Eye of Sauron shifts

Last week I already had in my head a half-written draft of this column. It was about U.S. President Donald Trump’s international tariff strategy after his recent stinging loss in the Supreme Court, which ruled his tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act unconstitutional. Trump’s response to the Supreme Court decision was predictably execrable, as a matter of both substance and politics. My column draft unflatteringly compared Trump to Sauron, the pervasive malevolent force in J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy.
But Trump’s eye abruptly shifted focus to another area, war in the Middle East, and so my column for this month has been hijacked into addressing that. Indeed, on Feb. 28 the U.S. and Israel began a major — currently ongoing — bombing campaign against Iran. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was quickly killed in an attack on his compound, as were numerous other senior Iranian political and defense figures. Military and other strategic sites — including air defenses, communications and nuclear and missile installations — throughout Iran have also been targeted. Battle damage assessments are at this point unclear, but Iran has been struck severely.
Retaliation by Iran has featured missile and drone attacks against U.S. military bases in the region, as well as selected targeting of the U.S.’s Middle East partners. Again, good information is difficult to get, but the retaliation seems sporadic, uncoordinated and militarily ineffective.
None of this is surprising. Despite negotiations, the U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the start of the year made an attack almost guaranteed. Iran’s weak response was also likely, as its national and proxy fighting forces have been degraded by the U.S. and Israel over the last 18 months. What is more surprising is Trump’s exhortation to the Iranian people to use this U.S.-Israeli attack to overthrow the Iranian regime. This indicates two things: that Washington may be willing to go further and longer than imagined in pressing its military advantage to effect regime change in Tehran, and that the Iranian regime will perhaps fight desperately rather than hunker down, absorb punishment and wait out the conflict.
Given that context, how should we understand this war? This is not a war of self-defense by the U.S., but rather a war of choice. The Trump administration argues that Iran was preparing imminent attacks against the U.S., but there is no evidence for this. This administration lies like it breathes, so we should discount the possibility that this is a preemptive war. Instead, this war is preventive, a war to preclude an adversary developing capabilities that could put the attacking state at risk. In this case, the U.S. (and Israel) attacked Iran to prevent it from furthering its nuclear and missile programs.
Unlike preemptive war, preventive war is impermissible under the United Nations Charter, and thus the U.S.-Israel war against Iran is illegal under international law. Moreover, it is also illegal under U.S. law, as a large-scale, indefinite war such as this requires congressional approval, which the Trump administration pointedly did not even seek. Considering other recent U.S. violations of international law — universal tariffs, the Nicolas Maduro operation in Venezuela, Caribbean boat bombings, the 2025 missile strikes in Iran — the Trump administration has gone rogue. Allies and adversaries alike must understand that the U.S. no longer plays by the rules of domestic or international law.
The outcome of the war in Iran is uncertain at this juncture. Khamenei and numerous henchmen are dead. We should be relieved that such a vicious, evil tyrant was eliminated. But there is no guarantee that Iran’s future will be more prosperous, equitable or humane. Perhaps regime change succeeds, and Iran is better off. But perhaps regime change fails. Or perhaps regime change leads to chaos, state collapse and regional instability.
In this context, South Korea has equities to consider. It has more than 16,000 citizens in Iran and the surrounding region. Seventy percent of its crude oil imports — for both consumption and industry feedstock — travel through the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently disrupted. Foreign exchange volatility may affect the won. Thus Seoul faces direct diplomatic and economic consequences from this war.
Moreover, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will again feel that Pyongyang’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was justified. Kim does not want to go out like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Maduro or Khamenei. Moreover, the notion that the U.S. used negotiations with Iran as a subterfuge to prepare for attack cannot be ruled out. This perception may spook Kim into avoiding negotiations with Trump, about which he was already skeptical. Kim will also note Iran’s ineffective air defenses and presumably review Pyongyang’s missile launch doctrine to minimize the possibility that North Korea sees its missiles destroyed before they are launched during a crisis.
The U.S.-Israel war against Iran tests my ability to hold conflicting thoughts simultaneously. I think this war is a bad idea for both prudential and legal reasons, but since it is happening, I hope Iranians seize the opportunity presented by Khamenei’s death to topple his regime and build a brighter future. I am thus in the strange, muddled position of both opposing U.S. actions and hoping they succeed. The cognitive dissonance is taxing.
Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and president of the Korea International Studies Association.