Open letter to Canadian submarine crew
Moon Keun-sik
The game is over. Canada chose Germany over Korea to procure 12 next-generation diesel-electric submarines.
Debating who won or lost the bid is no longer meaningful. As someone who served for more than two decades as a submariner, my primary concern is not the outcome of the procurement process, but rather what kind of submarines will safeguard Canada's national security over the next 30 to 40 years.
A submarine is not a piece of equipment that can be replaced as easily as an automobile. Once commissioned, it serves as an important national asset for nearly four decades. Therefore, procurement decisions should be guided not by political considerations or temporary public opinion, but by the future operational environment and threats a nation is expected to face.
This procurement reminds me of Australia's Future Submarine Program in 2016. Australia signed a contract worth approximately 40 trillion won to acquire 12 diesel-electric submarines from France. Yet only five years later, Canberra cancelled the agreement and established AUKUS with the United States and the United Kingdom, fundamentally shifting its strategy toward acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. Australia accepted enormous financial penalties and diplomatic costs because it concluded that diesel-electric submarines alone would not be sufficient to meet the security challenges of the future.
Canada faces a remarkably similar environment. It must simultaneously secure the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Arctic while monitoring one of the world's largest Exclusive Economic Zones. As the Arctic shipping route grows in strategic importance, the region is becoming a major arena of military competition. Like Australia, Canada is also a key member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, alongside the United States.
The Arctic is witnessing a steady increase in the activities of Russian nuclear-powered submarines. If Canada intends to exercise effective sovereignty over its Arctic territories, it will require significantly stronger undersea operational capabilities than it possesses today. Yet many of the missions essential to that objective are difficult, if not impossible, for diesel-electric submarines to perform.
The first is under-ice operations. In the Arctic, thick ice often makes snorkeling or surfacing impossible. Nuclear-powered submarines can remain submerged beneath the ice for months, whereas diesel-electric submarines are ultimately constrained by battery endurance.
The second is the long-term tracking of hostile submarines. Shadowing Russian nuclear-powered submarines for days or even weeks requires sustained high-speed submerged operations. Diesel-electric submarines must periodically snorkel to recharge their batteries, increasing the likelihood of losing contact with the target.
The third is long-range land attack. Modern submarines have evolved into strategic platforms capable of striking targets thousands of kilometers away with cruise missiles. Nuclear-powered submarines possess a decisive advantage in their ability to approach targets covertly over long distances and withdraw rapidly after completing their mission.
In short, many of the strategic missions Canada is likely to undertake in the future are better suited to nuclear-powered submarines.
I fully understand that many Canadians are uncomfortable with anything associated with nuclear technology. However, nuclear-powered submarines should not be equated with nuclear weapons. France already operates nuclear-powered submarines, and current reactor technology is increasingly moving toward the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU).
The United States is also studying the feasibility of incorporating LEU into future naval reactor designs. Nuclear-powered submarines fueled by LEU could therefore provide a practical solution that minimizes nuclear proliferation concerns while delivering the operational capabilities required for these demanding missions.
Given these realities, Canada should reconsider whether an all-diesel fleet of 12 submarines is truly the optimal force structure. A more suitable approach may be a High-Low Mix: diesel-electric submarines for coastal defense and routine maritime patrols, complemented by nuclear-powered submarines for Arctic operations, long-range deployments, anti-submarine surveillance and strategic land-attack missions.
Above all, there is one message I would like to convey directly to the men and women who serve aboard Canada's submarines.
It is not politicians who operate submarines — it is submariners. Likewise, those who best understand the capabilities required for national defense are the sailors who operate these vessels every day.
Military personnel are not expected to be involved in partisan politics. However, it is their professional duty to explain to governments and legislatures what capabilities are genuinely required for national defense and to provide informed military advice. When the military remains silent, political considerations inevitably begin to shape military strategy, and the consequences can affect national security for decades.
Korea experienced a similar situation in 1996-97. As part of the repayment of Russian loans, Moscow offered Korea Kilo-class submarines under highly attractive financial terms. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea Navy declined the offer because of concerns over uncertain long-term logistics support, incompatibility with its German-designed submarine fleet and the excessive costs of maintaining two separate submarine systems.
That decision ultimately enabled Korea to concentrate on German submarine technology, accumulate indigenous expertise and develop into one of the world's leading designers and builders of submarines. The professional judgment of operational experts at that time became the foundation of today's Korean submarine force.
Today, the Royal Canadian Navy stands at a similarly important crossroads. Government policy deserves respect, but decisions concerning the nation's future defense capabilities must also fully reflect the professional expertise of those who will operate these systems. In light of the evolving strategic environment, the Royal Canadian Navy should continue presenting the government and the Canadian public with a long-term vision for submarine force development, including the eventual introduction of nuclear-powered submarines.
In this regard, Canada should also maintain close cooperation with Korea, which is pursuing the development of LEU-based nuclear-powered submarines and possesses world-class submarine design and shipbuilding capabilities.
Australia's experience offers a clear lesson: Selecting the right capability from the outset is far less costly — and far more secure — than correcting the wrong decision years later.
Ultimately, submarines should be chosen not by politics, but by the operational environment. And no one understands that operational environment better than the submariners who stand watch beneath the sea in defense of their nation.
Ret. Navy Capt. Moon Keun-sik is an adjunct professor of the Graduate School of Public Policy at Hanyang University. He is a former commanding officer of the Republic of Korea’s Navy submarine Na Dae-yong.