Seoul could be a better ally to Washington
By Stephen Costello
Much of the discussion of how Seoul could be a greater asset to Washington has centered on growing its military capabilities along with Washington's sanctions-centered coercion toward Pyongyang, or helping form a clear anti-China or pro-democracy camp.
However, each of those efforts ― which continue today ― more often serve to enable the worst instincts of unprepared U.S. leaders, and contribute to its decades of policy failures toward Korea. Instead, South Korea could finally pull more of its weight in the alliance by showing Washington how it can pursue its real interests and achieve lasting strategic wins in the region.
Two items are key. The first new deal with North Korea must be reframed, so that it is pursued in the context of economic development and infrastructure expansion. This would show that denuclearization and political actions are necessary to enable realistic peninsular and regional progress.
This is the most important, relevant and useful context in which to see the North Korea issues. The most successful deals that were ever pursued between Seoul and Pyongyang and between Washington and Pyongyang during the 1990s were based clearly on an economic development and security framework. Such framing makes denuclearization possible.
Secondly, South Korea would take a much larger role as creator of structures for South-North cooperation and international investments, as well as creating a coalition of states and international institutions to support and guarantee implementation of agreements.
The U.S. could also do this, but that cannot be expected. While this evolution goes against decades of Cheong Wa Dae's inability to assert its interests within the alliance, it also finally comes to grips with 20 years of bad analysis and expensive policy failure by U.S. administrations.
Seoul can expand its role without confrontation with the Biden administration. The expected pushback could be managed through existing channels. Both strategic and optical advantages for the U.S. would be extensive and low-cost.
Nevertheless, South Korea would have to step up and make its voice heard in both public and official ways. Seoul cannot “ask” Washington to play this role. Instead, the new role must be embraced, explained and clearly articulated. New responsibilities for Seoul would represent an overdue upgrading and modernization of the alliance.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in has been unable to expand Seoul's role. Since his summit with Biden, his ministers and officials are trying harder, but we still do not see a real plan. The closest we've seen is Institute for National Security Strategy President Kim Ki-jung speaking frankly to a group at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington recently.
That delegation strongly made the point that the U.S.'s goals in Northeast Asia hinge largely on its ability to advance North Korean denuclearization. Perhaps the next Korean president could do this, to the benefit of the U.S., South Korea, China, Japan, North Korea and Russia. However, we have little information about whether the next occupant of Cheong Wa Dae would or could do so. The election is still six months away.
The main strategic point is the central trade: suspending the five extreme U.N. sanctions that President Obama (through the U.N.) imposed on North Korea in 2016 and 2017. North Korea would require this relief in any case, but the price for them should be our top requirements.
All of the Yongbyon complex, a cap on fissile material production and long-range missile tests, and IAEA inspectors back in the country as part of a long-term verification regime, as well as an expanded role for Seoul in implementation and North-South cooperation would be necessary. We would get what we need, and President Biden would be able to credibly claim a security and diplomatic success.
It should go without saying that Republicans and some Democrats in the U.S. will attack any agreement. It could not be a formal treaty. Like the Agreed Framework of 1994 or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran of 2015 it would have to be a presidential deal. This simply recognizes that the U.S. political and diplomatic systems are deeply broken. This is one big reason why it is necessary to have South Korea play a larger role as soon as possible.
It should also go without saying that South Korea's participation and support for any agreement is very much dependent upon a Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) candidate winning the Korean presidential election in March. This point is practical and realistic rather than partisan. As in the U.S., South Korea's opposition parties are no serious about North Korea and alliance policies.
Key opposition and “conservative” figures are already talking about abolishing the Ministry of Unification, just as their predecessors did. How a non-DPK government in Seoul would handle North Korea issues is uncertain, but expectations should be extremely low.
The presidential election in six months could go either way, but as a practical matter policy continuity with the Moon approach would have to be assumed in order for Seoul to move forward now.
Finally, it has become less and less likely that the Biden team can settle its internal debates, assuming it has them, and come up with a realistic and bold initiative with North Korea. It has been instructive to watch as the new U.S. administration begins to tackle crucial foreign policy opportunities.
A U.S. return to the JCPOA ― which could prevent a nuclear program, just like the Agreed Framework did with North Korea ― should have been low-hanging fruit, but after months of U.S. bungling, that agreement is hanging by a thread. Hopes among Washington policy professionals for diplomatic progress across the foreign policy spectrum have been disappointed.
Regarding North Korea policy, there are simply no signs of movement. The whole catalogue of statements from the Biden diplomatic, security and East Asia teams for the past six months has been notable for its political insecurity, its strategic incoherence and its diplomatic insufficiency.
Military exercises have gone forward without any effort to discover what could be gained from their alteration or suspension. Within the administration, we know that White House Asia czar Kurt Campbell and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman have the knowledge and backgrounds to appreciate Seoul's points and the more strategic views toward North Korea. But we have no indication yet that either of them can or will play the role of internal catalyst among the Biden team.
So we hope to be surprised, but doubt that we will be. It may be time for South Korea to respect its alliance responsibilities and help the U.S. to return to a positive, helpful posture in the region.
Stephen Costello (
Costs55@gwu.edu) is non-resident visiting scholar at the George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies. He is non-resident visiting researcher at the Gyeonggi Research Institute, and a columnist at The Korea Times. He directed the Korea in transition program at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, and was director of the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation-USA.