Imagining the unimaginable

image

When Amitav Acharya, a renowned international relations scholar at American University, published his recent book, "The Once and Future World Order," he did something deceptively simple yet intellectually courageous: He questioned what most of us, including myself, had long taken for granted. His central argument, that the foundations of world order and the modern international system were never an exclusively Western achievement, but a shared enterprise built across five millennia of non-Western civilizations, ignited considerable debate in academic circles and on social media alike.

The historical accounts are astounding in their own right, but what particularly struck me was the act itself, the willingness to interrogate assumptions that had long calcified into common sense. That intellectual daring is exactly what this moment demands of us as well.

Humans are, by nature, resistant to revising their worldviews. The psychologist Leon Festinger famously identified cognitive dissonance — the discomfort we feel when presented with evidence that challenges our existing beliefs — as one of the powerful forces shaping human minds and behavior. Rather than updating our assumptions, we reflexively protect them. This is not a moral failing, but simply how minds work, trained over years and embedded in institutional cultures and day-to-day interactions.

But what is often forgivable at the individual level becomes inescapable at the national level. Policies, especially foreign policy, built on unexamined assumptions do not merely misread the world but miss it entirely and carry grave consequences.

Korea is not immune to this tendency. For decades, the architecture of South Korean foreign policy has rested on a set of premises that felt, if not permanent, at least durable: American unipolarity as the organizing principle of the world, the United States as an unconditional security guarantor, North Korea as a state defined above all by its pursuit of Korean reunification, and nuclear weapons as a firm taboo in public and policy discourse. These were not unreasonable premises. They reflected the world as it was.

But the world is shifting in ways that strain each of them.

American unipolarity, the structural background that shaped many of the South Korean strategic calculations since the end of the Cold War, is visibly shifting. The increasing accommodation by Washington of a multipolar world, the relative decline of American economic authority alongside the ascent of competing power and the dwindling of norms once thought to govern international conduct have introduced a degree of uncertainty into the security environment that would have seemed implausible a generation ago.

It is this new reality that lends persuasiveness to what Acharya calls “multiplexity,” an international order shaped not by a single hegemonic power but by a diverse constellation of state and non-state actors, multidimensional interdependence, political and cultural diversity, and pluralistic norms.

North Korea, meanwhile, has publicly and consequentially abandoned the reunification narrative that defined its ideological posture for 70 years. Pyongyang now frames South Korea not as a wayward brother to be eventually reconciled, but as a hostile foreign state, which is a rhetorical shift that carries strategic implications that Seoul has yet to fully process.

And domestically, South Korean public and elite opinion on nuclear armament has moved in ways that would have been politically unspeakable not long ago. Polls show a majority public support for an independent nuclear capability, and such numbers cut across the conventional left-right political divide, signaling a deeper anxiety about the reliability of extended deterrence.

These are not fringe scenarios, but unfolding realities.

This is where epistemological flexibility, the willingness to genuinely entertain and rigorously examine ideas that sit outside one’s inherited framework, becomes a strategic resource.

History rewards those who think ahead of the curve. The states and societies that shaped the rules of international trade, of the internet, of nuclear strategy and of artificial intelligence were not those who waited for these technologies to mature before engaging with them. They were those who invested in the speculative and often institutionally marginalized work of thinking seriously about possibilities before they became certainties. First-movers not only adapted to new realities but also actively authored rules governing new realities in ways that benefit them the most.

The same principle applies to grand strategy. Of course, Korea cannot prepare for every contingency; resources are finite, and attention is scarce. But there is an enormous difference between a policy establishment that has genuinely stress-tested its assumptions, that has gamed out scenarios involving alliance restructuring, peninsular realignment or shifting nuclear postures, and one that has not. When the critical moment arrives, as it inevitably will, only the former is in a position to act rather than merely react.

None of this is an argument for reconfiguring the alliance, pursuing nuclear weapons or accepting any particular conclusion about where Korean foreign policy should land. It is an argument for the quality of the thinking that precedes those conclusions.

Acharya’s great service was not merely to question the Western-centric history, but to demonstrate that the questions we refuse to ask are often the most important ones. Navigating one of the most complex strategic environments, Korea can ill afford the luxury of unexamined assumptions.

Park Jin-wan is a nonresident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna.

Interesting contents

Taboola 후원링크

Recommended Contents For You

Taboola 후원링크