How to implement Washington Declaration
By Ahn Ho-young
The Chey Institute started an ambitious new project in August 2018 soon after the Singapore Declaration between U.S. President Trump and his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un. It was to invite a group of foreign policy and security watchers in Korea and organize a series of debates focused on the North Korean nuclear issue. The purpose of the project was to promote study and debate on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the most important issue for Korea's national security. The project was named “Deep Dive,” maybe out of the organizer's desire to promote in-depth study on the issue.
The series has been continued over more than five years, and had its 13th session in late July. The session focused on how to effectively implement the Washington Declaration adopted between Presidents Yoon Suk Yeol and Joe Biden on the occasion of Yoon's state visit to the U.S. last April.
A large number of participants agreed that the measures set out in the declaration are presently the most effective measures to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence for Korea, given the fact that Korea's own nuclear program or the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea are not realistic options for the time being.
In fact, Korea and the U.S. had already formed several groups at different levels of government in order to strengthen extended deterrence. Those groups are focused on discussing most issues of policy and strategy. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), formed in accordance with the Washington Declaration, distinguishes itself by offering an opportunity to have detailed consultations on military and operational issues. That's the kind of consultation we need now, given North Korea's capability and professed intentions.
Consultation on these issues will allow Korea to have enhanced access to information on U.S. nuclear assets and operational plans. It will also allow Korea to have an important voice on the deployment of U.S. strategic assets. In this connection, it was pointed out that SSBN Kentucky, an 18,000-ton Ohio-class nuclear submarine carrying 24 ballistic missiles, made a port call at Busan during the first meeting of the NCG in Seoul. The most important modus operandi for SSBNs is to avoid exposure. It's not surprising that the Kentucky's port call was the first such visit by a U.S. SSBN to a foreign port.
As for the legal nature of the Washington Declaration, it was pointed out that it is not an international treaty having the force of law, but a political declaration. For this reason, it is important not to lose the momentum in implementing the actions stipulated in the Washington Declaration, leading to the timely institutionalization of those actions. The best available time for implementation would be the coming year or so, given the domestic political timetable in the U.S. Most participants agreed that the Korean government must come up with a list of actions for implementation expeditiously.
The operational plans of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) are presently limited to the use of conventional weapons. North Korea has amended its law on the use of nuclear weapons, and organized military units dedicated respectively to strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Those units have now allegedly started training on the use of nuclear weapons. Given such developments in North Korea, the CFC's operational plans must be based on conventional-nuclear integration.
Intelligence authorities in Korea and the U.S. agree that North Korea is planning various options for the use of nuclear weapons. One option of highest likelihood would be for North Korea to threaten South Korea with the use of tactical nuclear weapons to coerce the South to acquiesce with certain military or political options favored by the North. The Washington Declaration stipulates “joint planning and joint implementation” between Korea and the U.S. to deal with such eventualities. Now is the time to turn that language into detailed operational plans between Korea and the U.S.
Another issue that has been strongly emphasized by a large number of participants was the importance of Korea to strengthen its own capability. If Korea wishes to emerge as an active partner in the joint planning and implementation, it must not lose time in acquiring the “three-axis system” consisting of Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) capabilities. It will significantly strengthen South Korea's own capability for deterrence through denial and punishment.
It was also emphasized that concerned officers in the Korean military must be thoroughly trained in nuclear weapons. The Washington Declaration stipulates simulation exercises between the strategic commands of Korea and the U.S., which would offer tailored opportunities to deepen Korean participants' understanding of nuclear weapons. All of these necessary actions add up to make a tall, very tall list. The governments of South Korea and the U.S. have no time to lose.
Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as vice foreign minister and Korean ambassador to the United States.