Could Seoul be putting on pants?
By Stephen Costello
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The South Korean administration made some progress this week in crafting a foreign policy that recognizes the nation’s middle power realities, starts to engage in the “big game” in the region, and begins to build an alliance with its U.S. ally that is modern, forward-looking, and effective. President Moon Jae-in’s “Five Principals” are an excellent beginning, even if he still needs to reconcile the basic contradiction in No. 4, the “sanctions and pressure” White House fantasy.
Moon’s points were one, establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Two, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Three, taking a primary role in resolving inter-Korean issues. Four, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue by peaceful means, using sanctions and pressure. Five, responding sternly to any North Korean provocation.
Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa’s clear “Three Nos” statement to the National Assembly a week ago was also a great step forward. No additional THAAD batteries, no joining the US missile defense network, and no entering a military alliance with the US and Japan. This confirmation of Seoul’s inevitable and invaluable independent interests could have been made six months ago, but with multiple summits coming up, it was not at all too late. It is unfortunate that Moon has not yet demanded some kind of repayment for the $8 billion cost of Xi Jinping’s illegal boycott, but the THAAD issue is not resolved yet, and Seoul still has cards to play.
Days later President Moon embraced and doubled-down on Minister Kang’s statements. The push-back from the anti-diplomacy and “Korean subservience” crowd was expected, and it will continue. A Wall St. Journal editorial, whining that Moon is “appeasing Kim Jung-un,” “caving to Chinese pressure,” and is “an unreliable friend” should confirm that he is on the right track.
For the North Korea issues and the US-ROK alliance, all now depends on Seoul sticking to its principles and finally resolving the contradiction in Principle No. 4, Seoul’s embrace of pressure and sanctions. If North Korea is going to change, at least three basic facts must be recognized.
One:
The usefulness of showing additional military strength or pursuing global isolation and economic warfare in order to move the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic) is a fiction, since it was Washington, not Pyongyang, that rejected successful agreements two decades ago. There continue to be indications that the North would return to credible win-win negotiations now. There are no indications that the U.S. would. That means pressure and sanctions ― beyond those applied to any country’s illicit and destabilizing actions ― are aimed at the wrong problem.
Two:
The “threat” from North Korea has been exaggerated and misnamed for at least 15 years. Its main threat is to defend itself, as the US CIA and numerous professional analysts have assessed for years. It is unlikely to launch major attacks on the U.S. or anyone else unless pushed into a corner. This cannot be realistically called an unacceptable or global threat, any more than Russian or Chinese capabilities can. The fact that the White House National Security Advisor is forced to pretend that Kim Jung Un is crazy and can’t be deterred ― contradicting years of professional intelligence ― should be a tip-off to the false nature of these claims.
Three:
The U.S. refusal to enter into unconditional talks with North Korea ― a position now embarrassingly embraced by the ROK (Republic of Korea) ― should be another revelation to journalists, analysts and policy-makers paying attention: the Trump administration, like its two predecessors, does not have any roadmap or outline that would recreate the kind of mutual benefits that anchored the last successful deals. Such an economics- and security-based outline is the first requirement for resolving the DPRK nuclear and missile programs, as it always has been.
If Seoul can now advance a credible plan, and collect eager and powerful supporters, including the U.N., it could realize its long-delayed aspiration to lead a coalition toward a solution. As part of this, the Moon-Xi Jinping relationship could now become the most important of all. That will require that China’s power and interests be aligned. If they are opposed, as the tactics of the past two ROK administrations and the last three US administrations fantasized they could be, then Chinese diplomatic and economic power cannot be successfully applied to advance shared Chinese, Korean and U.S. interests.
There are still impediments to moving forward with the Seoul administration’s newly clear and practical foreign policy. The visit of President Donald Trump to Seoul should be seen as a necessary distraction, to be quickly overcome and forgotten. Seoul’s choice is more obvious and its responsibility more urgent in the visit’s aftermath. Despite Trump’s predictable gambits ― the aborted DMZ PR stunt and the “surrender” address to the National Assembly ― the Moon administration took the high road, and put on a smart and impressive welcome. But we don’t know yet whether they have undercut the newly articulated positions of last week.
Trump’s gambit seemed so transparent: “I won’t blow up your country if you waste billions on U.S. military hardware you don’t need.” Yet such a “deal” is characteristic of this U.S. President. A wide cross-section of Korean media and policy elites seem to have abandoned ― temporarily? ― their ambitions for the country. Many supported Seoul taking a leading role in making diplomatic progress just two months ago, but they now seem satisfied to just avoid an imaginary war, cooked up by reckless amateurs in Washington and promoted by a gullible press.
Accepting such a mafia shakedown will not work for President Moon Jae-in, however. He has serious work to do and ambitions to lead actors toward productive agreements. Hopefully, he will make a new start this week. The Blue House has not yet won out during this visit by Trump. To assume so would be a strategic blunder. Following the pressure and sanctions illusion will wreck the new clarity that has just been spelled out. Either afraid or unable to sit in the “driver’s seat,” Seoul would in that case find that the back seat is already taken, and it will have to squeeze into the trunk for the next four years. As Trump might say, “Sad.”
Stephen Costello(scost55@gmail.com) is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C.