Lee Jong-eun is a Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Greenville University.
2025: South Korea’s surprising continuity in foreign policy
Lee Jong-eun
By Lee Jong-eun
Last December, Korean politics experienced an unexpected crisis when President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law across the country. In the months that followed, the country faced political uncertainty and deepening divisions that ultimately ended in Yoon’s impeachment and the subsequent election of opposition leader Lee Jae Myung as the next president.
The turnover in government sparked speculation — and even anxiety —about potential shifts in South Korea’s foreign policy. In contrast to the Yoon government’s “value-based diplomacy” focused on explicit strategic alignment with the U.S. and Japan and hardline policies toward North Korea and Russia, some policy analysts predicted that Lee’s “pragmatic, national interest-based” diplomacy would seek greater strategic distance from the U.S. and Japan and renew more conciliatory policies toward North Korea and Russia.
The first year of Lee’s government, however, has largely shown continuity in foreign policy. While South Korea’s domestic politics has continued to experience polarization and unrest, there has been far greater stability in its diplomatic engagement.
First, Lee has continued “shuttle diplomacy” with Japan, a marked shift from his past critical rhetoric about the partnership. At a summit with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Lee reaffirmed past bilateral agreements, including the controversial 2015 “comfort women” agreement. The summit agreed to continue a “future-oriented” bilateral relationship that includes economic and strategic cooperation. Even after Ishiba was replaced by the more hardline Sanae Takaichi, Lee maintained a cordial approach toward Japan’s new prime minister.
Lee has also reaffirmed his commitment to the alliance with the United States. During his state visit to the U.S., Lee allayed concerns that Korea might hedge between the U.S. and China. Instead, he emphasized prioritizing the alliance with the U.S. over economic relations with China. After months of negotiations with the Donald Trump administration, Lee’s government also secured a bilateral trade deal that included increased Korean investment in the U.S. and lower tariffs.
The new government's rhetoric towards North Korea has been more conciliatory than that of the Yoon administration. Lee suspended loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea and proposed a multistage “END” (engage, normalize, denuclearize) framework for North Korean denuclearization.
During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju, Lee met with President Xi Jinping of China and reaffirmed his commitment to a continued bilateral economic partnership. However, Lee’s government has prioritized trilateral strategic partnerships with the U.S. and Japan. Lee reaffirmed coordination with the U.S. and Japan on deterring North Korean threats and achieving denuclearization, declining to recognize North Korea as a “nuclear weapons state.”
North Korea, in turn, has rebuffed South Korea’s diplomatic overtures, prolonging the suspension of bilateral talks. To strengthen South Korea’s military deterrence, Lee also secured U.S. approval to construct a nuclear-powered submarine, risking protests from North Korea and China.
Finally, Korea-Russia relations have remained distant compared to the period before the Russia-Ukraine war. Upon inauguration, Lee did not call Russian President Vladimir Putin, as he did leaders of the U.S., China and Japan. Lee’s government has described the bilateral relationship as important yet difficult, with “serious limitations,” and has criticized the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea.
Despite the change in the presidency, South Korea’s foreign policy over the past year has largely continued along the same trajectory. South Korea has continued to seek closer strategic partnerships with the U.S. and Japan, expanded multilateral diplomacy with developing nations, increased arms exports to Europe and attempted to deter or mitigate conflicts with neighbors. As South Korea’s foreign policy has frequently shifted following changes in the presidency, such continuity — if it persists — is a rare occurrence.
This continuity may be attributed to Lee’s pragmatic calculations to avoid risky changes amid a volatile geopolitical environment, which has intensified with Trump’s second term. It may also reflect South Korea’s good fortune: So far, it has avoided serious external shocks that might have increased pressure for foreign policy changes. Despite leadership changes of their own, the U.S. and Japan have continued to maintain strategic partnerships with South Korea, while North Korea has so far refrained from severe provocations.
As 2026 approaches, South Korea faces uncertainty about whether this trajectory can continue. First, South Korea’s luck may run out as its strategic partners and challengers increase pressure. The Trump administration may impose new demands, such as restructuring or reducing U.S. forces deployed in South Korea. Despite an initially friendly encounter, diplomacy between Lee and Takaichi may face political challenges as a result of recurring bilateral tensions over historical memory. Lee’s effort to mitigate tensions on the peninsula may also face heightened adversity, particularly if Chinese tensions with Taiwan, Japan and the U.S. escalate.
Second, even a relatively stable geopolitical status quo may eventually be viewed with concern and discontent by some. With respect to North Korea, there are concerns that the continued suspension of talks will cement the divide between the two Koreas, worsening prospects for future political reconciliation and denuclearization. To avert a new cold war in Northeast Asia, Lee’s government may face domestic pressure to risk more proactive engagement.
As the cliche “it takes two to tango” suggests, South Korea’s foreign policy will be impacted by the responses of its key diplomatic partners. In the next few years, perhaps South Korea’s partners will allow Lee to continue his current foreign policy. If not, Lee’s government will need to strategize how its foreign policy can be adjusted and to seek new policy opportunities. For South Korea to succeed in its foreign policy, the hope is that its diplomatic partners — intentionally or unintentionally — will help increase the likelihood of success in the future.
Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer.