Bernard Rowan is an associate provost for contract administration and professor of political science at Chicago State University.
No North Korean Spring
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By Bernard Rowan
Following North Korea’s recent “nuclear missile test,” status quo powers have decided to take notice and to provide a result. This week, the United States, South Korea, and China (perhaps, most hope) have signaled an agreement on sanctions against Pyongyang. These sanctions won’t harm the North too much, let alone prompt changed behavior. South Korea can’t allow provocative actions to go without a response. However, the context of forces and relations in the region will need continuing patience and vigilance, for there is no quick fix.
The basic story of politics in the North is the endless melodrama of stabilizing Kim’s power base. It’d appear Kim Jong-un is prone to scapegoating, to using outliers (even loyal supporters) as displays of his power. Nonetheless, he never achieves enough consensus. His use of “sticks” and other forms of display occur to impress the masses ever further.
Kim does have a fondness for public displays of military and political grandeur. His police and security apparatus provide a backup against expressions of dissent. He’s the unquestioned leader of his nation in all ways, and he uses redundant and excessive means to redisplay this status.
However, outside North Korea, regime maintenance buys Kim little else. I don’t think the world can soothe his problem for him, since it’s a self-fulfilling negative feedback loop of monstrous proportions.
I’m also not sure Kim cares. The North doesn’t seek wider integration with the world. Japan, the United States, and to a lesser extent Russia and China don’t fear these actions. Russia and China pretend to care. Their ambitions and pretensions compete with the interests of Japan and the United States.
That’s why I think we’re in for a long road ahead. I’ve written about this many times.
These days, I’m impressed with the role of China, but not because I think they care about Korean unity. On the contrary, I’m impressed with how they’re using the norms, practices and inherent tensions of the status quo to buffer their buildup in the region. The Chinese have a long-term objective of building access to and greater control and defense of the world’s waterways. They’re showing that in the South China Sea. This posture complements the strategy. The Chinese are experts in the line of Alfred Thayer Mahan. That’s why they both try to support the North and placate the South and her allies.
The Chinese don’t want too many North Koreans flocking to their country, let alone a deluge. So they don’t want the North to collapse. But count on them to adjust the tone of any sanctions, to continue aiming for trade, and to buttress their security profile in the region based on a continued North Korean existence and presence.
The Chinese can’t yet pretend to be South Korean allies. A ranking Chinese diplomat just committed a blunder and said THAAD might end everything! China should work to develop closer ties with South Korea, other things being equal.
I think the lesson of Chinese provenance toward “allies” is to view them as auxiliary regions to the Chinese empire or now the Chinese nation-state. We must be wary of reading forward old historical notions to overstate the degree to which peoples from Tibet, the Koreas, Vietnam and other places are “of China.” Let’s not miss the point. The nations on China’s perimeter also form security buffer zones against enemy attack and influence, as well as trade partners. Just as the United States views Canada and Mexico, so the Chinese can envisage so many nations in the region by extension.
I’m going to briefly repeat a related suggestion. Assume a security scenario that looks this way: a stagnant but dogged Pyongyang, a rising China as semi-partner, an unreliable Russia, and a continuing but weaker American presence. This compels attention to Japan. Stronger Korean-Japanese ties deter North Korean, Chinese, and Russian mishaps. Perhaps it’s asking a lot, but do try and make greater peace with a former enemy. You’ve already created some headway.
Sanctions won’t buy much. The North can find new avenues to gain cash. There are so many ways to do this for determined anti-status quo powers these days. The insecurity overtures will continue. There’s no pro-democracy movement in the North. There’s no Pyongyang Spring to bloom.
Bernard Rowan is associate provost for contract administration and professor of political science at Chicago State University, where he has served for 22 years. He is a past fellow of the Korea Foundation and former visiting professor at Hanyang University. Reach him at browan10@yahoo.com.