One critical component missing in Trump’s 'reverse Kissinger' strategy
Choo Jae-woo
As U.S. President Donald Trump and his team seek a tough agreement with Ukraine and Russia to end their war, many pundits refer to his approach as a “reverse Kissinger” strategy. Most people are pessimistic about the possibility of such an approach for entirely the wrong reasons. The goal of the policy is not to negotiate peace between two warring states. It is more about a long-term strategy to help America, such as diverting Russia’s attention away from China and serving as a go-between for Moscow and Beijing. That way, Washington can focus solely on its competition with Beijing not only for the next ten “decisive” years, as claimed by the US National Security Strategy 2022, but also for the next 40 years, as J.D. Vance declared at the Munich Security Conference in February 2024. What these American experts miss with their pessimism is a clear understanding of détente and the mechanical work of triangular relations.
Détente did not occur as a result of the United States profiting from the deteriorating relationship between China and then the Soviet Union. It was also not fully achieved, despite having all of the geopolitical, economic, and strategic grounds for success. The goal may currently be unachievable, since the essence of the interpersonal relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, is too difficult to crack and separate. Rather, it is all about defining détente and creating the necessary conditions for it to occur.
Today, the way America has constructed relations with China and Russia cannot work the same way as it did in the past. Détente is about two superpowers reconciling their differences. Under former President Richard Nixon, the United States and the Soviet Union reconciled to create a more amiable international atmosphere, however temporary and misleading it may have been. For the "reverse Kissinger" to work, we need to remember one important thing. In a triangular partnership, such as the United States, China and Russia, you must have a good relationship with at least one party before you can pull away from the other. For the United States to play a pivotal role, the prerequisite is good relations with both other parties. Nixon and his security adviser Henry Kissinger understood this when they set about improving relations with China, which had been strained since diplomacy was abandoned in 1950.
In today’s triangular connections, if the United States is to serve as a power broker between China and Russia, it must be at the center. Simultaneously, it must preserve friendly relations with them. Furthermore, one more criterion must be met in accordance with historical lessons from Nixon’s 1970s plan: The relationship between Beijing and Moscow must be so terrible that the former would consider the latter an opponent. After Stalin’s death in 1953 and Khruschev’s accession to power, the bilateral relationship took a downhill turn. In 1956, a power struggle between Mao Zedong and Khruschev for leadership of the communist bloc drove a wedge between the two, causing them to conflict militarily in the late 1960s. Nixon and his associates capitalized on and exploited the cracks in the relationship.
Nixon was able to exploit Mao’s strategic concerns regarding Khrushchev. He initiated a reconciliation with Mao with the goal of diverting China’s support for North Vietnam in order to bring the war to an end sooner. In exchange, Washington offered Beijing a “marriage of convenience” to help offset Moscow's power. This offer culminated with Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972. The visit resulted in the Paris peace deal that ended the Vietnam War, made possible by Beijing's mediation in 1974.
People just assumed the changes were the result of Nixon’s visit to Beijing and the normalization of relations. However, it did not meet the criteria for détente, which was about resolving the relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The improvement of relations between Washington and Beijing only helped regional interests, particularly from an American standpoint. In the context of China’s military struggles against the Soviets, it may have taken on some worldwide strategic significance. However, for Washington, it was limited to the regional environment.
Nixon’s historic journey to Moscow as the first American president to visit since the city became the communist capital in 1917 ushered in an era of détente. History also remembers him as the first American president to visit a Chinese metropolis since the communist party assumed power in 1949. His Moscow tour was not as widely publicized as his Beijing one, and people are understandably impressed by the latter and easily forget how the thawing of relations in the early 1970s came about. During his stay in Moscow, Nixon was able to hold strategic arms limitations discussions (SALT) and negotiate a deal with his Russian counterpart to reduce nuclear weapons, resulting in the famous accord known as SALT I. In terms of the triangular relationship, the United States successfully manipulated the estranged China and Russia, remaining in control and isolating them further from each other.
Look at where the United States is in its relations with China and Russia. Since 2017, it has treated them with scorn and enmity, defining them as antagonistic states, as indicated by successive U.S. national security documents. Washington is in no position to play the power broker role that it seeks, let alone a mitigating one. The way Washington views and handles Beijing and Moscow will only serve to strengthen and reinforce their ties, which is based on the “no limits” partnership created in 2023. The reverse Kissinger strategy the Trump administration is pursuing won’t work simply because it overlooks straightforward historical lessons.
Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.