Rare opportunity for South Korea in dealing with Pyongyang
By Stephen Costello
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It now seems clear that the White House, having provoked the current crisis with North Korea, is unable to diffuse it for very long. Some hope for a clever and surprising twist to US tactics that would achieve the North’s backing down and the US victorious. Yet not one official in the current US administration has said anything to indicate that planning is underway to return to a deal, trading DPRK weapons capabilities for diplomatic ties, credible security, and access to economic development. That is the only deal that would attract North Korea, since it has pursued these goals for 20 years. The US also sought those goals until 2001.
The Chinese government has recently clarified that it would assist North Korea to repel any US first strike. That promise – previously assumed but not explicitly made – almost certainly takes the strike contemplated by Trump and his military off the table for good. Kim Jung Un may be expected to strike first, but he seems far more rational and level-headed than the US commander-in-chief, and is judged unlikely to do so.
A way out of this impasse is available. The new South Korean government could lead a new initiative.
The necessary steps are not new, nor are they untried. Even the fresh element of South Korean leadership has been successfully deployed before, from 1998 to 2008. Diplomats, generals, Assemblymen and others achieved remarkable results then, and could again. Korean officials worked against strong opposition from many directions. But they achieved two things. First, they steered ROK policy in a way that was dynamic, assumed leadership, and influenced all actors, including the US, North Korea and China. Second, they demonstrated that in the post-Cold War environment, Seoul has the capability to advance its interests in unprecedented ways. Today the Blue House again wants to be the main organizer.
To address the US-DPRK standoff, the US, as the more powerful and secure party, must make the first move. That move is the one many experienced former officials and others have been urging for over a decade: it could postpone or significantly scale back military exercises that are meant to provoke insecurity in Pyongyang. This adjustment to scheduling and location has been made before for diplomatic reasons, and it has been useful. It gives up nothing of value.
When the US – once again – adjusts military exercises in favor of talks, recent statements and proposals from China, Russia, North Korea, and the best American specialists can then be acted upon. The “freeze for freeze” proposal that would halt Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development could be implemented. There would be no more nuclear tests or missile launches while negotiations were under way. Among early agreements, the introduction of IAEA inspectors would confirm this. The North would be expected to put its nuclear programs back on the table.
Two other US actions would be required along with the adjustment in military exercises. The Trump administration would have to halt its global campaign to economically starve and sanction North Korea, leaving only existing UN sanctions in place. Only then could talks commence without additional coercion. And the US administration would have to enter into good-faith and no-preconditions talks, so that the real issues could be finally aired.
All three policy changes should be acceptable to the US, since they come at no cost, each contradicted previous US public pledges, and changing them could achieve longstanding US goals. The DPRK would be making the greatest policy change. Unlike the US, it is realistically threatened – existentially – with military force, while also being economically sanctioned and politically isolated. Freezing its deterrent – before it is perfected – should be seen as significant. Because both governments have reneged on past agreements, there will have to be oversight of each action by other governments, and by the UN.
Only South Korea and the UN are in positions to organize, lead and manage this transition from crisis to opportunity. While difficult, it is achievable.
The current crisis atmosphere provides a very rare chance for Seoul to act on its long-delayed responsibilities and use its latent but significant diplomatic capabilities. The fact that the US is uniquely incapacitated – diplomatically, institutionally, and increasingly politically – is regrettable. However, it allows Seoul to help its ally in ways that are unprecedented and would be strategically and historically priceless.
South Korea could ask Chinese, German, Russian, French and Australian leaders to agree to jointly present Trump with this new roadmap. UN Secretary General Gutierres could also be briefed, and asked to give it his public support. The Japanese Prime Minister also has multiple reasons to give his support. Kim Jung Un should also be directly briefed and asked. All could be convinced as long as Korea has a solid roadmap, and a short but realistic timeline for achievement. This coalition-building should be done before a meeting with Trump.
A joint meeting with the US President at the UN General Assembly next month would be the ideal time and place to urge him to agree.
President Trump would have several pressing reasons to agree. First, he could say he had been quietly supporting the ROK, China and others all along. Second, he could say – correctly – that he was aiming to achieve what Clinton, Bush and Obama could not: a durable end to the DPRK nuclear programs, an end to the Korean War, and a region at peace with US support. The security, strategic, economic and political advantages to the US from the new talks must be described quickly and colorfully, with maps and photos.
The US/ROK Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercises are scheduled to begin on 21 August. In one month, on 12 September, the UN General Assembly will convene in New York, with many heads of government attending. There may not be a better time to get the cooperation of other leaders. A clear effort by Moon, with maps and photos, showing the multiple advantages of getting back to deals with the DPRK, would have a great impact at this time. Such a briefing; short, visually and logically powerful, could be used across many platforms, to governments, the UN, and media.
This cannot be a request. The coalition should go ahead regardless of the US position. But it would be far more effective, and can begin sooner, if the US was in agreement.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.