New risks lurk for Korea-US shipbuilding partnership
Daniel Choi
On June 5, U.S.Rep. Jared Golden's amendment passed the House Armed Services Committee as part of the FY 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), now heading to a House vote. Intended to promote the U.S. domestic shipbuilding industry, the amendment prohibits any FY 2027 NDAA funds from being used to obtain battle force ships and parts built in foreign shipyards. Historically, the U.S. Navy has never purchased a battle force ship from a foreign country. This practice is also codified in existing law: Under 10 U.S.C. 8679, the military is generally prohibited from procuring major components of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel from foreign shipyards. The Golden amendment would close off any remaining flexibility, prohibiting foreign procurement of battle force ships and parts entirely.
The problem is that the ban the amendment proposes directly goes against where U.S. defense strategy has been heading. Facing workforce shortages, the U.S. ability to sustain sea operations through battle force and commercial ships is a known vulnerability across the Pacific. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the U.S. produces only 0.1 percent of global shipbuilding, while China produces 53.3 percent. Even in terms of sea power, the U.S. Navy has struggled with shipbuilding construction, with 82 percent of new warship construction behind schedule. Meanwhile, China maintains a shipbuilding capacity over 200 times greater than the U.S. The 2026 National Defense Strategy compounds this urgency, as it places the deterrence of China through maritime strength as one of its core goals.
Given these realities, the Trump administration proactively moved to rebuild U.S. sea power through its Maritime Action Plan (MAP). Critical to MAP is a new “Bridge Strategy”, which is a contracting framework that could allow foreign shipbuilders to construct U.S. naval vessels on the condition that they invest significant amounts in domestic U.S. shipbuilding.
The U.S. is attempting to execute this framework with Korea, an ally demonstrating tremendous shipbuilding capabilities. Through the Make America Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) initiative, a series of investments show how Korean firms are already fulfilling their end of the bargain.
Hanwha purchased the U.S. Philadelphia shipyard for $100 million and announced a new $5 billion infrastructure plan to add two docks and three quays
Hyundai and Huntington Ingalls signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to increase joint investments, pursue strategic teaming opportunities for Navy auxiliary shipbuilding programs, collaborate on artificial intelligence and machine learning, robotics, automation and general support for all U.S. Navy vessels.
General Dynamics, Samsung, and Daewoo Ship Engineering Company also signed an MOA to collaborate in industry-leading ship design and manufacturing technologies and the U.S. Navy’s Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLS).
Hanwha and the U.S. Navy Mastership Repair Agreement signed a five-year contract in 2024 permitting U.S. Navy vessels to be repaired in its Geoje Shipyard.
These investments align with the Bridge Strategy. Former U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan stated the Navy was reviewing the possibility of acquiring warships from foreign countries, a position recent enough that it likely reflects ongoing U.S. Navy institutional thinking — and one that Golden's amendment would legislatively foreclose.
This institutional desire appears to have extended to the Oval Office itself. In June, President Lee Jae Myung told reporters that U.S. President Donald Trump had asked him whether the ROK could quickly build 10 U.S. Navy warships. Lee said he responded that it was absolutely possible. This exchange emphasizes how seriously the U.S. is relying on allies, especially Korea, for battle force ships.
Golden’s amendment threatens to legislatively undercut the very arrangement Trump discussed with Lee. The Bridge Strategy’s incentive structure for Korean firms in hopes of building U.S. vessels in its own shipyards and logistics advantage to the U.S. Navy would no longer be viable under the amendment. Without the promise of procurement of Korean-built battle force ships, the commercial and political rationale for Korea to front billions in U.S. shipbuilding weakens considerably.
The amendment also creates a remarkably thin legal tightrope for future MASGA investments relating to battle force ships. Specifically, the General Dynamics, Samsung, and Daewoo Ship Engineering MOA targets collaboration on ship designs, automation and technology and the NGLS. While this agreement is designed to comply with domestic build requirements, the amendment could lead to further debates on what it means for a battle force ship to be foreign-built versus domestic-built, particularly as design collaboration with Korean firms deepens. This brings further compliance exposure to the MOA and creates legal uncertainty.
It is important to note that many of MASGA's investments are tied to maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) contracts, which will not be at risk from Golden’s Amendment. MRO contracts allow the U.S. to make equipment changes, maintenance services and mass repairs required through Korea’s shipyards. MRO contracts for repair and maintenance for U.S. Navy ships at Korean shipyards will remain outside the amendment’s scope.
However, there are indirect risks for future MRO contracts. By establishing a de facto ceiling on the broader partnership's trajectory, Korean firms will have to reevaluate their expectations for possible expansion of their existing MRO operations.
Major Korean shipbuilding companies have been intentionally investing in U.S. shipyards to hedge against the kind of risk the amendment imposes. Whether it's creating a U.S.-based production presence or specific designs for support vessels, commercial maritime cooperation investments will largely remain intact.
Approved by a bipartisan 44-12 vote, Golden’s amendment will be included in the 2027 NDAA, which will head to the House floor for a vote. The legislation is projected to request $1.85 billion to integrate and assess the capabilities of allied shipyards.
But the bill still requires a reconciliation process from the Senate, and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) is moving in a noticeably different direction. On June 11, the SASC would allow the Pentagon to build up to two bulk fuel and two sealift vessels in foreign shipyards. Compared to Golden’s amendment that applies a ban on foreign-built battle force ships, the Senate carved out an exception for a controlled number of auxiliary ships.
The SASC’s permissive posture towards foreign-built military vessels, even if they are auxiliary ships, reflects a substantive divergence between the House and the Senate. Both chambers share commitment to advancing U.S. shipbuilding. However, they disagree on whether allied construction is an obstacle to that goal or a prerequisite for it. Given Trump’s track record of influencing Congress to fulfill his administration’s goals, a House floor vote likely does not have the final say on the matter. Whether Congress produces an overarching prohibition or limited exceptions, the FY 2027 NDAA will determine the future of the U.S.-ROK shipbuilding alliance and whether the Bridge Strategy remains executable.
Daniel Choi is a research intern at Pacific Forum, a junior at Pomona College, and an Army ROTC cadet. His research focuses on U.S.-ROK alliance dynamics and Indo-Pacific security.