Age of modesty
(0)(0)(1).jpg?w=728)
By Stephen Costello
The apex was reached during the George W. Bush years. It was in the wake of 9/11, which should make us stop and think a bit. That was when American hubris was most fully embraced by the president, his team, and much of the confused media. We now know that the recklessness, the shallow ideas, and the made-up ideals that drove US policy were a disaster not for decades, since it has already gone beyond that, but for generations. US credibility as a thoughtful power may never recover. That’s not such a bad thing. Even today allies such as South Korea tend to overestimate the wisdom and capabilities of the particular president and his advisors. Some are very good; others less so. With Donald Trump assuming the office later this month, this may be a good time for them to be more realistic about what their ally can and can’t do, will and won’t do.
From the US perspective it’s been appropriate for some time for American leaders, officials and pundits to dial back the urge to tell others what their real interests are, what their best deal is, what’s good for them. Of course, paying attention to what is appropriate has not been, shall we say, at the top of our to-do list during this same, frustrating decade-and-a-half since the Bush experiments. Unfortunately, as it has related to US policy toward Northeast Asia, the last eight years have seen both lowered ambitions and in many cases a lack of modesty in US approaches. It’s been a complicated mix, with military tough-talk and posturing and diplomatic hectoring and weaseling. All the while the diplomats and specialists who could do the real heavy lifting were chained to their desks, to their scripts, or were just not consulted.
The region
Now that Donald Trump will steer US interests as Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe anchor the Chinese and Japanese positions, each with their own extensive domestic opposition, the region heads into an unexpected era. Trump lost the popular vote by 2.8 million, yet is preparing a cabinet on the right fringe of the US political/social spectrum. Xi is trying to both reform and contain a system in perpetual crisis. And Abe is attempting to remilitarize Japan while at the same time supporting some of its most dangerous and toxic myths. Partly because of those deep divisions at home, which affect national identity, purpose and capability, we really should be entering an Age of Modesty.
At least we should be more modest about what governments can do outside their borders. And perhaps they could be less strident about what they want to do. During this age, perhaps foreign affairs should become more a matter of development and the long game, and not so much of a plaything for domestic politics. Such impulses are always in tension, but the balance today is surely off. If foreign relations were to become more interest-based, then real strategic cohesion might increase.
South Korea
In the region South Korea alone is outside this trend of overreach followed by a need for modesty. For Seoul it has been quite the opposite. Finally achieving multi-power democracy in 1997, leaders began to drag the country from its crony-capitalist, authoritarian and Cold War limitations into the modern era. They quickly addressed both domestic economic structural changes by using the Asian Financial Crisis, and the festering North-South dilemma by matching Washington’s engagement position. Carefully and patiently they were making progress until the 2000 US election.
Today, South Koreans are not asking,“How do we do what Park Geun-hye was doing, just more effectively and less corruptly?” Rather, they are more likely to realize, “Clearly others cannot solve the Korean Peninsula problems. Maybe it’s time for us ― once again ― to doit ourselves.” Recent history shows that a combination of modesty and practical ambition are the keys to successful policy.If the public sees the incoming government this way, it quickly faces a few questions.
First, what is the connection between the North Korea issues and South Korean democracy? The connection is intimate. Kim Dae Jung repeated it for 25 years before his presidency, and many progressives understand it. Presidents Park and LeeMyung Bak both resisted democratic progress by using the North Korea issue to divide society and escape responsibility for South-North rapprochement. Either Koreans embrace democracy and deal with the North, or they will be unsuccessful at both.
Second, how does Korea leverage its strengths to impact and shape regional trends, rather than being shaped by them? One obvious answer is to acknowledge overlapping interests with North Korea. Relations with Japan and China can become more realistic and more stable when the Koreas begin to coordinate. The same is true for overlapping interests with Japan, and their impact on local power dynamics. Smarter military and economic structuring will add to Korean power. The THAAD decision is a test. Beijing and Washington are both bullying Seoul, showing that the issue is a proxy for non-Korean issues. Knowing what the US offers as a diplomatic, rather than military, partner is another major card for Seoul to play, if a Korean leader is wise enough to use it.
Third, how can the Korean administration lead its US ally to support a regional strategy?Only two months ago the region faced the likelihood of increased tension and possibly conflict if Hillary Clinton had won the US election. It would be hard for Trump do worse, although he may try. But enough things have changed that Korea has new flexibility. This is one reason why an early Korean presidential election could be good for deciding the direction of South Korean policy and influencing the US.
For these and other reasons, new presidents in the Blue House and White House may want to ignore the hysterics and predictions of impending crisis generated by those attached to or constrained by the status quo, and remember some real options for progress that could open up in 2017. Rather than overreach, fantasy diplomacy or loose talk, modesty and realism could turn out to be better guides
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.