Senator Durbin, THAAD, and Korea
By Stephen Costello
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“It’s my fear that he thinks ― I hope I’m wrong ― that [Moon] thinks that South Korea has a better chance working with China to contain North Korea than working with the United States,” Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin, D-Ill., told the Washington Examiner. The Examiner is a right-wing conservative paper. They were thrilled to be able to quote a top Democrat criticizing the new progressive South Korean President.
Senator Durbin’s view is misplaced, uninformed and counter-productive. It also reveals a misunderstanding of U.S. interests. It is, however, in line with the evolving views among members of the U.S. Congress, and a reminder of the virtual collapse of a clear Democratic view of U.S. foreign policy. That Democratic view can still be discerned in the March 2 letter by Senators Ed Markey, D-MA, Ranking Member on the East Asia Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Al Franken, D-MIN, who explain to President Donald Trump that sincere, committed diplomacy is the only way to effectively address North Korean issues. But they are a small minority, and their voices are muted in the current atmosphere.
One might argue that such a Democratic view is largely irrelevant, since the Republicans control both houses of Congress, the White House and the Supreme Court at this time. That would be a mistake. The Republican Party long ago ceased being a political party in its core aspects. It is an interest group, a lobby. It works against consumers, against fairness, and in foreign affairs, against diplomacy. So the Democratic Party is the only institution in the U.S. government today that could advance a pro-U.S. realistic and effective view of East Asia.
Combine this picture of the intellectual and strategic qualities of Congress with a very similar evolution among Washington think tanks, and one can begin to appreciate the environment that has grown up in Washington during 16 long years of disastrous policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Today, even when institutes host senior or progressive Koreans, or those who would support President Moon’s intentions to re-energize the engagement/denuclearization/development goals, they are often paired with ideological and non-analytical conservatives. The result is rarely a satisfying review of options.
President Moon walks into this internal U.S. confusion and retreat from foreign engagement when he meets President Trump at the end of this month in Washington.
What should he do?
First it is important to know his U.S. ally. As if in a card game, the Trump group doesn’t “have” anything. Their strategic view of how this plays out is empty. Why would the DPRK “come to its senses” with a virtual U.S. gun to its head? Their understanding of how we have arrived here over the past two decades is shallow-to-nonexistent. The U.S. seems to be committed to the THAAD deployment. But THAAD ― which may be a perfectly fine anti-missile system ― long ago became the symbol of Park Guen-hye’s incompetence and embarrassment and Barack Obama’s incoherence and timidity. It has very little to do with China.
Secondly, he should be clear about what he should NOT do.
He should not endorse the U.S. view that THAAD and increased sanctions ― its global “pressure campaign” in the words of US officials ― are necessary or appropriate. He should not endorse either policy. That is the heart of this summit only because Moon has insisted on coming before he was prepared. From the point of view of the White House, those are the two required “deliverables” from the Blue House. Nothing else matters. From the point of view of the Blue House, neither can be endorsed, or Moon will lose valuable time, trustworthiness and legitimacy that he will not recover. There is no middle ground, no matter how hard the “nice guy” Moon wishes there were.
In this situation, Moon’s only play is to start a new conversation with the US. That conversation could go something like this:
The THAAD missile defense system will remain frozen as it is. The “environmental review” is necessary on the Korean side because of how the system was forced on it. It has become a strategic liability for Korea. If the U.S. continues to make a big deal of this issue, the THAAD system will be packed up and shipped home.
North Korea is under multiple U.N. sanctions. We believe they are sufficient to keep the DPRK isolated, and to remind them of how they could benefit from relief of the sanctions. New sanctions, extreme sanctions, or a global campaign to isolate North Korea work directly against our policies, because they provoke the North to continue missile and nuclear tests. If they are testing, it is almost impossible for us to conduct North-South discussions. We will publically oppose such sanctions and campaigns.
What we must do now is to lay out a plan for the North to come back to agreements they have already made, and accept an initial freeze on nuclear and missile tests. The debates about “accepting” the North as a nuclear state are pointless. We and they will agree at the beginning that our goal is a nuclear-free peninsula.
The new approach by the Korean government ― in coordination with the US if possible ― must be comprehensive. It cannot be narrowly about the nuclear and missile issues. A peace treaty, access to economic development, and real security must be on the table from the beginning. U.S. Senators Markey and Franken made this point in their letter to the White House on 2 March 2017.
The Chinese role can be helpful, and will be valuable. But they do not have, and have never had, the ability or the strategic interest to force or coerce their neighbor ― and only regional ally ― to give in to U.S. demands. The six party format may be used to ratify new deals once they are concluded, but it is not useful at this time. Other arrangements are more appropriate.
The U.S. must understand how broad its potential advantages are from this approach. It will solve a problem that past U.S. presidents could not. It will gain the eager agreement of the South Korean and Chinese governments. Both will commit resources that will greatly support denuclearization and economic development. The Japanese will quickly come along, and their resources are significant, beginning with $10 billion long promised if agreements are made. Major infrastructure projects could start once security issues begin to be addressed. The U.S. would be a valued partner in all of these if it underwrites South Korea’s initiatives. President Trump would be a hero in Northeast Asia.
Needless to say, one main advantage to this is that this approach will cap and roll back North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, an outcome that all parties say they are committed to. Now is the time to prove that commitment. South Korea will take the lead here.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.