Trump goes rogue, candidates fall in line
By Stephen Costello
.jpg?w=728)
Pakistan, India, China and the US have all tested missiles in recent months. Some are more provocative than others, depending on who is making the assessment. For the most part, these are regarded as R&D, even as intentions are also carefully examined. It is far more likely that India and Pakistan will exchange nuclear missiles than it is that North Korea will commit regime suicide by attacking South Korea, Japan or US forces in the Pacific.
The creation of the current “crisis” surrounding North Korea is almost entirely due to US goading of the isolated and paranoid North Koreans through military exercises and displays of attack hardware, while continuing to refuse talks. Even the much-proclaimed nervous need by South Koreans for American demonstrations of “commitment” is largely the creation of forces in the US and Korean capitols that misunderstand and dismiss diplomacy, embrace myths about recent diplomatic history and the efficacy of pressure, and are cynical or worse toward the ability of governments to negotiate acceptable agreements.
This is not the fault of the US military. They are professionals and they do what their commanders tell them to. It is also not a defense of the North Korean system, which is brutal and dictatorial. But the behavior of the Trump administration has gone from reckless to rogue in a very short time. Most importantly, US actions are once again exposing its profound inability to rationally assess its interests and options regarding Korea and the Northeast Asian region.
The US system has many strengths, but on policy toward this region we have now entered the fifth four-year presidential term in a row in which unprepared presidents make major mistakes in addressing threats, lowering tensions, and advancing US, allied and other interests. Statements by the President, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in the past week are painful demonstrations that none of them has the background to be doing these jobs. This is not good.
How should South Korean presidential candidates respond to this? After all, papers in Seoul are today splashed with headlines proclaiming “Is the Next Korean War Coming?,” “Korean Peninsula Tensions Mount,” and so forth. But to paraphrase the late UK Prime Minister Margret Thatcher, now is not the time to “go all wobbly.” In this case, wobbly would mean shallow reactions to the latest version of the infamous “North Wind” that was used so effectively by conservative and anti-democratic forces for decades. We might call the current type “Crisis Wind,” “THAAD Wind,” or “Trump Wind.” Maybe it should just be “North Wind 2.0.” If this one is different from those provoked by Roh Tae Woo or Kim Young Sam, that’s mainly because the US is the main driver.
We might be generous to the candidates and separate their campaign rhetoric from their real preferences and their more serious policy directions once in office five weeks from now. Presumably they know the voting population better than we do. In that case, the rush to link the possibility of new DPRK missile launches or nuclear tests to the THAAD system could be excused. The rush to link the Trump tweets, confusing official statements, and aircraft carrier display to US strategy could be seen as tactical.
We should hope so, because they are not linked. North Korean missile launches and nuclear tests are done in the context of national anniversaries and the US and ROK use of pressure without talks. Contradictory and untrustworthy expressions by President Trump and US officials are not grounded in a coherent strategy. The candidate who becomes president will have to digest these facts soon enough.
More important is the need to hear the prospective next presidents talk about their overall approach to addressing the interrelated US-DPRK-China demands. What should Korea’s role be? Is there a path for Korea to take that can improve each actor’s position, or is it necessary to trade off one relationship for another? Nothing could be clearer than the fact that today Chinese and US leaders are trying to force South Korea to choose. Should they be trying? Should Korea choose?
The next president will have to find a degree of self-confidence that is almost super-human. Few people can summon such bearing, such calm knowledge that they can face the biggest challenges and be strong and wise. For this reason, all successful presidents, including those few who are prepared for the job, need a lot of help. Just as important, they need to KNOW they need help. Research will show that presidents who did big things, who solved problems or changed history, did so by hiring big personalities and experienced professionals, and listening to them. On the other hand, those who prize loyalty over experience, think they know everything, and fear working with big personalities, inevitably don’t accomplish much. In many cases they make matters worse.
Among the requirements in the Blue House next month will also be the ability to correctly read the strengths, weaknesses and interests of allies, partners, and adversaries. This is more important than often acknowledged. President Park Guen-hye seemed to misunderstand the Chinese leadership and its interests. Presidents Bush, Obama and now Trump seem to get US interests on the Korean Peninsula wrong. The current Chinese leadership has mistaken its own strengths on Korea. If he is going to try to advance initiatives that have positive impacts, the Korean president had better have wide and deep communications with advisors inside the government, outside among universities and NGOs, and among contacts everywhere.
The strategic and security landscape looks very daunting for the new administration, according to many pundits and observers. Despite that, he has options that past Korean governments have not used, and he has flexibility that other parties either cannot or will not exercise. To name just a few, he can use the UN in much better ways. He can use the combined middle power capabilities of Japan, Australia and South Korea to greater effect. He can drag the US-Korea alliance out of its tailspin and point its trajectory in a productive direction. And of course he can invite all Koreans to contribute to the new government, regardless of “color” as long as they embrace core principles. Perhaps a good beginning would be to substitute “we” for “I” whenever talking about what the next team will do.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.