Reshuffle could feed strategic shift, benefiting all parties
By Stephen Costello
WASHINGTON ― As the Moon Jae-in government of South Korea plans for its last two years, the latest Cabinet reshuffle provides an opportunity to put several policies on a more stable footing, thus allowing for greater predictability for domestic and foreign audiences.
The choice of former lawmaker Park Jie-won for National Intelligence Service (NIS) director and Rep. Lee In-young for unification minister are examples of how these changes could go right, or not.
It is regularly claimed these days that Seoul faces several crises, each terribly difficult, resulting in a kind of paralysis that can be fatal for government.
But looked at in another way, the most urgent crises and policy decisions are deeply interconnected. Addressing one boldly and creatively would make working on the other ones easier. A virtual circle of reinforcing pressures could allow for greater forward movement.
Most of this cannot happen, however, if the government gives in, or compromises on basic principles, to the opposition. Surely there are democratic conservatives and other opposition voices on the political landscape. They have a heavy responsibility to create Korea's first post-authoritarian political opposition to the “Democrat” parties.
But like the U.S. Republicans of today, many current “conservatives” are unhinged in their rhetoric, uninterested in policies that will help the public or the national interest, and fundamentally undemocratic.
As Barack Obama discovered in Washington, it is a losing game to appease these extremists. Instead, they should be kept as far away from power as possible, for as long as possible. This is an institutional rather than partisan point.
On each of the major policy areas necessary for effective governance, the current opposition will often refuse to compromise with elected officials and their party in the National Assembly. This will apply to the Korea-U.S. alliance, South-North relations, Korea-China relations, and of course to confirmation of cabinet secretaries.
It seems Lee In-young's nomination to the Ministry of Unification will be opposed due to his activism in support of the democracy movement while in college. Really? It seems Lee was on the right side of history as demonstrated by political/social progress in the 1980s and 1990s, and the candlelit rallies of 2016-17. Opposing him on those grounds would seem to be opposing basic democratic achievements.
I met Park Jie-won 30 years ago, when our small team in Washington began advising Korean democrats on party institution building and the mechanics of polling and message management. He was completely dedicated to the democratic struggle, and to helping Kim Dae-jung and his wife Lee Hee-ho handle the pressures on them.
Later, when he was in the Blue House with President Kim, Park had the unenviable task of handling demands from journalists, among others. And of course, he played a critical and sensitive role in the breakthrough meetings with the DPRK in 2000. It may be difficult to remember, but those meetings were the major breakthrough for all Koreans since the 1950-53 Korean War.
But Park also had to endure political and fake prosecutions related to those same South-North meetings. When Hyundai Group secretly made agreements with the North, it surprised President Kim with a no-win choice two weeks before the summit.
Former NIS chief and unification minister Lim Dong-won, who I also knew well in the 1990s, details these events in his excellent book, “Peacemaker.”
One result was that Park was prosecuted and imprisoned because some political forces objected to South-North peacemaking. Despite this, he's now been a leading lawmaker for years. I saw him last summer at the DMZ Forum in Goyang.
Both Lee and Park should be duly questioned in the Assembly as part of normal confirmation hearings. Both appear to be well-qualified for their unification ministry and NIS positions. But to the degree that opposition to them is disrespectful of democratic progress or diplomatic achievements, it probably ought to be ignored.
A reinvigorated team could use Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha to finally work with the U.N., so that it can recall its founding principles, listen to some of its better rapporteurs regarding North Korea, and respond to a new Korean initiative breaking the current impasse on U.N. sanctions.
Minister Kang is the one who is best-positioned to do this, for a list of reasons. Such an initiative would be the only way that the medium-sized deal discussed in Hanoi could be achieved, and soon. The closure of Yongbyon, a cap on fissile materials production, and other items in exchange for major, credible U.N. sanctions relief and South Korean flexibility will lead the U.N. community back to an end to DPRK nuclear and ICBM production.
In this way, the new project would address three other pending issues. It would begin to build back credibility and authority with its Northern neighbors, North Korea, China and Russia.
It would begin to build back both of those tools with its U.S. ally, despite what some opposed to denuclearization, such as John Bolton, will say. It will deliver the biggest gift yet to the U.S.-Korea alliance, demonstrating the alliance's continued relevance in the coming decades. It will honor the sacrifices made defending and protecting South Korea until it could become a strong middle power.
If the Moon administration can lay out a clear plan, and begin to make progress on the exchange of sanctions for weapons capabilities, its impact on ASEAN and other regional initiatives, from health to infrastructure to defense, will increase. Such a virtuous circle is possible, as we began to see in the late 1990s under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
Recent statements from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong contained new and fascinating possibilities for more honest interaction. But like the U.S., they will require South Korea to lead here.
With new national security adviser Suh Hoon acting as control tower, Lee In-young could build up the capacity for an investment/development gate for the South and North to operate, in order to minimize the possibility that rogue South Korean companies would once again undermine the open, transparent development that the North so badly needs.
Rather than being faced with multiple unresolved policy choices, maybe South Korea is now able to make progress on several of the big ones at the same time. A sort of virtual circle.
Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) managed the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation Washington office in the 1990s. He directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council there from 1999 to 2004. He now directs AsiaEast.Org, a policy initiative focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington and Seoul.