Feedback from Asia Society
By Ahn Ho-young
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the alliance between Korea and the United States, and will witness a large number of seminars held on the subject both in Korea and the U.S. I recently attended one such seminar held in New York which was jointly organized between the Korea Foundation and the Asia Society.
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Danny Russel moderated the first session and started by raising the following question with me: ”The Yoon government began to talk about GPS (the Global Pivotal State policy) from early on; declared the Indo-Pacific Strategy in December last year; and issued National Security Strategy last week. Could you unpack them for us?”
I thought “unpacking” each of the initiatives would take too much time, and suggested focusing on the common denominators underlying the three different but interrelated initiatives. For me, there are two essential common denominators. One of them is the shared perception of the challenges now buffeting the rules-based international order, which had enabled Korea's industrialization, democratization and national development.
Another is the resolve of the Yoon government to work vigorously with like-minded countries to defend and promote the rules-based international order. After making this general introduction regarding the new Korean government's basic orientation in foreign and security policy, I intently followed the discussions to better learn which issues were of particular interest to the U.S. panelists and the public gathered at the Asia Society.
One issue often cited by U.S. participants was Korea-Japan relations. They admired in particular the audacious decision that President Yoon made to resolve the difficulties raised by the Korean Supreme Court's ruling on the forced labor issue and to visit Japan in order to advance the deeply frozen relations with the country. They hoped that the improvement in Korea-Japan relations would lead to further development of trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan and the U.S. to better address the challenges we presently face in Northeast Asia and beyond.
Another issue of high interest to U.S. participants was the tension in the Taiwan Strait and what action Korea would take in case of a flare-up of military conflicts there. One member of the Korean delegation responded by saying that the Taiwan contingency would become the Korean contingency. He elaborated by emphasizing the importance of the East China Sea for Korea's maritime transport and the impact the military conflict would have on security on the Korean Peninsula. I observed how intensely the U.S. participants held on to each word spoken by the Korean panelist.
In this context, I tried to address certain concerns raised about Korea's new foreign and security policy; Korea's new policy is overly pro-U.S. and would undermine Korea's relations with China.
I reminded the U.S. participants about the geopolitical and geo-economic realities around the Korean Peninsula. China is one of the few countries which could and should play a crucial role to nudge North Korea toward denuclearization. China's portion in Korea's overall trade is still above 20 percent. Given such a reality, Korea must continue to cooperate with China.
It should be done, however, on the basis of a rules-based international order and mutual benefit and mutual respect. This is clearly laid down in Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy and is being implemented consistently.
Other than these two issues, U.S. participants expressed keen interest in how the Washington Declaration was received in Korea, especially given the fact that more than 80 percent of Korean citizens supported the idea of Korea developing its own nuclear weapons.
I told U.S. participants that there were two key points in the declaration: joint planning and joint implementation. The reason why a large number of Korean citizens worry about the U.S. extended deterrence is because of the perception that Korea does not have any voice in how the deterrence would work in a contingency situation. The agreement on joint planning and joint implementation in the Washington Declaration, if they are fully executed, will provide a much-needed voice for Korea, and significantly strengthen Korean citizens' confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.
I also said that the key component of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group is the standing working group. The Nuclear Consultation Group, to be formed between Korea and the U.S., must also have such a group and work full-time on joint planning and joint implementation.
Through the two-day seminar at the Asia Society, I could observe that the series of foreign and security policy initiatives of the Yoon government were closely followed and supported by U.S. experts gathered at the Asia Society. Highly positive momentum has been created over the past year. Now, we must make best use of the momentum so that Korea and the U.S., along with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, can further strengthen the rules-based international order. That will be the most meaningful way to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Mutual Security Treaty between Korea and the U.S.
Ahn Ho-young is chair professor of Kyungnam University. He served as vice foreign minister and Korean ambassador to the United States.