US still paralyzed on Korean Peninsula
.jpg?w=728)
By Stephen Costello
Koreans pay special attention to views in the US about them. They also pay attention to American policy directed at the Korean Peninsula. In this election year in the US, the prospect that a Republican administration could return to office and continue the approaches and mindsets from the Bush years has real consequences. But the prospect that a new Democratic administration could also fail to remember past successes and make the security situation even worse is even more likely.
It is particularly important to appreciate that for many Koreans, the engagement with Korea in broader regional responsibilities and advancements under the Clinton administration ― and the underlying strategic rationale for it from 1992 to 2000 ― were rejected by the Obama group in 2009. Even though the Korea projects had been dwarfed during the Bush years by the triple impacts of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld missile defense focus, the “Axis of Evil” or return to a Cold War analysis of Northeast Asia, and the post-9/11 further militarization of US foreign policy, there were some arguments during the transition over whether the new administration should explore diplomacy to recapture some of the strategic benefits from the Clinton era.
From all we’ve heard in the past seven years, that argument was settled by Obama before the new team took over the White House. They would embrace the Bush trio’s views and double down on a coercion/capitulation strategy toward North Korea. Toward the South, this meant its value as the aggrieved victim of DPRK threats was most important, and its roles as democratizing, leading the engagement with North Korea, and taking on broader roles in the region were discounted. This may have been both disappointing and clear to the North Koreans, who set off a nuclear test on 25 May 2009. So in a practical sense, the current set of (mistaken) assumptions and (counterproductive) policies have been in place for 15 years.
The possibility of a continuation of Bush, and now Bush/Obama policies, under Republicans is important to note, because it goes far beyond the current statements from Donald Trump. Any current Republican leader would embrace these policies and worldviews because of the intellectual climate in the party today. It is only slightly less clear how much Hillary Clinton would seriously review or deviate from the disastrous choices of the past decade and a half. After all, she had to defend them herself as Secretary of State. Recent books, speeches and papers by possible members of her foreign policy team ― should she win ― give some clues to their thinking, and they are not encouraging.
"The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia,” by Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for Asia; a speech at CSIS by Wendy Sherman, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and now an article “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?” by Robert Einhorn, former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, are partly resumes for jobs in a possible Clinton government. But they all stress the containment of North Korea and assume either a conservative South Korean administration or one that accepts the Bush/Obama approaches. None provides either suggestions for a different approach by the US or South Korea or the broader strategic reasons why one might be preferable.
And that is important. These are former officials in democratic US administrations, none are ideologues, and all should be aware of alternatives to the current direction. Yet they all neglect to consider either serious South Korean initiatives or a change in US assessments or interests. What this means is that the leadership within the US system for any creative change is harder to see and less likely to emerge. Paralysis of policy and imagination has set in.
It seems the view of South Korea from Washington has changed markedly in the last decade. The ROK is no longer seen as a full partner or regional actor but instead as subordinate to a vague China-balancing policy. The fact that discussions in South Korea about getting nuclear weapons, the debates over deployment of THAAD anti-missile batteries, and the rollback of democratic habits and institutions are all part of a package is not considered relevant, or even known. The effort to arrange for President Park and Japanese Prime Minister Abe to be in the same photo is a big deal.
With South Korea’s dwindling profile ― and importance to Washington ― there will be extra sensitivity to how the new US administration talks about and treats the two Koreas. Would it be better or worse if the new US leadership makes North Korea a “higher priority” as many here advise? Will the approach to the region be defined and limited by the “pivot” the TPP, and the military response to China?
It probably will. After the US election, discussions in Korea will be about its own Presidential contest, a year down the road. Most important will be how to organize the economy in the face of pressures from China, Japan and a stalling Europe. National security and military approaches will have to be debated, and some hard choices made. THAAD, OpCon, force structure and basic strategic approaches must be reviewed and decided. A new look at how to use diplomacy should be taken.
With the right choices, Seoul would recapture some of its ambitions, and be noticed in Washington again, with expanding roles to play. With the wrong choices, the current tense balance of threats will get worse, and Korea’s options will evaporate.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.