Lee Jong-eun is a Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Greenville University.
Can Trump solve world crises?
Lee Jong-eun
This month, the U.S. Republican Party held its national convention. On the last night of the convention, former U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently survived an assassination attempt, accepted the nomination as the party’s candidate for the upcoming presidential election. To the convention delegates who enthusiastically cheered on his return to national politics after the reelection defeat four years ago, Trump gave a long, at times off-script, speech that began with a reflection on his near assassination, criticized the Biden administration’s domestic and foreign policies, and concluded with his characteristic promise to “Make America Great Again.”
Though Trump's speech primarily focused on domestic issues such as immigration and inflation, he also acknowledged the global security crises. Trump admitted that conflicts and wars have spread throughout multiple continents, such as Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and warned such crises could escalate into a destructive World War III. Blaming the Biden administration for turning the world into a “planet of wars,” Trump vowed to end international crises and restore the “peaceful” era of his first term.
Trump’s convention speech communicated two impulses toward international crises. The first was reservation toward the U.S. entanglement in a foreign military crisis. Claiming to be the first modern U.S. president not to start a new war, Trump justified his policy of “getting along” with nuclear-armed states such as North Korea to prevent a nuclear crisis and boasted that he could prevent wars with diplomatic telephone calls.
The second impulse, however, was the determination to win in a conflict in which the United States was already involved. Taking self-credit for defeating ISIS in the Middle East, Trump criticized the Biden administration for losing the war in Afghanistan. Trump also warned groups holding American hostages (presumably including Hamas) that they would experience consequences after his reelection.
Though there are concerns that Trump’s return to the presidency could lead to disengaged, even isolationist foreign policy, these two impulses may complicate how the potential second Trump presidency might respond to international crises. As Trump acknowledged, his second presidency will start with the United States already involved in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific conflicts. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy will face the dilemma of limiting America’s overseas intervention without risking the perception of America’s weakness and defeats in international conflicts.
Trump expressed confidence that he could resolve international crises because of other countries’ fear of his personal reputation. However, even with Trump’s mediation, it is highly uncertain whether the stark divide among conflict actors' stances could easily be reconciled. Would North Korea agree to Trump’s proposal for a nuclear freeze? Would Russia be satisfied with Trump’s terms for armistice? Would Iran abandon its nuclear program? As President Richard Nixon’s “madman strategy” to end the Vietnam War faced years of diplomatic gridlock, Trump’s intimidation may be insufficient to convince actors to compromise their stances.
If Trump fails to broker a diplomatic settlement that he can portray as a “win” for his presidency, how might he respond? One possibility is that he might allow some conflicts to continue in gridlock. Similar to the outcome of the Hanoi summit with North Korea during Trump’s first term, the Trump administration might portray a “no deal” as still a better outcome than a “bad deal.” In this scenario, current international crises, such as nuclear provocations of North Korea and Iran, could persist during Trump’s second term.
Another possibility is that Trump’s second presidency might resort to aggressive, coercive measures to pressure conflict actors. Ukraine and Russia might face pressure to agree to Trump’s “just peace” solution to the war. The two Koreas may face pressures to accept terms that include unfavorable concessions (such as North Korea’s nuclear freeze and U.S. troops’ withdrawal from South Korea). Similar to the assassination during Trump’s first term of Qassem Soleimani, an Iranian major general and commander of the Quds Force, Trump’s second term may also implement military operations against uncooperative conflict actors. While such pressure may lead to a diplomatic breakthrough, there are also risks that it could stiffen resistance to Trump-backed settlement, further escalating the crisis and increasing the United States’s entanglement.
This year’s Republican National Convention highlighted growing public wariness, especially among Republicans, towards U.S. intervention in global crises. Since his first presidential run, Trump’s campaign has tapped into this sentiment with his "America First" slogan. Yet, Trump’s aversion to America’s “defeat” or “retreat” under his presidency creates complications in his foreign policy. As Nixon proclaimed “peace with honor” in ending the Vietnam War, Trump’s “America First” strategy includes maintaining a world sufficiently nonthreatening for America to “triumphantly disengage” from international affairs to focus on domestic issues. Yet, as Trump admitted in his convention speech, the magnitude of the international crises has escalated since his first term, and it is unlikely that conflict actors would allow Trump’s second term to disengage from these crises easily.
Subsequently, Trump’s second term will likely impose a transactional bargain with U.S. allies and partners. Aspiring for success in international conflicts while limiting U.S. involvement, Trump’s second term will pressure allies and partners to do more to help his “win.” Though Trump has often been described as likely to abandon U.S. alliances, a more accurate description may be that Trump is likely to “exploit” the alliance to maximize transactional foreign policy achievement. In turn, the allies and partners may also engage in transactional diplomacy to extract rewards for cooperating with Trump’s “America First” strategy. Should Trump return to the presidency, the intra-alliance bargaining will likely become more intense and dynamic, more so than in his first term. It will be a stressful time for allies, but perhaps some will find an opportunity to take advantage of Trump’s foreign policy impulses.
Lee Jong-eun is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.