5 myths confront 2 new presidents
By Stephen Costello
Several historians and political observers here have claimed that the US presidential election on Nov. 8 is the most important in a generation. They may have a point in that the election of Donald Trump would be a multi-level disaster for the US and many other countries. However, two points should be noted that will determine the election’s importance in northeast Asia.
One is that Donald Trump would probably re-establish a list of Republican Party policies and beliefs that have been gaining support for about 40 years. Any other Republican would do much the same. It might seem like a long time ago to younger voters, but the region experienced the results of these approaches just recently. That experience was the Bush years, from 2001 to 2009. Among the disasters that resulted from that election was the willful destruction of this region’s hard-won but working multilateral agreements on pacification of the North Korean nuclear programs.
The US election of 2000 also prevented expansion of North-South Korean cooperation, since the North logically prioritized normalization of relations with the US over the ROK, and the US had changed its interests. President Obama, surprising many observers, embraced the Bush policies toward Korea in 2009, leading to a worst-of-both-worlds bipartisanship. So Korea and the neighborhood know how these devastating sixteen years have affected them. A Trump presidency couldn’t make US policy much worse than what we have now. The talk of Korea paying more for US protection is mere hot air.
The second is that Hillary Clinton may behave as an Obama-but-more-aggressive president. There are many indications of this. But the fact is that we don’t know. Ms. Clinton has not had the freedom to chart her own course on matters as big and strategically important as the US approach to China, Japan and the two Koreas. As Senator she primarily served her state of New York. As Secretary of State she primarily served her somewhat inexperienced and naïve president, who has not delegated authority very well. Unless she is more knowledgeable and bold than Obama, and has translated her wide experience into valuable lessons learned, a Clinton presidency will probably continue on the same unhelpful path.
So for Americans the election is a big deal: do we go back to the Bush years, but this time with even less responsibility and ability to solve problems, if that is possible? Or do we hope that Hillary’s experience will make her able to organize, delegate, and seize opportunities rather than make things worse in the region? The choice is clear, but the outcome is not.For Koreans, the US election may not lead to much change. The Korean election in 15 months, however, could lead to progress on the Peninsula and in the region.
As soon has he or she begins to plan the next four years, the next US president will confront a wall of confusion, deeply rooted ideology, partisanship and misinformation when the subject of Korea comes up. And it will come up very quickly, as we have seen in past months. This confusion will not stop at the White House fence. Senior officials have for a decade and a half carried all of its resulting contradictions and impediments to progress into government. If that president is to change the doomed trajectory of US policy toward Korea, several myths will have to be confronted. These five seem most important.
Myth 1: China has the most leverage to change or force DPRK leaders to negotiate away their nuclear weapons. Following the fifth test of a nuclear device by North Korea on 6 September, journalists and experts everywhere declared this. Actually, the US has had the most leverage to change the North’s course for 20 years. This is not difficult to discover, and it is logical for North Korea’s leaders. The fact that the past two US presidents have refused to use this leverage is a function of their limits, not the tools available to them.
Myth 2: Demanding human rights improvements in North Korea removes the requirement that advocates should have realistic goals, or that they should understand the history of diplomacy. The policy that had the most positive impact on the human rights of North Koreans was the North-South engagement policy of 1998-2008, followed by the US Agreed Framework of 1994. Far more might have changed for more North Koreans had those agreements remained in force. The idea that human rights can be improved while diplomacy and negotiations are frozen is a fantasy. The UN has failed to play its role here. Perhaps the next UN Secretary-General will be more ambitious and independent. Koreans should hope so.
Myth 3: The US, under its new president next January, will have to decide which way to approach the worsening relationship with North Korea, and that will determine the fate of the region for years. As noted, the next US president has some choices to make regarding Korea policy. But South Korea can have a great deal to say about how the North is approached. The election there in December 2017 will be just as important and consequential for Korea as November’s election is for the US. More than the US, Korea’s election will impact both Koreas and the immediate region.
Myth 4: North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, so there is little reason to negotiate with them. This has become a crude test of seriousness and analytical ability when seeking information or fresh thinking about the nuclear issue. The many writers who confidently claim they know the position of the DPRK can’t possibly do so. There are regular indications, from North Koreas, scholars and experienced specialists, that the North’s strategic and security needs can only be really identified through serious, credible talks. There are solid reasons why the nuclear program, missile production, human rights and other issues will be on the table when negotiations resume.
Myth 5: South Korea is not strong enough to defend itself against the DPRK, or against China, and therefore must accept whatever direction comes from the US. To add to #3, above, there is near hysteria in several places, including Seoul and Washington, that the only reaction to North Korea’s continued drive to perfect a deliverable nuclear weapon is to escalate the crisis and acquire more advanced weaponry. Domestic military structures and systems can be upgraded, but military chest-beating will not address, much less solve, basic needs. The country is strong enough now to resume creating its own middle power diplomatic identity.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.