Will US get out of the way?
By Stephen Costello
The unlikely spectacle unfolding in Singapore this month, with the leaders of North Korea and the U.S. meeting in an attempt to bridge differences that have persisted for over 60 years, provokes great confusion.
One reason for that is that leadership groups in both countries have developed deeply ingrained narratives explaining their mutual confrontation. Both narratives will now have to be adjusted if the two are going to be able to find mutual interests and strike believable, trustworthy and durable deals. There are already signs in both countries that this is happening.
Based on Pyongyang's previous words and actions, and based on its acknowledged strategic interests in greater security, independence and economic growth, there are solid reasons to believe that deals can be agreed to that begin to eliminate its destabilizing weapons. It cannot hold on to its current capabilities for long, and they will have to be at first minimized in exchange for having those requirements met.
At the heart of the U.S. position are political and strategic contradictions.
On one hand, the Americans hold decisive and critical influence over international institutions, both political and economic, that are relevant to North Korea's denuclearization and development. These include the U.N. and its many organs, as well as the World Bank, the IMF, the IAEA, and others.
Regardless of the behavior of China or South Korea, this U.S. leverage has been decisive for the North. For this reason it made sense for DPRK leaders to prioritize the “normalization” of relations with the U.S. for over two decades.
On the other hand, the Americans beginning in 2017 have never been less trustworthy or less powerful in the political and soft-power senses that matter most. Even in military terms, the U.S.'s exaggerated threats have masked a very real lack of options to conduct unprovoked attacks.
On the level of expertise, Washington is uniquely empty of senior officials with relevant experience, the State Department has been hollowed out, and the White House team is composed of amateurs and ideologues, beginning with the president.
The position President Donald Trump finds himself in is both contradictory and highly ironic, because his weakness is one of the main reasons that the unprecedented heads-of-state meeting in Singapore can take place. His political isolation and his policy extremism have allowed him to do what Clinton, Bush and Obama would not do.
CVID is a political and ideological gimmick, and it is already giving way to the reality of what is practical and what is valuable. Because of U.S. blunders, Trump's biggest contribution now to the diplomacy surrounding the Korean Peninsula will be to get out of the way. That is what the easing of sanctions and the establishment of diplomatic channels will represent.
In addition to the leverage from its ability to sanction and squeeze the North, the U.S. previously built up a massive store of positive, soft-power leverage. During the 1990s the U.S. lead the diplomacy that struck deals capping weapons and facilitated the first meaningful economic openings since the Korean War.
The destruction of those painstakingly constructed multilateral agreements by the Bush/Cheney/Bolton crew during the 2000s gave up all that leverage. Another U.S. administration may begin to play a more positive role in coming years. But for now, Trump is left to either continue blocking economic development or to allow it in exchange for denuclearization.
North Korea's position is also full of contradictions that were hard to predict just a short time ago.
On the one hand, American abandonment of the 1994-2001 Agreed Framework provoked a massive re-investment in missile and nuclear programs, culminating in the long-range launches and powerful explosions of 2017.
Regardless of its need to develop economically and be more independent of its Chinese neighbor, deterrence of the U.S. attack capability took precedence over everything else.
The now-advanced missile and weapons programs have been a destabilizing influence in the region, and have provoked Pyongyang's increased isolation from most other countries. In addition to their direct costs, they have prevented any significant economic growth.
On the other hand, it may not be completely true that the North Koreans cannot feed the country or build roads and hospitals with nuclear weapons and missiles.
If Chairman Kim Jong-un's “shock and awe” buildup of 2017 leads eventually to a deal with the U.S. which begins to trade sanctions relief and beginning access to international financial institutions for those weapons, they could be seen as a wise investment, and well worth it.
Kim is probably quite aware that he is meeting with a distracted, isolated and diminished U.S. president. But he doesn't seem to mind. If the two presidents can make a deal in Singapore, North Korea will not need the U.S. very much.
It could follow a structured denuclearization process with Washington, while Seoul, Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo all line up to expand economic projects there. Whether the barn door has been left open, the train has left the station, or the genie is out of the bottle, this process has already begun. And North Korea needs everything.
Trump can facilitate a historic end to the Korean War and its lingering destructive regional impacts. He and his team seem to realize they do not need everything up front to do this.
Although the interests Trump is advancing will be his own, in this one odd case they overlap substantially with those of the U.S. The element of luck is critical here, as leaders in the other capitols also understand the mutual gains available to them from Singapore.
For us in Washington, the blunders of Clinton, Bush and Obama that prevented this U.S.-North Korea agreement for so long should be extensively and honestly explored. For Northeast Asians it will be fine for Trump to have a win, as long as they can begin to get beyond the Korean War.
Stephen Costello (scost55@gmail.com) is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C.