Kim Won-soo is the former Korean diplomat and the under-secretary-general of the United Nations for disarmament.
Trumpism and global disorder
Kim Won-soo
By Kim Won-soo
With the return of U.S. President Donald Trump in the United States, Trumpism has become a hot word. But that means many things, from his ideological disdain of liberal values to his transactional deal-making style.
Broadly speaking, Trumpism reflects underlying changes in American society. In that sense, Trumpism is not the cause, but rather a symptom that is seriously aggravating existing wounds. Trumpism also represents the president's unconventional style in the use of language and theatrics, fueling populism and identity politics.
A serious debate is ongoing as to whether Trumpism in the U.S. will be short-lived or endure after his presidency ends. The jury is still out. The first test will come at next year’s midterm elections. The political battle over liberal values in the U.S. is not over yet, as shown by a recent survey done by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. A growing majority of American people favors free trade and shows positive attitudes toward immigration.
On the international front, the impact of Trumpism is being felt on the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order, which has been maintained for the last 80 years since the end of World War II. Trump seems to pursue a self-contradictory posture, seeking to preserve U.S. hegemony without keeping the other side of the bargain, namely serving as the world's security guarantor and police to protect its allies, promote global free trade and provide aid to developing countries.
As a result, a big question mark is raised as to whether the liberal international order is working or effectively dead. The answer given by professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University, currently a global eminence scholar of Kyung Hee University was both yes and no, during a special talk held last week at the Chey Institute in Seoul, co-hosted by the Indo-Pacific Democracy Forum. Ikenberry admits that the liberal order is under severe stress, but he argues that the liberal order still remains the best possible institutional option since all other options are worse. Comparative advantages of the liberal order in managing international relations are still valid, since liberalism lowers the transactional costs for international cooperation in the age of inter-connectedness through institutions and norms.
It still remains to be seen whether and how Trumpism will hold as a long-term trend in the United States. Regardless of the answer to this question, the rest of the world, including Korea, will have to take it seriously for at least the next three years. For now, Trumpism will remain the unpredictable X factor in international relations. Korea needs to refine its coping strategy with the following priorities.
First and foremost, Korea must identify an optimal policy mix in managing its alliance relationship with the U.S. Bilateral coordination with the U.S. must be deepened in every important domain, particularly in the "2 Ds" (defense and diplomacy) and "2 Ts" (trade and technology). These four domains are increasingly interconnected as geopolitics these days are entangled with geo-economics and technological competition. In view of Trump’s top-down decision-making style, intimate personal rapport between the Trump and President Lee Jae Myung must also be nurtured carefully and given highest priority.
Secondly, bilateralism must be supplemented by minilateralism. Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral relations should come first. Korea and Japan can and should also deepen their bilateral coordination, to manage their relationship and mitigate regional and Trumpism risks. Among others, Korea and Japan can coordinate quietly on their responses to defense burden-sharing and trade tariffs. The Korea-Japan-China trilateral relationship comes next, as it provides Korea with a valuable avenue to explore possible areas of cooperation with China, starting from domains of low political differences and high mutual vulnerability, such as climate, the environment and nuclear safety. Korea should be open-minded and proactive to other minilaterals such as the Quad, consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the United States.
Last but not least, Korea must play a proactive role in facilitating various forms of coalition-building through plurilateral, regional and global multilateralism to compensate for the growing gap in the provision of global public goods. Middle powers must step up to the plate. They can build bridges between the Global North and the rising Global South. This role will be critical until the dust settles on global governance. Through issue-based and multilayered coalitions of the willing, middle powers can also help the U.S. and China manage their hegemonic competition responsibly. Coping with existential threats against the whole of humanity requires the U.S. and China to find common ground for the collective good of themselves and humanity.
None of these tasks is easy. Each of them must be planned thoroughly and executed discreetly. Risk management and contingency planning must be included. Indeed, the global and regional geopolitical climate facing Korea is full of uncertainty and volatility. But I count on Korea’s resilience in steering it shrewdly so as to turn crisis into opportunity.
Kim Won-soo is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. He is now the chair professor of Kyung Hee University in Korea.