Korea's energy opportunity in Central Asia
Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu
For much of the post-Soviet period, Korea’s relationship with Central Asia has been defined by trade. Seoul saw Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as emerging markets for Korean cars, electronics and consumer goods. Three decades later, that relationship is being transformed. Central Asia is no longer simply a destination for Korean exports. It is becoming an important part of Korea’s long-term energy, industrial and supply chain strategy.
The logic is straightforward. Korea is a resource-poor but technologically advanced economy. Central Asia is rich in oil, gas, uranium, critical minerals and renewable energy potential, but still needs capital, modern infrastructure and advanced industrial technology. This complementarity has created a partnership in which Seoul offers engineering, nuclear expertise, grid modernization and green technologies, while the region offers energy security and access to strategic resources.
Kazakhstan is the anchor of this expanding engagement. Oil remains central to bilateral trade, but the relationship is moving toward higher-value cooperation. Following Kazakhstan’s 2024 referendum on nuclear energy, Korean companies such as KHNP and KEPCO have presented themselves as potential partners capable of providing not only reactor construction, but also training, safety systems and workforce development. The $882 million Turkistan power plant led by Doosan Enerbility also demonstrates how Korean firms can help modernize aging energy infrastructure with more efficient technology.
Yet Kazakhstan also reveals the main weakness of Korea’s regional strategy. Seoul is strong in technology but more cautious in finance. Korean companies have signed agreements involving lithium, tungsten and other critical minerals, but they have often hesitated to make the large and risky equity investments required to secure long-term access. Central Asian governments increasingly expect Korea to move beyond memoranda of understanding and commit real capital.
In Uzbekistan, Korea has developed a different model. Rather than focusing primarily on resource extraction, it is becoming integrated into the country’s industrial modernization. Korean district-heating expertise is being introduced into the New Tashkent project, offering a long-term role in urban energy management. Korean companies are also exploring the relocation of energy-intensive production to Uzbekistan, where electricity costs are lower. This could support Korea’s electric vehicle battery supply chain while giving Uzbekistan access to advanced manufacturing, skilled employment and global markets.
The challenge is that much of this cooperation remains concentrated around Tashkent. Uzbekistan’s regional energy shortages and infrastructure gaps require broader investment beyond the capital. If Korean firms remain focused only on flagship projects, their presence may depend too heavily on political relationships rather than deeper market integration.
Turkmenistan, as a giant gas producer, represents perhaps the clearest success story for Korean downstream engineering. With some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the country has become a major arena for Korean engineering, procurement and construction companies. Hyundai Engineering and Daewoo E&C have participated in large gas chemical projects, helping Turkmenistan move from raw gas exports toward higher-value products such as polymers and fertilizers.
Today, this model suits both parties. Turkmenistan values Korea as a technically capable partner that generally avoids political interference, while Korean firms gain access to complex, high-value industrial contracts. However, Seoul’s role remains stronger in construction than in upstream energy investment. Korean companies help build the facilities, but they do not always secure a larger position in the resource chain itself.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are smaller markets, but they matter for a different reason. They provide space for Korea to demonstrate renewable energy, hydropower modernization, energy-storage systems and development-oriented technology. In Kyrgyzstan, cooperation on hydropower has potential strategic value for Korea’s semiconductor and advanced manufacturing industries. Yet poor transport links, weak infrastructure and limited financing continue to restrict progress.
In Tajikistan, an antimony-rich country, Korean solar technology and energy storage systems can help address persistent electricity shortages, especially in difficult mountainous conditions. These projects are often supported by official development assistance, making them useful demonstrations of Korean technology. Still, Korea faces strong competition from China, which can offer comprehensive packages combining mines, roads, power plants and financing. Seoul’s more cautious, project-by-project approach is credible, but not always competitive.
This pattern is visible across Central Asia. Korea has earned a reputation for reliability, technical quality and political restraint since the early 1990s. It is not seen as a traditional regional power, and this can be an advantage. Central Asian governments often view Seoul as an alternative partner that can support modernization without demanding geopolitical alignment.
The underlying trade data further demonstrates both the uneven scale and the strategic diversity of Korea’s engagement across Central Asia. In 2024, Kazakhstan supplied Korea with approximately $1.19 billion in crude petroleum and uranium, with resource exports representing 86.8 percent of bilateral trade. Uzbekistan’s refined petroleum and rare metal exports were valued at around $9 million and accounted for 43.2 percent of trade, while Korea’s role increasingly focused on district heating and industrial relocation.
Turkmenistan’s direct exports of propylene polymers remained modest, at roughly $27,000, despite resource-based exports constituting 72 percent of bilateral trade, reflecting a relationship driven more by Korean gas chemical engineering than commodity imports. Kyrgyzstan exported about $1.6 million in refined petroleum and antimony, while Tajikistan supplied $5.7 million in raw aluminium, which accounted for 94.6 percent of its trade with Korea. These figures underline why Seoul’s future success will depend on transforming a series of uneven country-level relationships into a more coherent and long-term regional strategy.
The next stage of engagement may focus on joint industrial ecosystems rather than isolated projects. Nuclear cooperation in Kazakhstan may include local workforce development and supply chains. Energy investment in Uzbekistan may extend beyond Tashkent. Engineering projects in Turkmenistan may create opportunities for deeper participation in downstream production. Renewable initiatives in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may be linked to infrastructure and mineral processing strategies.
By 2030, Central Asia can become one of Korea’s most important energy and industrial partnerships outside its traditional markets. The foundations are already visible. The real question is whether Seoul is prepared to match its technological confidence with financial commitment. If it does, Korea can become more than a contractor or equipment supplier. It can become a long-term partner in shaping Central Asia’s energy future.
Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is deputy director of the Seoul Institute of Global Affairs.