Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy in doubt
Choo Jae-woo
As I predicted in my article “Is Lee Jae Myung’s diplomatic shift an attempt at redemption?” on Feb. 13, the president’s cognitive dissonance is already evident in diplomatic contacts, particularly inter-Korean ones. He did not attend the NATO summit this month; some in Korea suspect he didn’t want to join a multilateral gathering with a hostile agenda toward China and Russia. The decision shows that Lee is abandoning his pragmatic foreign policy.
Lee’s actions so far have merely avoided criticisms of his pragmatic foreign policy. Multilateral engagement was part of the plan. He attended the G7 summit in Canada less than two weeks into his presidency. After the U.S. bombed Iran, the presidential office announced his NATO summit absence on June 22. The president was reportedly worried about a lack of a “control tower” throughout the turmoil.
“Had the Cabinet been fully staffed and the response system more complete, the president may have had the leeway to attend NATO," the Democratic Party of Korea's (DPK) chief aide for communications, Park Sang-hyuk, told YTN Radio. "Having the national security chief abroad could increase instability as Iran threatens to shut the Strait of Hormuz. This was the most practical choice.”
Presidential office spokesperson Kang Yoo-jung said in a June 23 presidential office statement, “Given the combination of domestic challenges and growing instability in the Middle East, it became clear that in-person participation was no longer feasible.” Internal concerns and Middle East uncertainties were to blame, she added.
After the National Security Council meeting to assess the security and economic implications of the Middle East crisis, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac attributed the cancellation to the government’s priority of Korean citizen safety and well-being, minimizing the crisis’ impact on the Korean Peninsula. He replaced Lee at the NATO summit.
Lee’s party also strongly supported the decision. The DPK welcomed Lee’s decision as a “wise move.” Floor spokesperson Kim Hyun-jung said, “Although parliamentarians may have personal ideas, our official position is to support the government.” In a live interview, DPK lawmaker Park Ji-won declared, “There will be no negative consequences. The Middle East problem limits our role, unlike NATO, which is a direct military alliance, hence the President decided not to go.” In another CBS Radio interview, Rep. Park Soo-hyun said, “It was the right call.”
The advice from Lee’s security consultants, which may have been more crucial to the decision, was not publicized. They may have advised Lee based on partisan interest. In diplomatic circles, they are known as the "self-help faction," or “jajupa” in Korean, which prioritizes strategic balance with China and Russia. Their goal is to become more independent of the U.S. in political and security matters.
Dating back to the 1970s and 1980s pro-democracy movement, anti-Americanism shaped their views. The foreign press called them radical students. The prime minister nominee, National Intelligence Service head, and the unification minister are among these officials.
In this context, Lee’s North Korea policy reversal from his presidential campaign was expected. At the time, he vowed to emphasize the significance of a strong deterrent stance against military provocations with the U.S.-South Korea partnership. Strengthening international cooperation was another priority. However, he is already contradicting himself with some pronounced measures.
He stressed that inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation and collaboration were the keys to reducing North Korea’s nuclear threat. He said his policy aims to denuclearize and establish a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. His statement Wednesday marking the 75th anniversary of the Korean War showed his shift in position. He said he would work to build a continuous peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula before leaving office.
Skipping the NATO summit shows Lee’s disinterest in a strong alliance-based deterrent posture, but he’s quick not to antagonize the North. On June 11, less than a week into his presidency, Lee imposed a complete ban on South Korea’s loudspeaker broadcasts aimed at North Korea. It appeared to be a conciliatory gesture to Pyongyang, to lessen military tension and encourage dialogue. South Korea recently announced its intention to steadily expand cooperation with North Korea based on denuclearization and a peaceful Korean Peninsula.
Also on Wednesday, the Ministry of Unification approved South Korean civilian organizations’ applications to establish contact with North Korea. No applications were authorized under Lee's predecessor Yoon Suk Yeol, but the ministry approved six of 11 applications, and the presidential office plans to submit a law loosening application rules.
The application date of June 4 mattered. That it occurred on Lee’s inauguration day implied that these applicants trusted a liberal party president who values inter-Korean cooperation. And they were right. The unification ministry also announced its intent to submit an amendment to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.
Lee seemingly has pragmatic diplomacy in his rearview mirror. Even without a pull-out meeting with the U.S., he should have attended the NATO summit. It would have been the perfect chance for a foreign policy neophyte to learn about world events, since he’s been a domestic politician his whole career.
He enthusiastically promoted Korean commercial diversification in his pragmatic diplomacy. NATO meetings go beyond military alliances and plans. Economic collaboration is camouflaged as defense industries in a diplomatic field like NATO. Korea is ready to capitalize on the defense consumer market, and Lee has proudly stated his dedication to it. Passing up NATO was therefore a missed opportunity.
He should have learned from his predecessor, who utilized those occasions with follow-up trips and deals that benefited Korea. The impeached former president's visit to the NATO pull-out meeting in the Czech Republic in September 2024 was an example of this. A 26 trillion won ($19.1 billion) nuclear power facility deal was finalized that week. This is pragmatic diplomacy.
Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.