Inter-Korean space race
By John Merrill
John Merill
In 1955, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a “mutual aerial observation” agreement with the Soviet Union that would allow the two Cold War rivals to spy on each other’s military movements to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to war. Moscow turned down the proposal.
It took nearly another four decades before a Treaty on Open Skies was signed by 34 countries, including the U.S. and Russia at the end of the Cold War. But the world is now a more dangerous place after U.S. President Donald Trump, in one of his final acts, withdrew from the treaty at the end of 2020 and Russia followed suit a year later.
That history should be kept in mind in assessing North Korea’s launch of its first spy satellite, the Malligyong-1 or Telescope-1, in November, which provoked a storm of international outrage since it was seen as improving the North’s missile targeting capabilities.
An argument can be made, however, that allowing Pyongyang to operate a spy satellite has the potential of increasing stability on the Korean Peninsula by giving it a better understanding of U.S. and South Korean joint military training exercises, which the North views as a potential threat, and reducing the possibility of an accidental war.
The architecture of mutual North-South aerial surveillance was completed when South Korea, only a week after the North’s launch, saw its first spy satellite placed into orbit.
The dueling spy satellite launches are reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet space race during the Cold War as both Koreas seek to score points in the race for competitive legitimacy. It also highlights their different strengths in their space ambitions.
North Korea has the edge when it comes to rocket technology since it was able to launch its spy satellite (after two failed earlier attempts) in contrast to South Korea, which had to rely on a Space X Falcon 9 rocket to lift its satellite from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.
South Korea has fallen behind the North in rocket development since it was subject for years to technical limits imposed by the U.S. on the range and payloads of its indigenous missiles in exchange for technology transfers. It was only in 2021 that the Biden administration agreed to abolish these restrictions.
On the other hand, South Korea enjoys a competitive advantage in terms of satellite and imaging technology, with a better capability to see through cloud cover or at night. Pyongyang may be hoping to close the gap in the future by obtaining access to Russian satellite or imaging technology as part of its Ukraine-related arms deal with Moscow.
Both Koreas appear determined to expand their space activities. Seoul reportedly has plans to place up to 130 spy satellites in a low earth orbit by the early 2030s as part of a space surveillance and military communications network. This satellite system would play a crucial role in South Korea’s preemptive Kill-Chain strike system to target North Korean leaders if a nuclear attack by Pyongyang appeared to be imminent.
North Korea has less capability to deploy such an extensive surveillance network, although it has announced plans to put up three more spy satellites in 2024 as part of a long-term project to launch “a large number of reconnaissance satellites.” Meanwhile, South Korea is planning to launch five spy satellites this year.
With both Korea’s pursuing a similar space strategy, Pyongyang has protested that it is being subject to a “double standard” in being condemned for its spy satellite launch. It argued that its satellite launch was being criticized as a threat to regional peace and stability, while the U.S. was making a “shameless” claim that South Korea’s satellite launch was different under international law.
In response, the U.S. pointed out that South Korea is not subject to U.N. Security Council sanctions, while North Korea “is unabashedly trying to advance its nuclear weapons delivery systems by testing ballistic missile technology in clear violation of this council’s resolutions” barring ballistic missile activity, U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the U.N.
Regardless that the spy satellite was put into orbit by one of North Korea’s rockets, perhaps consideration should be paid to the fact that the greater transparency it provides is not necessarily a bad thing if it reduces the risk of inadvertent conflict by giving Pyongyang clarity about U.S.-South Korea military movements.
In an interesting development, Kim Yo-jung, the influential sister of the North Korean leader, warned that Pyongyang would not return to talks with Washington until it dropped its condemnation of the spy satellite. Although only a straw in the wind, implicit in her remarks is the outside possibility that North Korea might resume talks if the U.S. reduces its confrontational stance.
John Merrill (jmerrill05@gmail.com) is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Korean Studies at George Washington University.