Trump is not all wrong about Mexico
Guillermo Ortiz
MEXICO CITY – In several interviews after U.S. forces extracted Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela, U.S. President Donald Trump said that his administration will “have to do something about” Mexico, America’s southern neighbor. Trump again praised Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum as a “terrific person,” but reiterated his belief that drug cartels run the country. This notion was recently reinforced by the U.S. indictment of Maduro, which alleged that he and other Venezuelan officials worked with Mexican cartels to traffic cocaine and launder drug proceeds.
On several occasions since returning to the White House, Trump has threatened military action against the cartels and offered to send special forces to accompany Mexican troops on drug raids. Sheinbaum has repeatedly rebuffed these moves because U.S. intervention would be politically devastating for her and the ruling Morena party that her still-powerful predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), founded and controls.
Trump is at least partly right that organized crime has vastly expanded its influence in Mexico and controls large swaths of the country’s territory. Accurate data on the extent of criminal activity in Mexico are difficult to obtain, but reliable sources point to an increase during AMLO’s presidency, a trend that continues today.
In addition to drugs and human trafficking, the cartels maintain lucrative extortion rackets, which have become a more important source of income following the effective closure of the U.S.-Mexico border to undocumented migration and the consequent fall of human trafficking revenues. Recent reports find increased levels of extortion across regions and sectors, including merchandise transport.
Whereas AMLO “paused” relations with the US embassy on security matters during his term, Sheinbaum has sought to appease Trump by increasing cooperation and information sharing with U.S. authorities on drug trafficking and other illicit activities. The U.S. Department of State and others in the Trump administration have praised the Mexican government’s willingness to collaborate.
As part of this effort, Mexico has extradited dozens of cartel members to the U.S., including 37 people in late January. Sheinbaum has also appointed an experienced and competent Secretary of Public Security to coordinate the army and the National Guard in intelligence operations, resulting in confrontations with notorious cartels and the arrests of many organized-crime leaders.
The supply of fentanyl from Mexico to the U.S. – a main focus of the Trump administration – appears to have slowed considerably (or at least seizures of the drug have fallen sharply). Homicides have decreased, but disappearances have increased sharply, and last year’s discovery of a cartel’s “extermination” camp, with forced recruits believed to be among the victims, triggered widespread outrage about the worsening problem.
Despite the seeming reversal of AMLO’s “hugs, not bullets” approach toward organized crime and increased cooperation with the US, the data suggest that these groups are still expanding. That is certainly how the White House and the Mexican population see it (surveys in Mexico and across Latin America show that security is a top concern). But American intervention in the country without the consent of the Mexican military would be dangerously counterproductive, severely damaging bilateral relations and turning public opinion in Mexico against the U.S.
It would also be ineffective, because curbing the power of organized crime requires severing their ties to political power. The ruling Morena party is widely known to have received funds from criminal organizations to finance electoral campaigns in several states and municipalities over the years. Moreover, prominent party members, including state governors and congresspeople, have alleged ties to organized crime.
The straightforward answer is for Sheinbaum’s government to investigate these links. But all the politicians with alleged cartel ties were appointed by AMLO, and Sheinbaum is clearly unable or unwilling to risk a rupture with her predecessor that would fracture Morena and put her administration at risk. Sheinbaum must call a midterm election in 2027 to retain her presidency, and thus needs Morena’s electoral machine. (That vote is a trap invented by AMLO to ensure his continued control of Morena even while out of power.)
Trump is not similarly constrained. If he is serious about targeting Mexico’s cartels, he should focus on revealing their links to Morena politicians rather than pushing for military action. The dozens of cartel members extradited to the U.S. have surely provided detailed information on these ties. The revocation of Baja California governor Marina del Pilar Ávila’s U.S. visa in 2025 and the arrest of former Chihuahua governor César Duarte for alleged money laundering are promising first steps. More arrests and indictments could have a positive impact on Mexico-US relations.
Such actions would reduce AMLO’s grip on Morena, allowing Sheinbaum to take control of the party and expand the fight against organized crime. In the future, politicians would be less likely to work with the cartels if they knew it could lead to their arrest and imprisonment.
Another potential benefit is that the Morena alliance could splinter, opening the possibility of real political competition and a move away from the autocratic path that AMLO set the country on. Of course, Trump cares little about the robustness of Mexican democracy. But a more competitive political system might lead to the easing of the constraints that AMLO imposed on the electricity sector, particularly the restrictions on private investment – a development that could be of great interest to US companies and Trump.
Perhaps more importantly, stronger law enforcement against the cartels could improve investors’ perception of Mexico, both at home and abroad. Given that stagnant investment is probably the main reason why the Mexican economy has performed so poorly in recent years, this shift could be a win-win for Mexico and the U.S. But it can happen only if Trump combats the cartels with political pressure, not military force.
Guillermo Ortiz, a former finance minister of Mexico and governor of Banco de Mexico, is Treasurer of the G30. This article was distributed by Project Syndicate.