Challenge of Camp David
By John Merrill
The Camp David summit scheduled for Aug. 18 between U.S. President Joe Biden, President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will try to shore up what has been a wobbly trilateral alliance structure in Northeast Asia. The summit comes amid serious new challenges posed by China, Russia and North Korea.
The White House is already describing the first-ever dedicated and exclusive meeting among the leaders of the three countries as “a discussion of historic proportions in terms of the importance of this bilateral relationship to the Indo-Pacific region and, frankly, to the world.”
The key question is whether the summit will live up to its billing. The U.S. is hoping to cement the recent reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo, whose relations have often been disrupted by historical grievances. Washington views close cooperation among the three countries as the linchpin of its security position in Northeast Asia.
For Biden, the summit offers an opportunity to redirect attention from his domestic problems and a constant barrage of criticism from Republicans to refocus on foreign policy. He hopes the bucolic and private setting of Camp David will improve the chances of success.
For his part, Yoon views the summit as a way to boost his flagging popularity at home. He has become the toast of Washington, being treated to a state dinner at the White House in April. The reason for Yoon's popularity among American officials is his efforts to improve relations with Japan and strengthen defense ties with it.
This is in sharp contrast to the actions of Yoon's predecessor, Moon Jae-in, who initially tore up a military intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan, and supported a long-festering dispute over the wartime conscripted labor of Koreans by Japan.
The goal of the summit from Washington's perspective is to establish a firm foundation for trilateral defense cooperation and set technology and supply chain guidelines on trade with China.
But behind all the talk of a ”rock solid” trilateral alliance, fissures remain. Seoul's improving ties with Tokyo may not be as secure as Washington believes.
One reason for Yoon's unpopularity is that many Koreans believe that he has made too many concessions to Japan in trying to resolve historical disputes stemming from its colonial rule.
Public suspicions about Japan remain strong as seen in the current controversy over the release of wastewater from Japan's Fukushima nuclear facility, which Koreans believe could harm their fishing industry because consumers will fear eating contaminated seafood.
Such attitudes bode ill for extensive military cooperation with Japan. Although a port call in May by a Japanese destroyer flying the controversial imperial-era “Rising Sun” flag passed without much protest, will Koreans accept the presence of Japanese troops on their soil during future joint military exercises?
American encouragement for Japan to build up its already considerable military force could also meet a hostile reaction in Korea. Meanwhile, continued strong public support for a South Korean nuclear bomb, despite Seoul's recent agreement with Washington not to pursue such a project, remains a potential irritant in relations with Japan. If Seoul ever decides to “go nuke.” Japan is likely to follow suit and achieve such a goal quicker since it enjoys a technical advantage in making a nuclear weapon.
Their strategic aims also differ. Seoul is focused on meeting a threat from North Korea, while Japan views China as its primary adversary. Tokyo is more likely to participate in a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan than Seoul, which appears to be reluctant to get involved.
There are also disagreements between the U.S. and its two Asian allies when it comes to economic policies. Both Seoul and Tokyo are unhappy with the Biden administration's trade policy, with its focus on expanding America's technology base at the expense of imports as well as curbing semiconductor supplies to China. This particularly poses a threat to the Korean chip industry, while Seoul does not want to alienate China, its biggest trading partner.
Any trilateral deal reached at Camp David will need to stand the test of time. Domestic politics could undo any progress. The possible election of Donald Trump to a second term as U.S. president in 2024 could disrupt alliance cooperation, while a left-wing candidate to replace Yoon in 2027 could revive anti-Japanese sentiment. Meanwhile, Tokyo is unlikely to make more concessions to Seoul given the powerful influence of the nationalist wing of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
The challenge for Biden at Camp David will be to forge an agreement whose structure will be strong enough to preserve recent progress despite any future political backlash. The odds of achieving that, however, do not look good.
John Merrill is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Korean Studies at George Washington University