Suspend THAAD, pause China relations
By Stephen Costello
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The remarkable and complicated pressure on Korea from China and the U.S. over deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system has now made the choices for the next Korean government easier. It is an irony that just when the Korean public and leadership groups feel they have been unfairly bullied and their choices limited, clarity emerges. Friday’s final impeachment of President Park Geun-hye by the Constitutional Court can only add to that clarity.
The kind of decisions forced upon the next president and his team may have been inevitable, largely because of bad assumptions, bad strategies, and ultimately bad policy by Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barak Obama. Of course there is blame to go around, including on the parts of China and North Korea. But the present situation should be studied for decades as a textbook example of what happens when leaders don’t act strategically, abandon leadership and let shallow domestic politics drive policy.
US and Chinese bumbling
The clumsiness of Chinese diplomacy is sometimes striking. At a time when they are once again urging the US to play its appropriate role by returning to discussions with the DPRK, they are making enemies in South Korea. Those who were wary of ROK economic dependence on China now have much greater reason for distrust. Those who would work with China to address North Korean weapons and regional security have less reason to do so. China’s understandable effort to get the US and DPRK talking is fundamentally undercut by its tone-deaf, extreme boycott of South Korea at the most sensitive and vulnerable time there.
In the US the Trump administration continues to “review” policy toward North Korea inside the White House/NSC. As of today there is only confirmation that all options are being considered. Reporters have missed the main story here, which is that diplomacy – for now – is back on the table until the administration decides against it. As expected, the old myths are infecting the new team. Various officials have embraced the thoroughly discredited idea that China can and will act against its perceived interests with North Korea. UN Ambassador Haley has called Kim Jung Un “irrational” and said the US could not take him seriously until it sees “positive action.” Trump officials apparently see no contradiction between this and their active decision two weeks ago to stop DPRK officials from coming to the US for talks with former officials. Like the Obama group eight years ago, their first impulse is to fear talking.
Korean actions tough but necessary
If we are serious about testing the wisdom and leadership skills of potential presidential candidates, Assembly members, journalists and policy specialists, the current situation couldn’t be better. We are about to find out just how knowledgeable and courageous each of them is. Because what they should do now, in order to simply preserve South Korea’s independence, security and self-respect, and to give the next president a fair amount of breathing space and flexibility, is difficult.
The THAAD system will now have to be paused or suspended, pending a full review by the National Assembly. Whatever its military utility, it long ago became primarily a symbolic and divisive gesture, and a vivid reminder of policies that utterly failed to protect the public. Only after that review could the new administration decide on the way forward. We should not bet on Koreans keeping THAAD around.
At the same time, relations with China should be paused as well. It may not be necessary to recall the Ambassador, but an informal pause is now appropriate. As others have noted, Korean leaders should prepare for an extended Chinese trade war, and it should be part of their overall economic restructuring plans. Legal action with the WTO and other forums, as Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se pointed out, should be prepared. Relations should only resume after the Chinese side has clearly resumed all economic activity. Lotte departments stores should be full of shoppers, sports teams should be rescheduled to travel, and all evidence of state-directed boycotts should end.
Simply put, in both cases Korea cannot afford, and should not accept, such behavior from its neighbor and its ally.
Next Korean president needs flexibility
While it may be difficult to do, these initiatives should not be seen as somehow the main events or central policy choices of the new administration. In fact, they are the necessary steps to take in order to preserve the opportunity for that administration to act at all. If they are not taken, and if the new team attempts halfway measures or tries to partially please everyone, their power and credibility will evaporate. Alternatively, if these suspensions or pauses are instituted, and followed up carefully, the administration can get back to work on its program. It is the program, after all, that is the reason for serious political figures to go for the Big Job in the first place.
Roh Moo Hyun could testify to this dynamic. He had his weaknesses, as all presidents do, but because he came to office in 2003 after the withdrawal of US support for South Korea’s main historical, economic and democratic projects, he was hopelessly limited in what he could do. He had little chance to expand and build on the North-South achievements of his predecessor, little chance to improve on the Korea-US relationship, and no chance to continue to position the ROK as a leading driver of regional security and prosperity. Within those constraints, President Roh did a good job as a foreign policy president.
It is now ten years later, and Korea has endured the presidencies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. For a list of complex reasons, the country stands at a crossroads. If two big bulls are fighting in a small shop selling delicate china, is it really very hard to figure out what role the Korean Peninsula is expected to play? Yes, the role of the china shop. If the next Korean president does not take this opportunity to quickly shut down attempts to limit his goals through THAAD and the Chinese boycott, he will spend his entire term sweeping up broken china.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.