedite the nuclear-fuel cooperation and administrative procedures required for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines.
What South Korea seeks is not a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine, but a nuclear-powered attack submarine fueled by low-enriched uranium. Such a submarine would not be an instrument of nuclear armament. It would be a defensive capability designed to track North Korean submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile threats over extended periods and strengthen combined U.S.-South Korean deterrence.
A nuclear-powered submarine is neither a nuclear weapon nor a nuclear explosive device prohibited by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear material used for naval propulsion, however, would be employed in a nonproscribed, nonexplosive military activity. South Korea would therefore need to establish a separate verification and management arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Paragraph 14 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, ensuring that the material could not be diverted to nuclear weapons.
What is now needed is to move beyond support in principle and establish the legal and administrative procedures necessary for the supply and use of nuclear fuel for naval propulsion. The U.S. administration should establish an interagency process involving the White House and the State, Defense and Energy departments. Through this process, Washington and Seoul should negotiate an appropriate bilateral arrangement, along with measures governing the supply, security and management of the nuclear fuel.
Congress should also provide bipartisan cooperation so that the necessary reporting, review and legislative procedures are not subject to unnecessary delay.
South Korean nuclear-powered submarines could ease some of the U.S. Navy’s operational burden and strengthen deterrence across the Indo-Pacific. Steel should make the case in Washington that the relevant discussions must not become stalled in interagency review. She can serve as a crucial bridge, encouraging the administration and Congress to complete the necessary procedures promptly and responsibly.
Third, I hope that Steel can actively make the case to the U.S. administration and Congress for granting South Korea greater autonomy in the peaceful enrichment of uranium and management of spent nuclear fuel.
South Korea possesses world-class capabilities in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. Yet it remains dependent on foreign sources for enriched uranium and has not resolved the long-term management of its growing inventory of spent nuclear fuel. These constraints affect both its energy security and the sustainability of its nuclear industry.
South Korea is not seeking unrestricted enrichment and reprocessing authority that could facilitate the development of nuclear weapons. Rather, while fully complying with the U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation agreement, the global nonproliferation regime and IAEA safeguards, Seoul seeks to establish a more reliable supply base for commercial low-enriched uranium and obtain broader U.S. consent to manage U.S.-obligated nuclear material and spent fuel safely and transparently.
The current U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement already leaves open the possibility of uranium enrichment below 20 percent in South Korea, subject to consultations through the bilateral High-Level Commission and further written agreement from the United States. This issue should therefore not be framed as a demand for an entirely new right. It should be approached as an effort to make meaningful use of, and further develop, the consultative mechanisms already established under the agreement.
I hope that Steel can explain in Washington that Seoul’s request is intended not to support nuclear armament, but to strengthen energy security, address the spent-fuel challenge and improve the global competitiveness of the two countries’ nuclear industries. The U.S. administration should actively examine what can be achieved under the existing agreement and what additional measures may be necessary. If amendments are required, Steel should also encourage Congress to cooperate with the relevant review procedures.
Greater South Korean autonomy over enrichment and spent-fuel management, under strict verification and transparency requirements, could advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives while making the bilateral nuclear partnership more durable.
These three priorities are closely connected. Shipbuilding cooperation would strengthen America’s industrial base and naval power. South Korean nuclear-powered submarines would enhance the alliance’s maritime deterrence and burden-sharing. Expanded nuclear cooperation would support both countries’ energy security and industrial competitiveness. This is not a list of unilateral demands from South Korea. It is a strategy of joint investment in which the two allies share capital, technology, human resources and responsibility.
The U.S.-South Korea alliance must now evolve beyond the defense of the Korean Peninsula into a future-oriented strategic partnership encompassing shipbuilding, nuclear energy, advanced technology and supply-chain security. If Steel achieves meaningful progress in these areas, she will be remembered not only as the first Korean American woman to serve as U.S. ambassador to South Korea, but also as a historic ambassador who harmonized American interests with South Korea’s expanding role.
Her success would demonstrate that the interests of the two countries do not have to conflict, but can grow together through cooperation grounded in trust and responsibility. Shared values and shared national interests matter more than shared ancestry. I hope Steel will draw on her distinctive experience and political leadership to open a new chapter in the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
Retired Navy Captain Moon Keun-sik is an adjunct professor at Graduate School of Public Policy of Hanyang University in Seoul.