Contemporary warfare in Ukraine: Is Seoul asleep at the wheel?
This month marks the fourth year of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. This tragedy has caused immense suffering and loss of life, but Ukraine still exists as a sovereign state, as its people have defended themselves courageously and capably. Indeed, what was expected to be a quick victory for Moscow has become a quagmire for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose forces have been decimated in a meat grinder.
In fact, the Russian military has now been fighting against Ukraine for longer than the Soviet Red Army fought Germany during World War II, yet with only modest gains. How has Kyiv achieved this, aside from the desperate tenacity, bravery and warfighting skill that Ukrainians have demonstrated? There are many factors, including assistance in air defense, intelligence, communications, weaponry and ammunition provided by the US and European partners, but an important one has been their quick adaptation to two modern battlefield realities: drones and cyberwarfare.
The advent of full-scale drone warfare during the Russia-Ukraine war has been a dynamic process, changing and evolving as the two adversaries learn from experience. Ukraine has succeeded in defending itself against much larger Russian forces in part because it has learned lessons effectively. Some of these lessons are especially relevant for the Korean Peninsula.
First, drones are flexible, diverse, evolving and omnipresent. The initial stars of drone warfare were medium-altitude long-endurance drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 that destroyed tank columns early on, but these became vulnerable to air defenses and were transitioned to reconnaissance tasks. Over time, their role was replaced by one-way attack drones and loitering munitions, effectively inexpensive cruise missiles for long-range strikes. The majority of these may be shot down, neutralized or otherwise destroyed, but the ability to deploy large numbers of them at low cost means they are still devastating. These drones are complemented by micro-drones for reconnaissance or attack at much shorter ranges. These drones expose infantry, provide targeting data for artillery and enhance battlefield awareness for other military units. At some points in the war, more than 10,000 of these drones have been used per day. Drones have also been employed in sea warfare and for land-based logistical tasks such as supplying troops.
Second, the sheer volume of use on the contemporary battlefield means that production capacity is critical. The ability of industry to produce mass numbers of drones is as essential as producing mass numbers of tanks, artillery rounds or other matèriel. However, production has to be accompanied by innovation in order to defeat air defense, electromagnetic and other measures used to neutralize drones. This will likely be accelerated and exacerbated by increasing use of artificial intelligence in drone warfare.
Third, drones have a profound psychological impact on soldiers in the battlefield. They are exposed like never before, as the front line has become transparent to a depth of 10-20 kilometers. From the line of contact to rear areas, no location is truly safe. This increases the cognitive stress on infantry especially, provoking fear, paranoia and mental fatigue that impact combat ability.
As for cyberwarfare, the important lesson is that contemporary war is now inseparable from cyberspace. From the lead-up to and early days of Russia’s attack in 2022 to the present, cyberwarfare has been part of every stage and domain of the conflict. Ukraine reports constant exposure to cyberattacks against military targets, critical infrastructure and civilian institutions, encompassing everything from water and power to banking and media. This is intended to sap the will to fight, so mitigating effects and quick recovery is important. As with drone warfare, the cyber dimension of conflict is also a cat-and-mouse game, with offense and defense in a race to outsmart each other.
What does all this mean for Korea, where topography makes drone warfare likely in conflict, and where the South is highly networked and reliant on the internet? North Korea has an epistemic advantage over South Korea by virtue of its alliance with Russia and its soldiers’ experience in the war. Pyongyang has been able to learn about modern drone and cyber warfare indirectly from Russia and directly through battlefield experience. South Korea should increase its engagement with Ukraine and others assisting the country, including the U.S. and European states, in order to catch up.
As of late 2025, South Korea was still worrisomely behind in its efforts to consistently observe and learn from the Ukrainian battlefield. Indeed, knowledgeable Ukrainian contacts have told me that South Korea is far down the list of states talking with Ukraine about its experience with drones and cyber warfare. If this does not improve, such negligence would be dangerous national defense malpractice.
Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and president of the Korea International Studies Association.