China and South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy
By Sandip Kumar Mishra
In the recent months, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration of South Korea has been moving toward having its own Indo-Pacific strategy, though it is not clear whether it would be called a strategy, framework, vision or something else.
President Yoon has said that if there is an invitation, South Korea would positively consider joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and has also indicated that by the end of 2022 South Korea would have its own version of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
His stance is quite different from the previous administration which was reluctant to talk either about the Quad or the Indo-Pacific strategy. It is being expected that Yoon's stance would annoy China and there are going to be repercussions for South Korea.
Actually several observers in South Korea argue that it would be a change of the status quo and lead to China's wrath. China is an important economic partner of South Korea and almost one-fourth of South Korea's external trade happens with China alone. It is being considered a counterproductive move on the part of the Yoon administration and being criticized.
It has been reminded that there could be a repeat of China's reaction that happened after the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea and it would hurt South Korean interests.
South Korea's move to be open to Quad or having the Indo-Pacific strategy may be a departure from the Moon Jae-in administration's stance, but it must be reminded that it does not constitute any change of the status quo on the ground.
Even though South Korea was not forthcoming on the Indo-Pacific strategy or Quad and preferred to deal with the region through its New Southern Policy, South Korea had also expressed multiple times its agreement with the expressed goal of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Moreover, it must be underlined that South Korea is a security ally of the U.S. and if the U.S. has an Indo-Pacific strategy and membership of Quad, South Korea is also indirectly part of these formulations.
For example, India signed three foundational agreements with the U.S. ― the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020. They are considered to be part of India's integration into the Quad network.
South Korea also has similar agreements and understandings with the U.S. There is the seamless integration between the defense forces as well as technical details of the U.S. and South Korea. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 between the U.S. and South Korea clearly says that an armed attack on one party would be considered as an attack on the other party as well.
Thus, since the new South Korean administration's move toward Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy do not make any significant change in the status quo on the ground, there is little possibility that China would react too much on these moves.
Actually, China would be more annoyed by certain other moves of the Yoon administration which do constitute a change of the status quo. For example, if South Korea gets more THAAD batteries on its soil, it would be a change on the ground. However, the Yoon government has not made any formal moves toward it, although the South Korean leader did talk about that during his election campaign.
China would also be furious if U.S. tactical weapons are reintroduced on the Korean Peninsula, which were withdrawn in the early 1990s and that was also demanded during the campaign by Yoon.
Notwithstanding speculative moves of South Korea, China would be unhappy with President Yoon's participation in the NATO summit. In June 2022, Yoon made his first overseas visit to Madrid to attend the NATO summit which identified China as a “systemic challenge.” China may read it as bringing NATO to the Indo-Pacific region, which definitely would be unacceptable to the Asian giant.
Thus, it would be important for South Korean observers to delineate these two different moves of the Yoon government. South Korea joining Quad or having the Indo-Pacific strategy does not make any big change on the ground, but South Korea getting connected to NATO or having more THAAD batteries on the Korean Peninsula does.
Furthermore, it would also be irrelevant to be critical of a South Korean foreign policy move in anticipation that China would be unhappy. Let China formally express its objections and then the issue could be pondered over.
Lastly, it must also be kept in mind that even though there are few statements of China which condemn the South Korean move to join the Indo-Pacific network, it must be seen how much real intent China had in these statements and where it would take any punitive action on South Korea.
The author (
sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.